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ABSTRACT
Climate change is one of the greatest challenges confronting
society today. Solar climate engineering (SCE) has the potential
to reduce climate risks substantially. This controversial
technology would make the earth more reflective in order to
counteract global warming. The science of SCE is still in its
infancy, and SCE research and development should proceed in
a coordinated, responsible, and expeditious fashion. However,
the roles of patents, research data, and trade secrets in SCE
research remain unclear and contested. To this end, this article
identifies concerns that may arise from the acquisition of
intellectual property rights in SCE and proposes the formation
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of an SCE “research commons” and “pledging” to facilitate
responsible SCE research and development. This research
commons would permit public and private sector research
institutions around the globe to share their research data. They
would also pledge to avoid trade secret protections and that any
patents they obtain would be managed so as to reduce
unnecessary barriers to research and development of safe and
effective SCE technologies.
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INTRODUCTION
Climate change is arguably the greatest environmental
challenge confronting global society. Yet nearly thirty years
after significant concerns first arose, progress toward
preventing it remains insufficient. Atmospheric concentrations
of greenhouse gases (GHGs), the cause of climate change,
continue to increase annually.1 The concentration of carbon
dioxide, the most important GHG, is presently roughly forty
percent greater than its preindustrial value.2 Even if one
assumes that the nonbinding first round of pledges that
1. See U.N. ENV’T PROGRAMME, EMISSIONS GAP REPORT 2015 3 (2016),
http://uneplive.unep.org/media/docs/theme/13/Emissions_Gap_Report_2016
.pdf; see also Earth Sys. Research Lab., Trends in Atmospheric Carbon
Dioxide, NOAA.GOV, http://www.esrl.noaa.gov/gmd/ccgg/trends/ (last updated
Dec. 5, 2016) (showing mean monthly CO2 at Mauna Loa between 2012 and
2017).
2. Lisa V. Alexander et al., Summary for Policymakers, in CLIMATE
CHANGE 2013: THE PHYSICAL SCIENCE BASIS: WORKING GROUP I
CONTRIBUTION TO THE FIFTH ASSESSMENT REPORT OF THE
INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE 3, 11 (Thomas F. Stocker
et al. eds., 2013) [collection hereinafter CLIMATE CHANGE 2013: THE PHYSICAL
SCIENCE BASIS] (“Carbon dioxide concentrations have increased by 40% since
pre-industrial times . . . .”).
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countries adopted pursuant to the 2015 Paris climate change
agreement are fully implemented, models indicate that global
warming would go well beyond the limit that the Paris
Agreement codified.3 Furthermore, even once emissions do
peak and decline, elevated temperatures and atmospheric
concentration of carbon dioxide will persist due to the gas’s
slow natural rate of removal and the ocean’s thermal capacity.4
Scientists and economists expect that climate change will
have severe negative effects on humans and on ecosystems.5
Temperatures will increase.6 Precipitation will change as well,
mostly increasing.7 Extreme weather events will be more
frequent and more intense.8 These changes will, among other
things, impact agriculture and raise the risk of food insecurity.9
Sea levels will rise, threatening low-lying coastal areas.10
Ecosystems will change, and threatened species will go
extinct.11
In response, some scientists and others are considering
increasingly drastic action to reduce climate change risks. For
example, in the mid-2000s, measures for adapting societies and
ecosystems to a changed climate became the second primary
category of responses to be internationally endorsed and
coordinated.12 In more recent years, techniques to remove
3. INT’L ENERGY AGENCY, ENERGY AND CLIMATE CHANGE: WORLD
ENERGY OUTLOOK SPECIAL BRIEFING FOR COP21, 4 (2015), https://www.iea
.org/media/news/WEO2015_COP21Briefing.pdf (forecasting 2.7 degrees
Celsius warming by 2100, which is above the 2 degree stated goal); see also
Conference of the Parties, Adoption of the Paris Agreement, art. 2.1(a), U.N.
Doc. FCCC/CP/2015/L.9/Rev.1, Annex (Nov. 30, 2015) [hereinafter Paris
Agreement] (agreeing to hold warming below 2 degrees Celsius and to pursue
efforts to keep it below 1.5 degrees).
4. See Matthew Collins et al., Long-Term Climate Change: Projections,
Commitments and Irreversibility, in CLIMATE CHANGE 2013: THE PHYSICAL
SCIENCE BASIS, supra note 2, at 1029, 1107 (“Eliminating CO2 emissions only
would lead to near constant temperature for many centuries.”).
5. See Field et al., Summary for Policymakers, in INTERGOVERNMENTAL
PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, FIFTH ASSESSMENT REPORT 1, 11–24
(Christopher B. Field et al. eds., 2014).
6. Field et al., supra note 5, at 14.
7. Id. at 12, 18, 21, 23–24.
8. Id. at 12–13.
9. Id. at 17–18.
10. Id. at 12–13.
11. Id. at 14–15.
12. See E. Lisa F. Schipper, Conceptual History of Adaptation in the
UNFCCC Process, 15 REV. EUR. CMTY. & INT’L ENVTL. L. 82, 89 (2006); see
also Conference of the Parties, Report of the Conference of the Parties on its
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carbon dioxide from the atmosphere as a means of mitigating
climate risks are increasingly considered to be a necessary
component of scenarios in which dangerous climate change
would be avoided.13 These negative emissions technologies,
such as directly capturing carbon dioxide from the air or
accelerating natural weathering, are at various stages of
research and development (R&D).14
An alternative—and controversial—approach to counterac-
ting the warming effect of GHGs is to make the planet slightly
more reflective or otherwise to block incoming sunlight.15 These
“solar climate engineering” methods (SCE, elsewhere often
“solar radiation management” (SRM), “solar geoengineering,”
“climate geoengineering,” or “albedo modification”) presently
appear to have the potential to reduce climate change
significantly, yet pose physical and social risks of their own.16
Moreover, SCE would fail to address other adverse effects of
GHG proliferation, such as ocean acidification.17
Sixteenth Session, Held in Cancun from 29 November to 10 December 2010.
Addendum. Part II: Action taken by the Conference of the Parties at its
Sixteenth Session, § II, U.N. Doc. FCCC/CP/2010/7/Add.1 (reporting that the
U.N. party countries agreed to enhance adaptation, placing it on the same
priority level as GHG emissions abatement).
13. See Detlef P. van Vuuren et al., The Representative Concentration
Pathways: An Overview, 109 CLIMATIC CHANGE 5, 17–18, 21, 25 (2011)
(modeling long term climate change and discussing carbon capture and
storage as one of the technologies to be utilized in slowing climate change);
Paris Agreement, supra note 3, art. 4.1 (agreeing to aim to limit climate
change by establishing a “balance between anthropogenic emissions by
sources and removals by sinks of greenhouse gases”).
14. See NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL OF THE NAT’L ACADS. ET AL., CLIMATE
INTERVENTION: CARBON DIOXIDE REMOVAL AND RELIABLE SEQUESTRATION ch.
3 (2015) [hereinafter CLIMATE INTERVENTION: CARBONDIOXIDE REMOVAL].
15. See generally NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL OF THE NAT’L ACADS. ET AL.,
CLIMATE INTERVENTION: REFLECTING SUNLIGHT TO COOL EARTH, 2, Box S.1
(2015) [hereinafter CLIMATE INTERVENTION: REFLECTING SUNLIGHT]
(describing Albedo Modification: “intentional efforts to increase the amount of
sunlight that is scattered or reflected back to space . . . ”); OLIVER MORTON,
THE PLANET REMADE: HOW GEOENGINEERING COULD CHANGE THE WORLD 54
(2015) (describing a “veil” around the earth as “[t]he most widely argued-over
form of climate geoengineering . . . ”).
16. Olivier Boucher et al., Clouds and Aerosols, in CLIMATE CHANGE 2013:
THE PHYSICAL SCIENCE BASIS, supra note 2, at 571, 575 (concluding that
“[m]odels consistently suggest that SRM would generally reduce climate
differences compared to a world with elevated greenhouse gas concentrations
and no SRM . . . ”). Note that SCE and negative emissions technologies are
sometimes bundled together as “climate engineering” or “geoengineering.”
17. See CLIMATE INTERVENTION: REFLECTING SUNLIGHT, supra note 15, at
6.
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One key reason that SCE-based proposals are highly
contested is their uncertain physical and social risk profiles.18
These risks may be transboundary, and even global.19 Despite
these risks, SCE is receiving increasing attention by scientists,
policy makers, scholars, and others.20 At the request of the
United States Congress in 2012, the U.S. National Academy of
Sciences in 2015 issued two reports on the current state of
knowledge and the need for more research into both carbon
dioxide removal and SCE.21 Further, the 2015 Paris Agreement
of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate
Change (UNFCCC) contemplates carbon dioxide removal, and
its goal of maintaining temperatures well below a two degree
Celsius increase over pre-industrial levels may be achievable
only through the use of SCE.22
Because some proposed SCE methods appear to have the
potential to reduce climate change risks greatly, while at the
same time creating countervailing risks, some form of SCE
governance will be needed.23 Indeed, the seminal report on
18. See John A. Dykema et al., Stratospheric Controlled Perturbation
Experiment: A Small-scale Experiment to Improve Understanding of the Risks
of Solar Geoengineering, 372 PHIL. TRANSACTIONS ROYAL SOC’Y A (Theme
Issue No. 2031) 1, 1 (2014) (“In addition to the risks associated with current
knowledge [of solar radiation management], the possibility of ‘unknown
unknowns’ exists that could significantly alter the risk assessment relative to
our current understanding.”).
19. See Andy Jones et al., The Impact of Abrupt Suspension of Solar
Radiation Management (Termination Effect) in Experiment G2 of the
Geoengineering Model Intercomparison Project (GeoMIP), 118 J. GEOPHYSICAL
RES.: ATMOSPHERES 9743, 9743 (2013).
20. P. Oldham et al., Mapping the Landscape of Climate Engineering, 372
PHIL. TRANSACTIONS ROYAL SOC’Y A (Theme Issue No. 2031) 1, 5–6 (2014)
(showing a rapid increase in the number of scientific publications on SCE
since 2007).
21. CLIMATE INTERVENTION: CARBON DIOXIDE REMOVAL, supra note 14;
CLIMATE INTERVENTION: REFLECTING SUNLIGHT, supra note 15.
22. Paris Agreement, supra note 3, art. 4.1 (agreeing to aim to limit
climate change by establishing a “balance between anthropogenic emissions by
sources and removals by sinks of greenhouse gases”). See, e.g., JOSHUA B.
HORTON ET AL., HARVARD PROJECT ON CLIMATE AGREEMENTS, IMPLICATIONS
OF THE PARIS AGREEMENT FOR CARBON DIOXIDE REMOVAL AND SOLAR
GEOENGINEERING 3–6 (2016), http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/160700
_horton-keith-honegger_vp2.pdf; Olivier Boucher, et al., In the Wake of Paris
Agreement, Scientists Must Embrace New Directions for Climate Change
Research, 113 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. U.S. 7287, 7288 (July 5, 2016).
23. See, e.g., JOHN SHEPHERD ET AL., GEOENGINEERING THE CLIMATE:
SCIENCE, GOVERNANCE ANDUNCERTAINTY 41 (2009); CLIMATE INTERVENTION:
REFLECTING SUNLIGHT, supra note 15, at 149–76 (calling for governance of
SCE). See generally Daniel Bodansky, The Who, What, and Wherefore of
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climate engineering from the United Kingdom Royal Society
concluded that “[t]he greatest challenges to the successful
deployment of geoengineering may be the social, ethical, legal
and political issues associated with governance, rather than
scientific and technical issues.”24 However, developing
governance structures will be a lengthy and difficult process,
given international divisions over climate change, the absence
of existing regulation, the low state of knowledge and
concomitant high uncertainty, the lack of consensus among
policy makers, the slowness of, and generally low appetite for,
new global environmental agreements, and the threat of
appropriation by rogue actors with subsequent destabilizing
effects.25 Although some normative principles have been
developed by non-state actors (such as regulation of climate
engineering as a public good; public participation; disclosure
and open publication of research results; and independent
assessment of impacts),26 these are of uncertain effectiveness,
in part because of their voluntary nature and because of their
generality.27 National governments or international bodies will
need to help further these norms and other regulatory
objectives.
Independent of future international law, national law, or
non-state governance mechanisms, the policies regarding
patents, trade secrets, and research data will play important
roles in the governance of these technologies. In fact,
intellectual property (IP)28 policies often act as de facto
Geoengineering Governance, 121 CLIMATIC CHANGE 539, 542–43 (2013)
(discussing general rules of international climate governance). On
environmental governance generally, see Brian C. Chafin, et al.,
Transformative Environmental Governance, 41 ANN. REV. ENVTL. RESOURCES
399 (2016).
24. SHEPHERD ET AL., supra note 23, at xi.
25. See Joshua B. Horton & Jesse L. Reynolds, The International Politics
of Climate Engineering: A Review and Prospectus for International Relations,
18 INT’L STUD. REV. 438, 443–45 (2016) (reviewing the arguments for and
against the potential hostile and rogue use of SCE).
26. Steve Rayner et al., The Oxford Principles, 121 CLIMATIC CHANGE
499, 502–03 (2013).
27. See, e.g., id. at 503, 508 (proposing a number of broad
“[p]rinciples . . . as a draft framework to guide the collaborative development
of geoengineering governance” so as to create a “culture of responsibility,” and
recognizing the potential inadequacy of voluntary regulation).
28. In this article, “intellectual property”/“IP” refers principally to
patents, trade secrets, and research data. Other forms of IP, such as
copyrights and trademarks, are less relevant to the issues discussed in this
article.
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governance mechanisms for emerging technologies in the
absence of technology-specific law.29 They do so through private
and public decisions regarding control, development, and
licensing of the technologies, and through normal state actions
in regulating research, development, and implementation
activities.
Relying on general market and regulatory processes to
address SCE research, development, and possible
implementation poses particular concerns due to the public
good aspects of the technology and the potential for
transboundary harm that the technology may create.30 Indeed,
some scholars have called for limitations on SCE patents. For
example, an influential set of guiding principles for climate
engineering argued that there should be a presumption against
exclusive private control of SCE technologies and a need for
specialized regulation of any IP:
Without precluding a role for the private sector, or the granting of
patents, it is the case that the distribution of intellectual property
rights can result in, or exacerbate existing, injustices. There should
therefore be a presumption against exclusive control of
geoengineering technology by private individuals or corporations.
This does not mean that there can be no intellectual property in
geoengineering, but that there might be a need for restrictions to
ensure fair access to the benefits of geoengineering research.31
Thus, SCE may present challenges to traditional means of
managing patented technologies and other IP. For example, the
holders of essential SCE patents might demand high royalties
for licenses for technologies that may be able to greatly reduce
climate change risks, triggering controversial governmental
responses to reduce prices.32 Further, some policy makers or
other influential voices could assert that patents on means of
intentionally altering the planet’s climate are contrary to
public morality and should not be permitted. Policies will need
29. See Oldham et al., supra note 20, at 1 (noting that “[I]n the absence of
a governance framework for climate engineering technologies . . . the practices
of scientific research and intellectual property acquisition can de facto shape
the development of the field.”).
30. See, e.g., Rayner et al., supra note 26, at 505.
31. Id.
32. Cf. Natalie J. Tanner, Understanding the Disparity in Availability of
Prescription Drugs in the United States: Compromise May Be the Answer, 2
IND. HEALTH L. REV. 267, 273 (2005) (“[G]overnments of industrialized
nations, excluding the United States, impose price controls in order to keep
the prices of pharmaceuticals low . . . . [T]he United States remains one of the
only industrialized nations whose government has not imposed restrictions on
pharmaceutical pricing.”) (internal quotations omitted).
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to address issues common to emerging technologies, such as the
risk that broad, early patents will hinder subsequent
innovation.33 On the other hand, the legal and non-legal
governance of SCE IP may offer opportunities not only to
address these and other challenges, but also to encourage the
R&D of SCE in a manner that is safe, responsible, and
congruent with the public interest.34 These opportunities
currently exist as a result of the early stage of SCE research,
and the relative absence to date of extensive private sector
engagement.35
This article examines how the research, development, and
possible implementation of SCE would challenge existing IP
policies, and explores opportunities for innovative approaches
to SCE IP governance in order to help ensure that SCE R&D
proceeds appropriately. Our approach generally assumes that
SCE is worth additional research and consideration, and that if
it appears sufficiently safe and effective, it should be developed
responsibly. We acknowledge the real concerns and risks, both
environmental and social, but feel on balance that these can
and should be managed through appropriate SCE research,
governance, and monitoring, rather than the suppression of
SCE research activities.
Part I of this article introduces SCE, its potential, and its
risks. Part II describes the current regulation of, and market
for, SCE and considers possible future scenarios of these. In
Part III, we briefly review the existing landscape of SCE
patents and their ownership, and current patterns of the
development and coordination of research data and of possible
trade secrets. Part IV explores potential challenges to SCE
governance arising from IP rights and restrictions on research
data, based on similar concerns that have arisen in other
emerging fields. Part V considers a range of approaches, both
public and private, to managing IP that policymakers have
deployed in other fields. Part VI proposes the formation of a
“research commons” and “pledge” approach, through which
public and private actors could manage SCE patents and other
IP rights and data in a manner that furthers SCE’s potential to
reduce climate risks while minimizing its physical and social
risks.
33. See discussion infra Section IV.E.
34. See discussion infra Section II.B.
35. See discussion infra Section II.B.
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I. SOLAR CLIMATE ENGINEERING
As described above, SCE would make the planet more
reflective or block incoming sunlight in order to counteract the
warming effect of GHGs.36 Only a small effect is needed:
offsetting the warming that would arise from a doubling of the
preindustrial atmospheric carbon dioxide concentration—which
will probably be reached around the middle of this century—
would require an approximately 1.8% reduction in incoming
solar radiation.37 Generally speaking, SCE could counter most
climatic effects of elevated GHG concentrations (albeit
imperfectly), would take effect rapidly, would have low direct
financial implementation costs, would have global impacts, and
would be reversible in its direct climatic effects.38
Researchers have proposed several SCE methods, which
vary in their expected capacities, feasibilities, costs, and
risks.39 Four techniques are discussed here. First, very fine
particles, such as sulfate aerosols, could be injected into the
stratosphere, a layer of the upper atmosphere.40 These particles
would deflect some incoming solar radiation and consequently
cool the planet.41 There is a natural precedent: large volcanic
eruptions have introduced sulfate aerosols into the atmosphere
and have cooled the earth for a year or so.42 Of all the proposed
SCE methods, stratospheric aerosol injection receives the most
attention due to its expected low direct implementation costs,
large cooling capacity, reversibility, and apparent technical
feasibility.43 This approach also may carry less uncertainty and
be more acceptable to the public given the evidence from
natural volcanic activity.
36. See CLIMATE INTERVENTION: REFLECTING SUNLIGHT, supra note 15 at
29–46.
37. SHEPHERD ET AL., supra note 23, at 23.
38. See generally id. at 23–36 (discussing the effectiveness, affordability,
timeliness, and safety of different SCE methods).
39. See id.
40. See Sirisha Kalidindi et al.,Modeling of Solar Radiation Management:
A Comparison of Simulations Using Reduced Solar Constant and
Stratospheric Sulphate Aerosols, 44 CLIMATE DYNAMICS 2909, 2910 (2015)
(discussing this method).
41. Id.
42. See generally Alan Robock, Volcanic Eruptions and Climate, 38 REVS.
GEOPHYSICS 191, 191 (2000) (describing many effects of volcanic eruptions on
climate, including cooling phenomena).
43. See SHEPHERD ET AL., supra note 23, at 31 tbl.3.4.
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Second, seawater could be sprayed as a fine mist into the
lower atmosphere.44 The salt particles that would remain
airborne after the seawater’s evaporation would serve as cloud
condensation nuclei.45 In turn, this would cause marine clouds
to consist of smaller water droplets and be brighter.46 Marine
cloud brightening has received a significant but secondary
degree of attention, perhaps because of its less environmentally
intrusive means of intervention, its reversibility, and its
potential for partial localizing of its effects.47 Third, objects
such as mirrors or dust could be placed in space, either in the
earth’s orbit or at a key point between the sun and earth.48
Although the popular press often discusses space-based SCE, it
is presently prohibitively expensive.49 Finally, terrestrial
surfaces could be made more reflective such as through
genetically modified crops or brighter human-made
structures.50 This land-based SCE would have very limited
cooling capacity and likely would be expensive.51 However, local
benefits could be significant.
SCE is presently at an early stage of development. Total
global SCE research funding is on the order of only ten million
U.S. dollars per year.52 Almost all evidence thus far is from
modeling work undertaken during the last fifteen years, and
especially since 2008.53 Scientists can draw some insights from
existing analogs such as volcanoes, marine ships’ cloud tracks,
and lower atmospheric pollution, each of which reflect some
44. See, e.g., John Latham et al., Marine Cloud Brightening: Regional
Applications, 372 PHIL. TRANSACTIONS ROYAL SOC’Y A (Theme Issue No. 2031)
1, 1–2 (2014).
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. See SHEPHERD ET AL., supra note 23, at 28 tbl.3.3.
48. See, e.g., Joan-Pau Sánchez & Colin R. McInnes, Optimal Sunshade
Configurations for Space-Based Geoengineering near the Sun-Earth L1 Point,
PLOS ONE, AUG. 26, 2015, at 1, 22.
49. See, e.g., SHEPHERD ET AL., supra note 23, at 33 tbl.3.5.
50. See, e.g., Hashem Akbari et al., The Long-term Effect of Increasing the
Albedo of Urban Areas, ENVTL. RES. LETTERS, Apr. 12, 2002, at 1, 2; Bradley
M. Zamft & Robert J. Conrado, Engineering Plants to Reflect Light: Strategies
for Engineering Water-Efficient Plants to Adapt to a Changing Climate, 13
PLANT BIOTECHNOLOGY J. 867, 872 (2015).
51. See, SHEPHERD ET AL., supra note 23, at 25 tbl.3.1.
52. See Geoengineering Research, OPEN PHILANTHROPY PROJECT (July
2013), http://www.openphilanthropy.org/research/cause-reports/geoenginee
ring#Who_else_is_working_on_this.
53. Cf. id. (citing no sources before 2008).
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incoming solar radiation.54 Researchers in the United Kingdom
planned a field test of equipment for stratospheric aerosol
injection in 2012, but they cancelled it due in part to concerns
regarding a potential conflict of interest with a reviewer who
had applied for a relevant patent.55 The first outdoor
experiments of the environmental impacts of SCE—in this
case, those on stratospheric ozone from sulfate aerosols—are
presently at the planning stage.56 Some scientists envision a
wider portfolio of SCE field trials.57
Although SCE could reduce climate change and its risks at
a gross level, it would also pose environmental and social risks,
many of which would arise at the research stage. The primary
physical risk of SCE arises from the fact that GHGs and SCE
would influence the earth’s climate in manners that are not
perfect mirror images of each other.58 The former traps heat
globally, whereas the latter would have the greatest
compensatory effect where sunlight is most direct: close to the
equator.59 Furthermore, because temperature differences are a
leading driver of the planet’s hydrologic cycle,60 precipitation
patterns would change both under climate change and under
climate change plus SCE. Therefore, regional temperature and
especially precipitation anomalies would persist with SCE.
Nevertheless, models presently indicate that an optimized level
54. See, e.g., Y.-C. Chen et al., Occurrence of Lower Cloud Albedo in Ship
Tracks, 12 ATMOSPHERIC CHEMISTRY& PHYSICS 8223, 8232 (2012) (employing
ship track observations as means to assess the microphysics of aerosol-cloud
relationships); Zhihong Zhuo et al., Proxy Evidence for China’s Monsoon
Precipitation Response to Volcanic Aerosols over the Past Seven Centuries, 119
J. GEOPHYSICAL RES.: ATMOSPHERES 6638, 6638 (2014) (explaining how the
cooling effect of volcanic eruptions may play a role in weather conditions).
55. See Daniel Cressey, Geoengineering Experiment Cancelled amid
Patent Row, NATURE (May 15, 2012), http://www.nature.com/news
/geoengineering-experiment-cancelled-amid-patent-row-1.10645.
56. See Dykema et al., supra note 18.
57. See David W. Keith et al., Field Experiments on Solar Geoengineering:
Report of a Workshop Exploring a Representative Research Portfolio, 372 PHIL.
TRANSACTIONS ROYAL SOC’Y A (Theme Issue No. 2031) 1, 3 tbl.1 (2014)
(charting the different tests and experiments available for Solar Radiation
Management).
58. See CLIMATE INTERVENTION: REFLECTING SUNLIGHT, supra note 15, at
29–46.
59. Id. at 130.
60. See generally Nat’l Weather Serv., The Hydrologic Cycle, NOAA.GOV,
http://www.srh.noaa.gov/jetstream/atmos/hydro.html (last visited Oct. 29,
2016) (showing how temperature differences condenses and vaporizes water
throughout the hydrologic cycle).
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of SCE could compensate for the vast majority of climate
change’s temperature effects and the majority of its
precipitation effects.61
Besides precipitation, SCE would present other physical
risks. Space-based SCE and stratospheric aerosol injection
would globally reduce incoming sunlight, and the latter would
make it more diffuse.62 This would affect agriculture and
ecosystems. The leading candidate material for stratospheric
aerosol injection—sulfate aerosols—is believed to catalyze the
destruction of stratospheric ozone, which blocks harmful
incoming ultraviolet radiation.63 Negative environmental
effects may not merely be physical, but also may manifest inter
alia as impacts on humans, changes in food security, and the
loss of biodiversity.64
Other risks are social in nature. For example, the mere
prospect of SCE may reduce the already insufficient and
politically fragile efforts toward GHG emissions abatement.65 If
this were the case, then ocean acidification would worsen. Also,
if SCE were to be implemented at a high intensity under
conditions of elevated atmospheric GHG concentrations and
were subsequently to stop—for whatever reason—then the
climate change that had theretofore been suppressed would
rapidly manifest, posing very large risks.66 Another troubling
61. See Ben Kravitz et al., A Multi-Model Assessment of Regional Climate
Disparities Caused by Solar Geoengineering, ENVTL. RES. LETTERS, July 22,
2014, at 1, 6–7. The precise degrees of compensation will depend on inter alia
the relative values placed on different regions of the planet and on preserving
temperature versus precipitation.
62. See J. Pongratz et al., Crop Yields in a Geoengineered Climate, 2 NAT.
CLIMATE CHANGE 101, 103 (2012).
63. Giovanni Pitari et al., Stratospheric Ozone Response to Sulfate
Geoengineering: Results from the Geoengineering Model Intercomparison
Project (GeoMIP), 119 J. GEOPHYSICAL RES.: ATMOSPHERES 2629, 2630 (2014).
64. See generally PHILLIP WILLIAMSON & RALPH BODLE, SECRETARIAT OF
THE CONVENTION ON BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY, TECH. SER. NO. 84, UPDATE ON
CLIMATE GEOENGINEERING IN RELATION TO THE CONVENTION ON BIOLOGICAL
DIVERSITY: POTENTIAL IMPACTS AND REGULATORY FRAMEWORK (2016).
65. See Jesse Reynolds, A Critical Examination of the Climate
Engineering Moral Hazard and Risk Compensation Concern, 2
ANTHROPOCENE REV. 174, 175 (2015) (“Climate engineering proposals have
been controversial for a variety of reasons. Perhaps the most widespread
concern is that they would undermine mitigation efforts.”).
66. See Jones et al., supra note 19. But see Jesse L. Reynolds, Andy
Parker & Peter Irvine, Five Solar Geoengineering Tropes that Have Outstayed
Their Welcome, EARTH’S FUTURE (accepted for publication 2016, forthcoming),
http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1002/2016EF000416/full (last visited Jan.
2, 2017).
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scenario is one in which SCE is implemented with a weak
knowledge base, perhaps in response to perceptions of sudden
and dangerous climate change.67 Furthermore, any SCE
activities undertaken at a substantial scale in one country
would have transboundary effects.68 To the extent that political
leaders disagree regarding whether, when, and how to
implement SCE, it could exacerbate international tensions.69
Countries that experienced extreme weather events or other
damaging environmental anomalies could blame the states or
other actors that implemented or tested SCE. Some may even
suspect, rightly or wrongly, that those engaged in SCE did so in
order to gain an economic or military advantage.70 Finally,
stratospheric aerosol injection and perhaps marine cloud
brightening appear to be inexpensive and feasible enough that
small states or even wealthy nonstate actors could implement
them, with global impacts.71 Political scientist David Victor
wrote, alluding to the villain from a James Bond film, that “[a]
lone Greenfinger, self-appointed protector of the planet and
working with a small fraction of the [Bill] Gates bank account,
could force a lot of [solar] geoengineering on his own.”72 As
described in the following Part, SCE regulation is insufficient,
both nationally and internationally to address these concerns.
Some of these concerns relate to IP and are discussed in Part
IV.
67. See Joshua B. Horton, The Emergency Framing of Solar
Geoengineering: Time for a Different Approach 2 ANTHROPOCENE REV. 147,
149 (2015).
68. See CLIMATE INTERVENTION: REFLECTING SUNLIGHT, supra note 15, at
29–46.
69. See Horton & Reynolds, supra note 25 (reviewing arguments and
evidence concerning international tensions, blame, and problematic unilateral
action).
70. See id.
71. See SHEPHERD ET AL., supra note 23, at 31 tbl.3.4; SHEPHERD ET AL.,
supra note 23, at 28 tbl 3.3. At the same time, the capacity for unilateral or
minilateral action may also be an advantage, in which SCE is able to break
through the political stalemate and collective action problem of GHG
emissions abatement. See John Virgoe, International Governance of a Possible
Geoengineering Intervention to Combat Climate Change, 95 CLIMATIC CHANGE
103, 116 (2009).
72. David G. Victor, On the Regulation of Geoengineering, 24 OXFORD
REV. ECON. POL’Y 322, 324 (2008); see GOLDFINGER (Eon Productions 1964).
Consider the unauthorized ocean fertilization experiment of 2012. Jeff
Tollefson, Ocean-Fertilization Project off Canada Sparks Furore, 490 NATURE
458 (2012). But see Horton & Reynolds, supra note 25.
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II. SOLAR CLIMATE ENGINEERING REGULATION AND
MARKETS
A. SOLAR CLIMATE ENGINEERING REGULATION
Although SCE presents both possible benefits and risks,
there is a widely acknowledged governance gap.73 In fact, there
is no regulation that is specific to SCE, legally binding, and in
effect.74 Instead, a patchwork of existing regulatory
mechanisms may potentially apply to SCE activities.75 Which
ones would be applicable, and in what manner, would be
contingent upon inter alia the nature of the SCE activity at
hand, its scale, the state of knowledge at the time, where it is
undertaken, by whom, with what intentions, and the
willingness and ability of national regulators,
intergovernmental organizations, and other entities to exert
control over the activities.
For example, within the United States, reporting
requirements under the Weather Modification Reporting Act of
1972 may apply to those engaged in SCE field activities.76 The
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) potentially could
interpret the definition of “pollutant” to include SCE emissions,
which would trigger its authority to regulate SCE methods
such as stratospheric aerosol injection.77 Notably, the Clean Air
Act allows the EPA some discretion in regulating research
projects.78 The National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA)
might, under circumstances such as public funding of research
73. See Virgoe, supra note 71, at 109–12.
74. See Jesse Reynolds, Climate Engineering and International Law, in
CLIMATE CHANGE LAW 178, 181–83 (Daniel A. Farber & Marjan Peeters eds.,
2016).
75. See id.
76. See Weather Modification Reporting Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-205,
§ 3(a), 85 Stat. 736 (1971) (enacted primarily to address the practice of cloud
seeding); see also National Weather Modification Policy Act, 15 U.S.C. § 330
(1976); CLIMATE INTERVENTION: REFLECTING SUNLIGHT, supra note 15, at
169.
77. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401–7661 (2012). For the definition of pollutant, see
U.S.C. § 7602(g) (2012). See generally Tracy D. Hester, Remaking the World to
Save It: Applying U.S. Environmental Laws to Climate Engineering Projects,
38 ECOLOGY L.Q. 851, 876 (2011) (“Given its willingness to regulate activities
to reduce the effects of GHG emissions, EPA may take an expansive view of
the Clean Air Act’s applicability to other activities that might alter climate
processes or directly release aerosols or other compounds into the atmosphere
to mitigate climate change effects.”).
78. 42 U.S.C. § 7403 (2012).
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or large-scale outdoor SCE activities, require an environmental
impact assessment or a programmatic environmental impact
statement if the risks were thought to be significant.79 Other
possible existing regulatory pathways include the Clean Water
Act and the Endangered Species Act, as well as state-level
cloud seeding regulations.80
Given SCE’s widespread effects, existing international law
and intergovernmental institutions also might regulate some
SCE activities.81 The UNFCCC and its related protocols
currently offer little guidance, as they focus on stabilizing GHG
concentrations, but the UNFCCC institutions may be a natural
locus for vesting increased international regulatory capacity
over SCE.82
The U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS)
may currently offer the greatest applicability to all forms of
SCE due to its numerous and general environmental
provisions, its widespread participation, and the impacts of
both climate change and SCE on the marine environment.83
79. 42 U.S.C. § 4321–4370h (2012).
80. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251–1387 (2012); 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531–1544 (2012); see
Rachel Hauser, Using Twentieth-Century U.S. Weather Modification Policy to
Gain Insight into Global Climate Remediation Governance Issues, 5 WEATHER,
CLIMATE & SOC’Y 180, 190–91 (2013) (discussing North Dakota’s oversight of
weather modification).
81. See Catherine Redgwell, Geoengineering the Climate: Technological
Solutions to Mitigation-Failure or Continuing Carbon Addiction?, 5 CARBON&
CLIMATE L. REV. 178 (2011) (discussing the potential for various regulatory
structures for SCE’s including international and intergovernmental
institutions, and arguing that international regulation is not the best method);
Jesse Reynolds, Climate Engineering Field Research: The Favorable Setting of
International Environmental Law, 5 WASH. & LEE J. ENERGY CLIMATE &
ENV’T 417 (2014) (examining various international environmental law and
proposing that this framework is favorable for climate engineering research
and regulation).
82. United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, May 9,
1992, 1771 U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter UNFCCC]. Compare Matthias Honegger
et al., Tackling Climate Change: Where Can the Generic Framework Be
Located?, 7 CARBON & CLIMATE L. REV. 125, 134 (2013) (arguing that “the
UNFCCC is best placed to provide for a generic framework on climate
change”), with Jesse Reynolds, Why the UNFCCC and CBD Should Refrain
from Regulating Solar Climate Engineering, in GEOENGINEERING OUR
CLIMATE? ETHICS, POLITICS AND GOVERNANCE (Jason Blackstock & Sean Low
eds., forthcoming 2017) (arguing that the UNFCCC, CBD, and other
international forums should hold off on pursuing binding regulation of SRM
for the foreseeable future).
83. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833
U.N.T.S. 396 [hereinafter UNCLOS]. The “marine environment” is undefined
in UNCLOS but scholars generally interpret it to include the marine
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For example, “[s]tates have the obligation to protect and
preserve the marine environment” and “to take . . . all
measures consistent with this Convention that are necessary to
prevent, reduce and control pollution of the marine
environment from any source,” including from land-based
sources.84 However, interpretations of the Convention’s
provisions in the SCE context are unclear. The UNCLOS’s
definition of “pollution” could include both SCE as well as the
global warming that SCE would counteract.85
The Environmental Modification Convention (ENMOD)
prohibits the hostile use of methods that implicitly include
SCE.86 Specifically, parties agree “not to engage in military or
any other hostile use of environmental modification techniques
having widespread, long-lasting or severe effects as the means
of destruction, damage or injury to any other State Party.”87 At
the same time, the agreement explicitly provides that it “shall
not hinder the use of environmental modification techniques for
peaceful purposes.”88 Nevertheless, the terms “hostile” and
“peaceful” are often in the eye of the beholder, and controversy
regarding actions’ hostility could arise if drastic – even
unintended – climactic effects are experienced in particular
regions.89 Enforcement also remains a hurdle, as ENMOD has
no standing institutions, and aggrieved victims would need to
bring complaints before the U.N. Security Council.90
The parties to the Montreal Protocol on Substances that
Deplete the Ozone Layer could choose to prohibit stratospheric
injection, because atmospheric scientists believe that sulfate
aerosols would catalyze ozone destruction.91 However, doing so
would be problematic. Common industrial processes such as
atmosphere. See VERONICA FRANK, THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY AND MARINE
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION IN THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF THE SEA:
IMPLEMENTINGGLOBALOBLIGATIONS AT THEREGIONAL LEVEL 12 (2007).
84. UNCLOS, supra note 83, arts. 192, 194, 207.
85. Id. art. 1.1(4).
86. Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of
Environmental Modification Techniques, Dec. 10, 1976, 1108 U.N.T.S. 151
[hereinafter ENMOD]. ENMOD has been in force since 1978 and counts
seventy-seven Parties, including the United States and almost all other major
industrialized states.
87. Id. art. I.1.
88. Id. art. III.1.
89. See Horton & Reynolds, supra note 25, at 445.
90. ENMOD, supra note 86, art. V.
91. Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, Sept.
16, 1989, 1522 U.N.T.S. 3.
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the combustion of coal already emit sulfate aerosols in large
quantities into the lower atmosphere.92 Thus, in order to
regulate the stratospheric injection of sulfate aerosols, the
Parties would need to define a sui generis controlled substance
that would be based upon the location and/or the intention of
its emission.
Likewise, stratospheric injection of sulfate aerosols from a
single country’s territory at the scale needed to induce a global
climate response would violate the protocols to the Convention
on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution (LRTAP
Convention).93 European and North American countries
created this agreement in order to reduce and eliminate
transboundary pollution, specifically the precursors to acid
rain.94 Three of its protocols place limits on countries’ sulfate
emissions.95 Below such thresholds, which could include small-
and moderate-scale SCE field tests, the LRTAP Convention
Parties would be obligated to report their emissions and to
consult with other Parties that are or at risk of being
impacted.96 However, it defines pollution much like the
UNCLOS does, and consequently appears to encourage SCE in
order to reduce the “pollution” of climate change.97
The Parties to the Convention on Biological Diversity
(CBD), a treaty with near global participation (but notably not
the United States), agreed to a nonbinding statement of
concern regarding climate engineering.98 The statement
92. See S. J. Smith et al., Anthropogenic Sulfur Dioxide Emissions: 1850–
2005, 11 ATMOSPHERIC CHEMISTRY&PHYSICS 1101 (2011).
93. Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution art. 1, Nov.
13, 1979, 1302 U.N.T.S. 219 [hereinafter LRTAP Convention].
94. See generally id.
95. Protocol to the 1979 Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air
Pollution on the Reduction of Sulphur Emissions or Their Transboundary
Fluxes by at Least 30 Per Cent, July 8, 1985, 1480 U.N.T.S. 215 [hereinafter
Helsinki Protocol]; Protocol to the 1979 Convention on Long-Range
Transboundary Air Pollution on Further Reduction of Sulphur Emissions,
June 13, 1994, 2030 U.N.T.S. 122 [hereinafter Oslo Protocol]; Protocol to the
1979 Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution to Abate
Acidification, Eutrophication and Ground-level Ozone, Nov. 30, 1999, 2319
U.N.T.S. 81 [hereinafter Gothenburg Protocol].
96. LRTAP Convention, supra note 93, arts. 5, 8; see also Helsinki
Protocol, supra note 95, art. 4; Oslo Protocol, supra note 95, art. 5; Gothenburg
Protocol, supra note 95, art.7.
97. LRTAP Convention, supra note 93, art. 1(a).
98. Conference of Parties to the Convention on Biological Diversity,
Decision adopted by the Conference of the Parties to the Convention on
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requested that states not engage in such climate engineering
activities that affect biodiversity until regulatory structures are
in place, the risks are considered, and the activity is
scientifically justified.99 And as seen with the above
multilateral agreements, SCE has the potential to both further
the CBD’s objectives (e.g. by helping conserve biological
diversity) as well as to counter them (e.g. by posing risks to
biodiversity).100
As already noted, developing a regulatory regime for SCE
will be challenging and will require quite some time. Climate
change itself is politically contentious; reaching even modest
international agreements has been a very lengthy process.101
SCE is, and probably will continue to be, especially contested.
Elected political leaders and international negotiators
presently have little incentive to develop international
agreements to invest in and govern SCE research, particularly
before the onset of significant adverse effects of climate change.
SCE also remains a highly uncertain matter, in terms both of
its expected effects and of states’ positions on it. When such
negotiating positions do begin to form, there may be a wide
variance among countries. Finally, there is also a general “low
appetite” for new multilateral agreements in the wake of the
burst of international law making from the 1970s to the early
1990s.102
B. A SOLAR CLIMATE ENGINEERING “MARKET”
In the absence of clearly applicable national and
international law, national policies regarding IP often become
the default regulatory regime for emerging technologies.
Patents are legal mechanisms through which policy makers
Biological Diversity at Its Tenth Meeting, U.N. Doc. UNEP/CBD/COP/DECX
/33/8(w) (Oct. 18–29, 2010).
99. Id.
100. Convention on Biological Diversity, art. 1, June 5, 1992, 1760 U.N.T.S.
79 [hereinafter CBD]; see also id. arts. 7(c), 8.
101. See Robinson Meyer, The Still Unresolved Questions of the Paris
Climate Agreement: A Guide to the Most Contentious Issues and How They’re
Discussed in the Agreement, THE ATLANTIC (Dec. 10, 2015), http://www.
theatlantic.com/science/archive/2015/12/what-does-the-paris-agreement-say
/419577/ (describing the most contentious terms of the Paris Agreement); see
also Jesse Reynolds, The International Regulation of Climate Engineering:
Lessons from Nuclear Power, 26 J. ENVTL. L. 269, 270 (2014) (“[O]bservers
should be modest in their expectations of climate engineering’s international
regulation, particularly through binding multilateral agreements.”).
102. Reynolds, supra note 101, at 286.
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grant inventors temporally limited exclusive rights in order to
incentivize the development of new inventions.103 Patents
incentivize disclosure to the public of technical information
that might otherwise remain secret.104 Similarly, trade secrecy
laws protect inventors of valuable technical and commercial
information from misappropriation by market competitors.105
Competition (antitrust) law regulates companies when they
bring products and services to the market, including research
and innovation markets.106 Thus, public authorities use the
market and IP rights as another regulatory mode, in addition
to more direct methods of funding innovation or of regulating
products and processes.
In order to understand the current and probable future
market in SCE, the structure and scale of the incentives for it
must be considered. Abating GHG emissions (or many other
types of pollution), implementing SCE, and conducting
scientific research are each public goods, in that no one—
including those who refuse to contribute to their costs and
those who object—can be excluded from experiencing their
effects.107 Such public goods are generally produced at
suboptimal quantities because a producer is unable to demand
that those who enjoy them either pay or be excluded. Indeed,
one of the primary functions of government is to provide public
goods directly or to offer incentives for their production.
103. See ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., PATENTS AND
INNOVATION: TRENDS AND POLICY CHANGES 5 (2004) (“Changes in patent
policy in OECD countries over the past two decades have fostered the use and
enforcement of patents with the aim of encouraging investments in innovation
and enhancing the dissemination of knowledge.”).
104. See John M. Olin, The Disclosure Function of the Patent System (Or
Lack Thereof), 118 HARV. L. REV. 2007, 2007 (2005) (stating that one main
justification of the patent system is the dissemination of information).
105. See Trade Secret, CORNELL.EDU, https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex
/trade_secret (last visited Oct. 25, 2016).
106. See, e.g., U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, ANTITRUST
GUIDELINES FOR THE LICENSING OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 10–11 (1995)
[hereinafter DOJ & FTC ANTITRUST GUIDELINES], https://www.justice.gov
/sites/default/files/atr/legacy/2006/04/27/0558.pdf.
107. Public goods are typically further defined as having effects whose
enjoyment by one does not dilute the effects for others. Here, “good” is meant
as something that is produced that satisfies the desires of some; it might be
neither beneficial to all affected parties nor normatively good. In order for
scientific research to be a public good, its results must be publicly available.
See Jesse L. Reynolds, An Economic Analysis of Liability and Compensation
for Harm from Large-Scale Field Research in Solar Climate Engineering, 5
CLIMATE L. 182, 186–89 (2015).
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In terms of scale, the direct financial costs of the method of
SCE—stratospheric aerosol injection—that presently appears
to be the most inexpensive have been estimated on the order of
U.S. $25 to $50 billion annually.108 This implementation of SCE
would roughly compensate for the warming effect of a doubling
of the preindustrial atmospheric carbon dioxide concentration,
a level that will be reached around 2060 at the current
trajectory.109 An industry with annual revenues of tens of
billions of U.S. dollars is neither small nor enormous,
approximately equivalent to the revenue of the world’s 500th
largest company.110 Even though this is within the reach of
smaller states and of wealthy non-state actors, they would have
no clear self-interest to assume this entire financial burden.111
This is because, although the climate benefits of SCE
implementation appear to be very large, they would be widely
dispersed across the globe. For small to medium states and
non-state actors, their benefits from SCE would be less than
the implementation costs.112 Furthermore, SCE may need to be
108. Paul J. Crutzen, Albedo Enhancement by Stratospheric Sulfur
Injections: A Contribution to Resolve a Policy Dilemma? 77 CLIMATIC CHANGE
211, 212–13 (2006) (estimating the yearly cost at U.S. $25–$50 billion); Alan
Robock et al., Benefits, Risks, and Costs of Stratospheric Geoengineering, 36
GEOPHYSICAL RES. LETTERS 1, 3 tbl.2 (2009) (estimating annual costs of up to
U.S. $30 billion); Justin McClellan et al., Cost Analysis of Stratospheric Albedo
Modification Delivery Systems, ENVTL. RES. LETTERS, Aug. 30, 2012, at 1, 6
tbl.2 (2012) (estimating annual costs ranging from U.S. $0.5 to U.S. $390
billion depending upon the delivery system type); Ryo Moriyama et al., The
Cost of Stratospheric Climate Engineering Revisited, in MITIGATION &
ADAPTATION STRATEGIES FOR GLOBAL CHANGE (forthcoming 2016),
http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11027-016-9723-y (last visited Jan. 2,
2017) (estimating annual costs of up to U.S. $10 billion).
109. See van Vuuren et al., supra note 13, at 23.
110. The 500th largest company is presently Old Mutual, with $21 billion
net sales in 2015. Global 500, FORTUNE, beta.fortune.com/global500/list (last
visited Nov. 24, 2016).
111. Small states and non-state actors may have nonfinancial reasons to
(try to) implement SCE. For example, states that are highly vulnerable to
climate change impacts could use SCE as a means to encourage GHG
emissions abatement by other states.
112. If we assume that climate change would cost 2% of countries’ economic
activity, then $50 billion in annual implementation costs would be justified
only for countries with a GDP of at least U.S. $2.5 trillion, of which there are
approximately six. This is only a rough estimate. See GDP Ranking, WORLD
BANK (Oct. 3, 2016), http://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog/GDP-ranking-
table; Douglas J. Arent et al., Key Economic Sectors and Services, in CLIMATE
CHANGE 2014: IMPACTS, ADAPTATION, AND VULNERABILITY. PART A: GLOBAL
AND SECTORAL ASPECTS. CONTRIBUTION OF WORKING GROUP II TO THE FIFTH
ASSESSMENT REPORT OF THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE
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maintained for a long period of time, as the injected aerosols
would fall from the atmosphere within several months to a
couple of years, causing the suppressed climate change to
manifest at a dangerously rapid rate.113 Furthermore,
implementation of global SCE could probably not remain
clandestine. Satellite systems likely could detect large-scale
field-testing or implementation of SCE, depending on factors
such as the magnitude of the climatic intervention.114 It seems
improbable that international and especially national
authorities would tolerate an individual or non-state group
under their jurisdiction or control modifying the world’s climate
without consent.
At the present time, the research activities conducted in
advance of developing a market for SCE is driven primarily by
public and private philanthropic research funders.115 The
former group includes funding bodies of the European Union,
the United Kingdom, Germany, China, Japan, Norway, and the
United States.116 In general, public bodies—especially in the
United States—provide little to no funding of SCE research.
This may be due to SCE’s controversial character and/or
concerns that such support would be perceived as coming at the
expense of GHG abatement efforts. To some extent, private
funders have partially filled this vacuum. A small, dedicated
fund established by Bill Gates dominates the latter.117
Considering SCE’s speculative and controversial character, the
current relative absence of private interest is unsurprising. As
described in the following Part, patents are scarce and appear
to be currently largely speculative. Research data is widely
shared.
CHANGE 690 (2014), http://ipcc-wg2.gov/AR5/images/uploads/WGIIAR5-
Chap10_FINAL.pdf.
113. See Alan Robock et al., Studying Geoengineering with Natural and
Anthropogenic Analogs, 121 CLIMATIC CHANGE 445, 448 (2013).
114. Dian J. Seidel et al., Detection Limits of Albedo Changes Induced by
Climate Engineering, 4 NATURE CLIMATE CHANGE 93 (2014) (examining global
and regional detection capabilities of SRM).
115. See Geoengineering Research, supra note 52 (“Our understanding is
that there is a significant amount of academic interest in stratospheric aerosol
injection.”).
116. See id. (follow link in section 3 titled “identify funded projects and
funding sources around the world that explicitly include a significant solar
geoengineering component”).
117. See Fund for Innovative Climate & Energy Res., STANFORD.EDU,
http://dge.stanford.edu/labs/caldeiralab/FICER.html (last visited Nov. 18,
2016).
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As noted, SCE research efforts currently are largely state-
supported activities.118 The early stage, costs, political
contestation, uncertain results, and the public good character
of SCE and its research may explain this.119 For the time being,
research will probably remain largely within traditional public
institutions such as government agencies (which might enlist
private contractors for some R&D activities) and universities.
Scientists’ stated preference for public funding, particularly for
more controversial outdoor SCE tests, may further limit
private sector research. For example, those who wished to
conduct what may become the first such outdoor test wrote that
“we will only proceed with [the project] if it passes independent
risk assessment and if it is financed predominantly with public
funding from a relevant scientific agency.”120 However,
additional interest from for-profit private actors may manifest
if SCE becomes more certain and less contentious. As a report
of the Royal Society stated, “[f]or SRM methods, a clear
financial incentive does not yet exist, although there may be
future income opportunities from publicly funded deployment
(especially of proprietary technology).”121 Research funding and
potential product or process patenting activity would
consequently shift to private institutions. This would present
both opportunities and challenges. As the Royal Society report
also noted,
[t]his [commercial involvement] may be positive, as it mobilises
innovation and capital, which could lead to the development of more
effective and less costly technology at a faster rate than in the public
sector. On the other hand, commercial involvement could bypass or
neglect the socio-economic, environmental and regulatory
dimensions of geoengineering.122
With respect to SCE implementation, it is difficult to
imagine a feasible scenario in which one or more states would
not be the primary decision makers regarding whether and how
118. See Geoengineering Research, supra note 52.
119. See generally Garth Heutel et al., Alternatives to Emissions Reduction:
Using Climate Engineering to Tackle Global Warming, VOXEU.ORG (June 4,
2016), http://voxeu.org/article/climate-engineering-economics (discussing the
uncertainty and difficulties of climate engineering).
120. Dykema et al., supra note 18, at 15. This commitment is particularly
noteworthy because the lead scientist for this proposal is one of the two
scientists who make the final decisions regarding grants from the Gates fund,
and is also among its beneficiaries. See Fund for Innovative Climate & Energy
Res., supra note 117.
121. SHEPHERD ET AL., supra note 23, at 44.
122. Id.
24 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. [Vol. 18:1
to implement such technologies, even if private entities owned
and licensed the necessary technologies. Powerful governments
would not likely tolerate the significant intentional alteration
of their climates without their consent, although such consent
could range from explicit to tacit. They would find or enact
legal means to regulate such behavior within their jurisdiction
or control. And they would also exert international pressure to
ensure that SCE implementation by private actors in foreign
jurisdictions was likewise controlled. In furtherance of the
research, development, and possible implementation of SCE
solutions, governmental actors would most likely need to
procure products and services through new or existing
procurement and bidding mechanisms. Such contracts could be
lucrative.123 Assuming that a handful of governments were
involved in such contracts, public monopsony control of the
market could tend to keep prices low, although rent-seeking
behavior through activities such as lobbying by contractors is
possible. In this way, a market for SCE could resemble that of
the military equipment market, albeit at a smaller scale.
III. THE SOLAR CLIMATE ENGINEERING INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY LANDSCAPE
In this Part, we summarize the current landscape of IP
protection for SCE technologies, focusing on patents, research
data, and trade secrets, and offer a likely trajectory of such
protection in the foreseeable future.
A. PATENTS
There are currently only a handful of patents that are
clearly relevant to SCE. While numerous studies have been
conducted with respect to patenting of “green” or “clean”
technologies, broadly defined, few have focused specifically on
SCE technology.124 In 2014, Paul Oldham and colleagues
123. See, e.g., Press Release, Dep’t of Climate & Energy (U.K.),
Government Unveils Eight Major New Renewables Projects, Supporting 8,500
Green Jobs (Apr. 23, 2014), https://www.gov.uk/government/news/government-
unveils-eight-major-new-renewables-projects-supporting-8500-green-jobs
(describing a twelve billion pound investment in renewable energy as a means
of combatting climate change).
124. See, e.g., John H. Barton, Intellectual Property and Access to Clean
Energy Technologies in Developing Countries, An Analysis of Solar
Photovoltaic, Biofuel and Wind Technologies, in INT’L CTR. FOR TRADE AND
SUSTAINABLE DEV. PROGRAMME ON TRADE AND ENVIRONMENT, TRADE AND
SUSTAINABLE ENERGIE SERIES viii (2007), http://ictsd.net/downloads/2008/11
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conducted an extensive survey of filed and issued patents
“directly or indirectly related to climate engineering
technologies” at the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office
(USPTO) and the European Patent Office, and under the
Patent Cooperation Treaty.125 They considered all forms of
climate engineering, including negative emissions (carbon
dioxide removal) technologies; SCE was only a small portion of
their resulting data set.126 Oldham et al. identified twenty-
eight patent families directly or indirectly related to SCE.127
Likewise, Anthony Chavez recently conducted a review of
USPTO records to determine “trends in applications for and
granting of patents involving climate-engineering
technologies,” and found eighteen SCE-related patents.128 Like
the data set of Oldham et al., that of Chavez included patents
and applications that are directly or indirectly related to SCE
and negative emissions technologies. We reviewed these sets of
patents for their invocation of and their direct relevance to
SCE, and we removed those that have or would have broader
application and are only indirectly related to SCE.129 We also
conducted our own searches for additional SCE related patents
and applications in early 2016, using similar terms and also
/intellectual-property-and-access-to-clean-energy-technologies-in-developing-
countries_barton_ictsd-2007.pdf (discussing the relationship between IP and
clean energy technology); JOHN M. LAZARUS, FOLEY & LARDNER LLP,
CLEANTECH ENERGY PATENT LANDSCAPE: EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 1, 3, 6 (2010)
(identifying the following clean tech categories: solar, wind, hydro/wave/tidal,
geothermal, biomass/biogas/biofuel, nuclear, hybrid vehicles, fuel cells for
hybrid vehicles, utility metering, smart grid, and CO2 storage or
sequestration); U.N. ENVTL. PROGRAMME, EUR. PATENT OFFICE & INT’L CTR.
FOR TRADE & SUSTAINABLE DEV., PATENTS AND CLEAN ENERGY: BRIDGING
THE GAP BETWEEN EVIDENCE AND POLICY: FINAL REPORT 9 (2010),
http://www.eurosfaire.prd.fr/7pc/doc/1308064085_patents_clean_energy_study
_en.pdf (mapping patents as a part of global GHG abatement innovations);
Antoine Dechezleprêtre et al., Invention and Transfer of Climate Change–
Mitigation Technologies: A Global Analysis, 5(1) REV. ENVTL. ECON. & POL’Y
109, 109–10 (2011), http://reep.oxfordjournals.org/content/5/1/109.full.pdf
(discussing GHG abatement inventions); Joy Y. Xiang, Addressing Climate
Change: Domestic Innovation, International Aid and Collaboration, 5 N.Y.U.
J. INTELL. PROP. & ENT. L. 1, 24–36 (2016) (summarizing empirical studies).
125. Oldham et al., supra note 20, at 1, 9–15; see also Anthony E. Chavez,
Exclusive Rights to Saving the Planet: The Patenting of Geoengineering
Inventions, 13 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 1, 9–12 (2015) (discussing the
rise in geoengineering patent applications).
126. Oldham et al., supra note 20, at 3.
127. Id. at 1.
128. Chavez, supra note 125, at 9.
129. See infra note 145 and accompanying text.
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checking subsequent applications or patents that cited to
earlier-filed, relevant patents or applications. As discussed
below, we have also assessed (where available) information on
patent ownership. We focused on whether the patents or
applications were (at the time of relevant publication) subject
to government rights; whether they were owned by
universities, private firms, or individuals; and whether owners’
professional affiliations could be identified.
Together, our subsequent review, research, and scrutiny
resulted in finding thirty-three inventions reflected in various
patents and patent applications that are directly related to
SCE (see Table 1 below, grouped by category of technology and
then by status). We chose to list patents and applications by
the number of inventions for two reasons. First, because of the
territorial scope of patents, counting patents or applications for
the same technology in multiple patents or applications issued
or filed in multiple countries would appear to suggest a
significantly higher number of inventions than actually may
have been made. Second, inventors often file multiple chains of
applications relating to the same invention, either to obtain
different patent claims or to continue prosecution concerning
the same invention, while earlier applications are pending or
after “final” rejections of particular applications.130 Such
“continuation” applications if listed separately would appear to
suggest many more inventions than actually were made.131
Note that the dates listed in Table 1 are the dates of the actual
applications, and not of any priority claim that may have been
made to earlier applications.
Of the thirty-three inventions that we identified, seven
were issued at least one patent that appears to remain in force
in some jurisdiction.132 Five inventions were issued at least one
patent that has since expired and no other patent has yet
issued. Fourteen applications were ultimately abandoned by
130. These applications often claim priority back to earlier applications.
See, e.g., 35 U.S.C. §§ 119, 120, 121 (2012).
131. This would be the case whether or not the applications contain
additional disclosures, and particularly when filed in multiple jurisdictions.
For similar reasons, Oldham focused on “first filings”—while also discussing
“family members”; Chavez focused on applications and grants only in the
United States since 2011. See Oldham et al., supra note 20, at 4; Chavez,
supra note 125, at 7 & n.72.
132. However, additional applications may yet result in patents in other
jurisdictions or further patents for the same invention in the same
jurisdiction.
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their applicants without any grant of a patent, whether
because the relevant patent office had indicated the invention
was not patentable or the applicant chose not to pursue the
matter further. Finally, seven inventions remain pending in
the form of at least one application in some jurisdiction as of
late 2016 (and may include additional applications pending in
the same or other jurisdictions).133
We note that some inventions had more than one patent
issue for that invention but originated as “divisional,”
“continuation,” or otherwise closely related applications. We
have not listed in Table 1 the additional granted patents in
these families that we thought were too closely related.134
Rather, we have listed only the first-granted patent for the
same invention, as understood per the discussion above.
Seventeen of the thirty-three patents or applications listed
in Table 1 relate to space- and surface-based SCE. These
proposed techniques are widely considered prohibitively
expensive, of limited capacity, and/or infeasible.135 That leaves
sixteen patent applications (some of which have gone
abandoned) and granted patents concerning the two proposed
SCE techniques that are currently considered relatively
feasible and effective: aerosol injection and marine cloud
brightening.136 Among these, four were issued and remain
active, one was issued and has since expired, nine have been
abandoned, and two are still pending as applications.137
Furthermore, several of the applications related to aerosol
injection use materials or methods that are not considered
viable among mainstream SCE scientists. Specifically, one
inventor has one pending application and one issued patent for
SCE inventions that address injecting materials into the lower
133. See infra Table 1.
134. We have also not listed any of the related applications, in the same or
other jurisdictions, whether now abandoned or that may remain pending.
135. See NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL OF THENAT’L ACADS. ET AL., supra note
15, at 128 (stating that “the committee has chosen to not consider these
technologies because of the substantial time (>20 years), cost (trillions of
dollars), and technology challenges associated with these issues,” and
concluding that surface albedo “techniques are judged to be of low potential
use on the global scale because of generally low effectiveness and high costs”).
136. See, e.g., PCT Pat. Appl. No. PCT/US2013/020589, Publ’n No.
WO2013086542A1 (June 13, 2013) (detailing a system for spraying salt water
to create cloud brightening droplets).
137. See infra Table 1.
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atmosphere (the troposphere, not the stratosphere).138 This
inventor has not published in the academic literature.
Interestingly, though many of these patents and patent
applications were filed in the United States, none appears to
have resulted from research conducted at U.S. research
universities or using U.S. federal research funding.139
Of the patents and applications they studied, Oldham et al.
concluded, “[w]hile patent activity [currently] appears to be
minor it merits further research using an approach focusing on
capturing activity by individual companies and inventors.”140
Having conducted our own review, we concur.
138. See, e.g., WO2008006364A2 and US5003186A, US7501103B2 (created
by Franz Dietrich Oeste and describing the addition of substances to fuels so
that the smoke resulting from their combustion cools the lower atmosphere).
139. This result has implications for the rights of the U.S. Government
under the Bayh-Dole Act, among other things. See infra Subsection V.A.2.
140. Oldham et al., supra note 20, at 14.
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The results of the patent survey thus do not imply that all
existing SCE granted patents and technologies disclosed in
patent applications are and will remain unimportant, nor that
they will avoid creating complications for the future research,
development, and possible implementation of SCE.143 Currently
pending patent applications containing broadly applicable
claims ultimately may be granted; patented methods that now
appear marginal could become central; early patents that are
not being practiced could later become essential; and more
applications for technologies and approaches could be filed.
Further, not only university scientists but also commercial
entities are filing applications for SCE patents, including non-
practicing entities that are known for affirmatively licensing
and occasionally litigating their patent portfolios.144 Finally,
there may be many other general-purpose, patented
technologies that could have uses in SCE, but whose patents do
not describe SCE applications. They thus did not appear in or
were removed from prior patent reviews and our review.145 We
have not attempted to search for such generally applicable
technologies in regard to presently understood SCE methods,
much less in regard to those that may be developed in the
future. Nevertheless, the relative paucity of patents that are
directly related to SCE at present provides a unique
opportunity to consider means that might avoid the
development of problems that they might engender.146
To better understand the patent landscape, some granted
patents and patent applications related to SCE warrant
elaboration. First, the inventors and the applicant (assignee) of
a pending application for an invention related to marine cloud
brightening (WO2013086542A1, “Salt Water Spray Systems for
Cloud Brightening Droplets and Nano-Particle Generation”147)
are all published SCE researchers.148 The applicants describe
143. See infra Part IV.
144. See Jim Kerstetter & Josh Lowensohn, Inside Intellectual Ventures,
the Most Hated Company in Tech, C/NET (Aug. 21, 2012), http://www.cnet.com
/news/inside-intellectual-ventures-the-most-hated-company-in-tech/.
145. See generally SHEPHERD ET AL., supra note 23 (discussing many of
these technologies).
146. See Oldham et al., supra note 20, at 14 (noting “very limited activity
in this field”).
147. PCT Appl. No. PCT/US2013/020589, Publ’n No. WO2013086542 A8
(May 21, 2015).
148. See Latham et al., supra note 44; Gary Cooper et al., A Review of Some
Experimental Spray Methods for Marine Cloud Brightening, 4 INT’L J.
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the relevant technology as “being particularly useful for
geoengineering for increasing cloud reflectivity.”149 Thus, the
applicants recognize these generally applicable technologies as
having specific uses in SCE, but as not being limited to such
uses.
Second, two researchers who assigned their rights to the
Hughes Aircraft Company (which has since been purchased by
the Raytheon Company) applied for and were granted a U.S.
patent that appears to be related to stratospheric aerosol
injection in 1991.150 The patent has now expired. The claims of
this early patent were worded broadly. The first of two
independent claims was for “reducing atmospheric warming
[by] . . . dispersing tiny particles of a material . . . [which]
provide a means for converting infrared heat energy into far
infrared radiation which is radiated into space.”151 This method
likely would not apply to stratospheric aerosol injection,
because—as presently envisioned—the aerosols would reflect
some incoming solar radiation back to space.152 In contrast, the
patent describes particles that, if they were to function
properly, would absorb near infrared wavelength energy and
re-emit them as far infrared wavelength energy.153
Third, Robert Theodore Jenkins (a former Intel engineer)
applied for and was granted two patents (one being a divisional
application of the original filing) for the “[p]roduction or
distribution of radiative forcing agents.”154 These patents cover
specific methods of delivering aerosols to the upper
atmosphere.155 The claims of the first patent address a vehicle
that produces the cooling agent through heat.156 For one
GEOSCIENCES 78 (2013); Gary Cooper et al., Preliminary Results for Salt
Aerosol Production Intended for Marine Cloud Brightening, Using Effervescent
Spray Atomization, 372 PHIL. TRANSACTIONS ROYAL SOC’Y A (Theme Issue No.
2031) 1 (2014); Armand Neukermans et al., Sub-Micrometer Salt Aerosol
Production Intended for Marine Cloud Brightening, 142 ATMOSPHERIC RES.
158 (2014).
149. PCT Appl. No. PCT/US2013/020589, Publ’n No. WO2013086542 A8
(May 21, 2015).
150. U.S. Patent No. 5,003,186 (issued Mar. 26, 1991).
151. Id. at claim 1.
152. Id. § 2.
153. Id. § 4.
154. U.S. Patent No. 8,152,091 B2 (issued Apr. 10, 2012); U.S. Patent No.
8,944,363 B2 (issued Feb. 3, 2015).
155. U.S. Patent No. 8,152,091 B2 (issued Apr. 10, 2012); U.S. Patent No.
8,944,363 B2 (issued Feb. 3, 2015).
156. See U.S. Patent No. 8,152,091 B2 claims 1, 19 (issued Apr. 10, 2012).
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example, this patent could cover an engine that burns aviation
fuel with a high sulfur content, producing sulfate aerosols.157
The claims of the second patent address vehicles that have
“control surfaces” to distribute cooling agents from “two or
more constituents” or that can be maneuvered to deliver such
cooling agents in response to atmospheric conditions.158 The
second patent was partially assigned to TVG, LLC of Oregon,
USA.159 However we have listed only the first in Table 1 and in
our count of inventions that have been granted at least one
patent, as we view these as closely related technologies.
Fourth, a granted patent (with numerous pending patent
applications that are not listed in Table 1) for a conduit, “High
altitude structures and related methods,” notes that
[b]y controlling the amount and type of gasses and/or particulate
placed into the atmosphere, it may be possible to control to some
extent the heating of the Earth. Delivery of such gasses and/or
particulate may be provided by the use of high altitude conduit
systems, such as are described here.”160
Some of the application’s inventors published early white
papers on SCE.161 Another named inventor in this application
is Nathan P. Myhrvold, a co-founder of Intellectual Ventures
(IV), one of the largest non-practicing, patent-holding
entities.162 The patent application is assigned to a corporation
that has been described as a shell company of IV, with which it
157. Id.
158. See U.S. Patent No. 8,944,363 claims 1, 16, 18, 19 (issued Feb. 3,
2015).
159. Id.
160. U.S. Patent No. 8166710, at col. 6, l. 5 (issued May 1, 2012).
161. See EDWARD TELLER ET AL., ACTIVE CLIMATE STABILIZATION:
PRACTICAL PHYSICS-BASED APPROACHES TO PREVENTION OF CLIMATE CHANGE
(2002); EDWARD TELLER ET AL., GLOBAL WARMING AND ICE AGES: I.
PROSPECTS FOR PHYSICS-BASEDMODULATION OFGLOBAL CHANGE (1997).
162. See The Partial List of Non-Practicing Entities Featured in the NPE
Tracker, IP CHECKUPS, http://www.ipcheckups.com/npe-tracker/npe-tracker-
list/ (last visited Nov. 19, 2016) (noting about 40,000 patents in IV’s portfolio).
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shares an address.163 IV claims that it does not intend to profit
from the patent.164
Fifth, another international application resulted in a
number of patents in England and more recently resulted in a
patent in the United States (e.g., GB2476518, GB2487287,
US9353954), for an “Atmospheric Delivery System” including a
conduit “for transporting and dispersing particles into the
earth’s stratosphere, particularly to achieve a global or local
cooling effect.”165 That application was one of the concerns
triggering cancellation of the 2012 United Kingdom field
trial.166 These applicants appear to have assigned their rights
to a spin-off company created by one of the researchers who is
also a named inventor.167 One of the patent holders stated that
he did not expect the venture to be profitable, but that if it
were profitable, the owners would donate the revenue to
“climate-change-related charities.”168 He claimed to have filed
this application in order to prevent others, especially
“ExxonMobil or Shell,” from doing so.169 This approach raises
the issues (discussed further in Parts IV and V below) of
defensive patenting and publication as means to create prior
art, preventing patent rights from issuing to subsequent
inventors, and of using patents defensively to countersue
others who seek to assert patents in a particular field.
163. Tom Ewing & Robin Feldman, The Giants Among Us, 2012 STANFORD
TECH. L. REV. 1, 38; see also U.S. Patent Application No. 11/788,383, Publ’n
No. US20080257977A1 (filed Apr. 18, 2007) (listing Searete LLC as the
correspondence address); U.S. Patent Application No. 11/788,372, Publ’n No.
US2008/0258006 A1 (filed Apr. 18, 2007) (listing Searete LLC as the
correspondence address); U.S. Patent Application No. 12/589,504, Publ’n No.
US2010/007177 1A1 (filed Oct. 22, 2009) (listing Searete LLC as the
correspondence address).
164. Press Release, Intell. Ventures, Intellectual Ventures’ Answers About
Geoengineering (Oct. 23, 2009), http://www.intellectualventures.com/news
/press-releases/intellectual-ventures-answers-about-geoengineering/ (claiming
“we do not expect or intend that our climate technology inventions will make
money”).
165. U.K. Patent No. GB2487287 (published Apr. 24, 2013), at 1, ll. 7–8.
166. See Cressey, supra note 55; see also infra text accompanying note 264.
167. U.K. Patent No. GB2487287 (published Apr. 24, 2013) (listing
“Davidson Technology Limited” as the “Proprietor[ ],” i.e., the owner).
168. Cressey, supra note 55.
169. Michael Marshall, Controversial Geoengineering Field Test Cancelled,
NEW SCIENTIST (May 22, 2012), https://www.newscientist.com/article/dn21840
-controversial-geoengineering-field-test-cancelled/.
40 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. [Vol. 18:1
Sixth, one abandoned patent application was for an SCE
business method.170 Specifically, the application claimed a
“business method for providing commercial value to a
geoengineering global cooling business” involving four steps: (1)
manufacturing a “device or agent designed to reduce the
incident energy upon the Earth”; (2) deploying the device; (3)
receiving compensation in the form of a credit for reducing
incident energy; and (4) selling the credit for other valuable
consideration.171 The patent thus would seek to address GHG
abatement measures through SCE approaches that would be
recognized within, among other things, carbon emission trading
markets.
In summary, the patent landscape for SCE currently
indicates a general low level of patent activity, particularly by
published, university-based SCE researchers and for SCE
proposals that are within the mainstream of SCE research.
This is remarkable, considering the potential development of
an industry that could have direct annual revenues on the
order of $50 billion.172 Further, our research, building upon the
work of Oldham et al. and Chavez, reveals that ownership of
SCE-related patents and patent applications is diverse. Parties
to whom applications or issued patents were assigned (at the
time of relevant publication) include individual inventors,
university scientists (with some assignments to their research
institutions or to spinoff companies), non-practicing entities,
and one large corporation.173
As a final note, the line distinguishing SCE and non-SCE
patenting activity is far from clear.174 As noted, research in
unrelated areas may yield innovations that are later important
or even essential to SCE research, development, or
implementation.175 Likewise, SCE work may lead to patents
170. U.S. Patent Application No. 12/942,701, Publication No.
US2012/0117003 A1 (filed Nov. 9, 2010).
171. Id. at claim 1.
172. See supra notes 108–09 and accompanying text.
173. See, e.g., U.S. Patent No. 8,152,091 B2 (issued Apr. 10, 2012); U.S.
Patent No. 8,944,363 B2 (issued Feb. 3, 2015); U.S. Patent Application No.
11/788,389, Publ’n No. US2008/0257396 A1 (issued Oct. 23, 2008).
174. See, e.g., Ken Caldeira and Katharine L. Ricke, Correspondence,
Prudence on Solar Climate Engineering, 3 NAT. CLIMATE CHANGE 941 (2013)
(“The phrase ‘field test of solar climate engineering’ cannot be unambiguously
defined.”).
175. See Megan Herzog & Edward A. Parson, Moratoria for Global
Governance and Contested Technology: The Case of Climate Engineering 13–14
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that are used largely or entirely in other domains.176
Furthermore, given SCE’s controversy, researchers may
attempt to conceal their SCE work by describing it in other
terms, such as by discussing uses for aerosols, clouds, or
climate in general. Consequently, some patents and patent
applications that were developed with SCE in mind may not be
described as such and may not have been identified in Oldham
et al.’s, Chavez’s, or our research.
B. RESEARCHDATA AND TRADE SECRETS
The present state of sharing research data among SCE
scientists is difficult to specify with precision. Informal
inquiries made by the authors to various SCE researchers
produced responses consistently indicating that they readily
share data when asked, and often place their results into
standardized, publicly accessible databases. For example, the
largest SCE modeling program—the Geoengineering Model
Intercomparison Project (GeoMIP)—converts its output into a
format consistent with the Coupled Model Intercomparison
Project, the leading standard for data from coupled
atmosphere-ocean general circulation models.177 The results
from GeoMIP are freely available online through the Earth
System Grid.178 The only contingency is that, if research data is
(UCLA Sch. of Law, Pub. Law Research Paper No. 16–17, 2016) (discussing
the overlap between general climate research and SCE field tests).
176. John Latham et al., Climate Engineering: Exploring Nuances and
Consequences of Deliberately Altering the Earth’s Energy Budget, 372 PHIL.
TRANSACTIONS ROYAL SOC’Y A (Theme Issue No. 2031) 3 (2014) (describing
SCE experiments that provide co-benefits for more general climate science).
177. See Ben Kravitz, GeoMIP Data, GEOENGINEERING MODEL
INTERCOMPOSITION PROJECT, http://climate.envsci.rutgers.edu/GeoMIP/data
/GeoMIP-data-submission.doc (last visited Nov. 19, 2016); Interview with Ben
Kravitz, Founder and Coordinator, GeoMIP. GeoMIP is a publicly funded
international collaboration that has been endorsed by the Working Group on
Coupled Modeling of the World Climate Research Programme. Ben Kravitz,
GeoMIP Support, GEOENGINEERING MODEL INTERCOMPOSITION PROJECT,
http://climate.envsci.rutgers.edu/GeoMIP/support.html (last visited Nov. 19,
2016); WCRP Coupled Model Intercomparison Project, WORLD CLIMATE RES.
PROGRAMME, http://www.wcrp-climate.org/wgcm/cmip_coord.shtml (last
visited Nov. 19, 2016).
178. See Project: GeoMIP, EARTH SYSTEM GRID AT NCAR,
https://www.earthsystemgrid.org/project/geomip.html (last visited Nov. 19,
2016). The Earth System Grid is an online research data gateway. It is
governed by the Earth System Grid Federation, an international collaboration
that primarily supports the World Climate Research Programme, a program of
the United Nations World Meteorological Organization. The Earth System
Grid Federation is led by the U.S. National Center for Atmospheric Research,
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used for publication “within a certain time window,” the
original modelers should be offered the opportunity to
contribute as co-authors.179 “Each modeling group is well posed
to understand its model and the intricacies of performing the
GeoMIP experiments, so their perspectives will undoubtedly be
useful.”180
Researchers in the broader climatology and earth science
disciplines participate in a number of international data
sharing initiatives and programs. These include the GEOSS
Common Infrastructure developed by the Group on Earth
Observations (GEO)181 and the intergovernmental Belmont
Forum’s E-Infrastructure for Global Change Research.182
Researchers, both at universities and private firms, might
develop and maintain trade secrets relating to SCE.183 This
could be with the intention of later development into
commercially viable technologies or for potentially valuable
business advantages in providing services to support SCE
research, development, or implementation activities. Unlike
patents, however, trade secrets are not registered or recorded
with any governmental agency.184 There is thus no way to
determine the extent to which such valuable information may
and is supported by the U.S. National Science Foundation, Department of
Energy, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, and National
Aeronautics and Space Administration. It closely collaborates with the E.U.
Common Metadata for Climate Modelling Digital Repositories. About the
Earth System Grid, EARTH SYSTEM GRID AT NCAR, https://www
.earthsystemgrid.org/about/overview.htm (last visited Nov. 19, 2016).
179. See Kravitz, GeoMIP Data, supra note 177.
180. Id.
181. The GEOSS Common Infrastructure, GROUP ON EARTH
OBSERVATIONS, https://www.earthobservations.org/gci_gci.shtml (last visited
Nov. 19, 2016).
182. See About: Belmont Forum e-Infrastructures and Data Management
Collaborative Research Action: Establishing Sustainable e-Infrastructures for
Global Change Research, BELMONT F., http://www.bfe-inf.org/info/about (last
visited Nov. 19, 2016).
183. Lawrence Kogan, President, Inst. for Trade, Standards, and
Sustainable Dev., Climate Change Technology Transfer or Compulsory
License?: Speech Presented at The American National Standards Institute
(ANSI) Monthly Caucus Luncheon 6 (Jan. 15, 2010) (“The ‘Global Access
Principles’ of such funding structures would set forth rules for the
international management of [IP rights] (e.g., patents, trade secrets,
copyrights, plant breeders’ rights) developed as the result of international
collaborations or research grants.”) (emphasis omitted).
184. See Trade Secret Policy, U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF., https://www
.uspto.gov/patents-getting-started/international-protection/trade-secret-policy
(last visited Nov. 19, 2016).
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be developed, by whom, and with what intentions.185 However,
our informal inquiries of some university researchers indicate
that they are not presently considering preserving their SCE
discoveries as trade secrets. Further, because of the lack of
current commercial development and implementation of SCE
technologies, any such trade secrets are likely nascent.
Nevertheless, the abandoned patent application for a business
method in trading credits from manufacturing and deploying
cooling devices (described above186) would certainly suggest
that the commercial potential of some SCE technologies or
related business practices may make trade secret acquisition
and maintenance attractive in the future.
IV. INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY CHALLENGES FOR
EMERGING TECHNOLOGIES
IP will form an important part of the SCE governance
landscape. In this Part, we address a number of common
concerns relating to IP protection in emerging markets, with a
particular emphasis on implications for SCE research.
A. PATENTS AND INNOVATION IN EMERGINGMARKETS
Diverse views exist as to the purpose of IP rights in
general, and patent rights in particular,187 and there are many
different approaches to understanding how they function.
Because innovation can be considered a public good, and
because others can use information—once publicly known —for
their benefit without paying for it, IP rights are often
understood as a means to overcome Arrow’s information
paradox.188 As applied to patent law, the government’s grant of
185. See generally James Pooley, Trade Secrets: The Other IP Right, WIPO
MAG., (June 2013), http://www.wipo.int/wipo_magazine/en/2013/03/article
_0001.html.
186. See supra note 170 and accompanying text; see also Andrew Lockley,
Licence to Chill: Building a Legitimate Authorisation Process for Commercial
SRM Operations, 18 ENVTL. L. REV. 25 (2016) (describing potential linkages
between SCE and voluntary carbon offset markets).
187. See Richard D. Nelson & Robert Mazzoleni, Economic Theories About
the Costs and Benefits of Patents, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS AND
RESEARCH TOOLS IN MOLECULAR BIOLOGY 17, 17–18 (1997) (discussing four
main theories of IP rights).
188. See Kenneth J. Arrow, Economic Welfare and the Allocation of
Resources for Invention, in THE RATE AND DIRECTION OF INVENTIVE ACTIVITY:
ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL FACTORS 609, 614–16 (Univs.-Nat’l Bureau Comm. for
Econ. Research, Comm. on Econ. Growth of the Soc. Sci. Research Council, ed.
1962). But see Michael J. Burstein, Exchanging Information Without
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temporary exclusive rights is believed to provide incentives to
invent new technologies that benefit society that would
otherwise not have been produced because of the inability to
protect the information, and to thereby recoup the investments
made in producing it.189 Patents also induce disclosure of
information for immediate use in further innovative activities,
as compared to protecting such information through secrecy.190
Patents, however, impose static costs to society in the form
of increased prices (if the patented invention has sufficient
market power) and dynamic costs to innovation (when the
patent rights raise the costs of or foreclose sequential
innovation).191 Some view patents as appropriately providing
exclusive rights to control such sequential innovation research
“prospects,” thereby allowing the patent holder to develop
sequential innovation more efficiently without the social costs
of duplicative efforts.192 Without wading deeply into an
unsettled debate over which theories of patents best reflect
historical justifications or actual operations, it suffices to note
that patent rights have historically led to some significant
conflicts. Moreover, many scholars believe that patents are
more important for developing technologies to the point of
marketable products, and less important for basic research that
governments typically fund in the first instance.193
Further, the optimal scope and duration of patent rights is
also subject to debate,194 with its resolution having significant
Intellectual Property, 91 TEX. L. REV. 227(2012) (arguing that IP is not
necessary to overcome Arrow’s paradox).
189. See, e.g., Arnold Plant, The Economic Theory Concerning Patents for
Inventions, 1 ECONOMICA 30, 38–40, 43–44 (1934).
190. This is the case at least for innovations that are not self-disclosing or
are not easy to reverse engineer. See generally Katherine J. Strandburg, What
Does the Public Get? Experimental Use and the Patent Bargain, 2004 WISC. L.
REV. 81, 111–17 (2004) (discussing self-disclosing and non-self-disclosing
inventions).
191. See, e.g., Suzanne Scotchmer, Standing on the Shoulders of Giants:
Cumulative Research and Patent Law, 5 J. ECON. PERSP. 29, 33–34 (1991).
192. See, e.g., John F. Duffy, Rethinking the Prospect Theory of Patents, 71
U. CHI. L. REV. 439, 465 (2004); Edmund W. Kitch, The Nature and Function
of the Patent System, 20 J.L. & ECON. 265, 278 (1977).
193. See infra notes 229–42 and accompanying text.
194. See, e.g., Robert P. Merges & Richard R. Nelson, On the Complex
Economics of Patent Scope, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 839 (1990) (arguing for a
reduction in patent scope); Richard J. Gilbert & Carl Shapiro, Optimal Patent
Length and Breadth, 21 RAND J. ECON. 106 (1990) (presenting models to
reduce “deadweight loss” associated with patent scope and duration); Vincenzo
Denicolò, Patent Races and Optimal Patent Breadth and Length, 44 J. INDUS.
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consequences. Broad initial patent rights in “pioneering”
(foundational) discoveries and technologies can preclude
sequential competitive innovation and development.195 For this
reason, three U.S. Supreme Court Justices have argued that
the historic, current, and universally acknowledged exclusion
from patent systems of patents on basic scientific and natural
discoveries—“laws of nature, physical phenomena, and abstract
ideas”196—was based on utilitarian concerns that such
fundamental building blocks of science and innovation should
not be privately owned:
The relevant principle of law “[e]xclude[s] from . . . patent
protection . . . laws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract
ideas.” This principle finds its roots in both English and American
law . . . .
The justification for the principle does not lie in any claim that
“laws of nature” are obvious, or that their discovery is easy, or that
they are not useful. To the contrary, research into such matters may
be costly and time consuming; monetary incentives may matter; and
the fruits of those incentives and that research may prove of great
benefit to the human race. Rather, the reason for the exclusion is
that sometimes too much patent protection can impede rather than
“promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts,” the constitutional
objective of patent and copyright protection.197
Similarly, many scholars have argued that the
fundamentality of such natural and scientific discoveries
generate concerns regarding the over-breadth of patent rights
that would cover such discoveries, which cannot be designed-
ECON. 249, 256–64 (1996) (comparing conditions for minimum and maximum
patent length).
195. See, e.g., Timothy Chen Saulsbury, Pioneers Versus Improvers:
Enabling Optimal Patent Claim Scope, 16 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV.
439, 442 (2010) (“[A] patent system entails an unavoidable tradeoff between
incentivizing pioneering inventions and subsequent improvements; though the
prospect of a broad patent may provide stronger incentives for creation and
commercialization of new developments, its scope reduces incentives for other
inventors to improve upon that work.”).
196. Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 601–02 (2010); see, e.g., European
Patent Convention, Art. 52(2)(a), Oct. 5, 1973, 1065 U.N.T.S. 254 (“The
following in particular shall not be regarded as inventions within the meaning
of paragraph 1: (a) discoveries, scientific theories and mathematical
methods . . . .”).
197. Laboratory Corp. of Am. Holdings v. Metabolite Labs., Inc., 548 U.S.
124, 126 (2004) (Breyer, J., dissenting from dismissal of cert. as improvidently
granted) (quoting U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8; Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S.
175, 185 (1981)) (citing Dolbear v. American Bell Tel. Co. (The Telephone
Cases), 126 U.S. 1 (1888); O’Reilly v. Morse, 15 How. 62 (1854); Le Roy v.
Tatham, 14 How. 156, 175 (1852); Neilson v. Harford, 151 Eng. Rep. 1266,
1273 (1841)).
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around (because that is how the world works), and which would
therefore dominate too much sequential innovation.198
Other scholars, including one of the present authors, have
argued that the exclusions from the patent system for
fundamental scientific and natural discoveries reflect historic
religious and deontological moral views that such basic aspects
of the world are not proper subjects of private property
rights.199 Scientific and natural discoveries were not considered
to be human but rather divine inventions, and scientists were
thought to have religious and moral duties to disseminate their
fundamental discoveries freely for the benefit of all (which
views later formed the basis for the Mertonian norm of open
and communal science).200 As eloquently stated by Lord
Camden in 1774, scientists were “entrusted by Providence with
the delegated power of imparting to their fellow creatures that
instruction which heaven meant for universal benefit; they
must not be niggards to the world, or hoard up for themselves
198. See, e.g., Mark A. Lemley et al., Life After Bilski, 63 STAN. L. REV.
1315, 1328–29 (2011) (“But what ideas are reserved to society? Those that are
fundamental, the building blocks of human thought . . . . the abstract ideas
exception operates where a patent claim is ‘too broad’ in the sense that it
encroaches upon society’s right to unfettered access to scientific truths,
fundamental principles, and the like; these properly belong in the commons
upon which future innovations can be built, ‘free to all men and reserved
exclusively to none.’ This concern about overbreadth is not, we think, limited
to the abstract ideas doctrine; it also animates the prohibition against
patenting products of nature.”) (quoting Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant
Co., 333 U.S. 127, 130 (1948)); see also id. at 1335 (“Our scope theory is also
largely consistent with the Court’s more recent ‘abstract idea’ decisions . . . . In
short, whatever was new about the invention [in Gottschalk v. Benson, 409
U.S. 63 (1972)] was unmoored to any practical application, such that it was ‘so
abstract and sweeping’ as to unduly foreclose follow-on invention, particularly
that using after-arising technologies. Given the Court’s concern with
‘unknown uses’ and ‘future-devised machinery,’ Benson cannot merely be
explained by traditional scope and disclosure doctrines.”) (quoting Benson, 409
U.S. at 64–68)).
199. Joshua D. Sarnoff, Patent-Eligible Inventions After Bilski: History and
Theory, 63 HASTINGS L.J. 53, 121–24 (2011) [hereinafter Sarnoff, Patent-
Eligible Inventions After Bilski].
200. See, e.g., id at 63–90 (tracing the relevant history in post-
Enlightenment philosophical thought, including internal limits to private
property within John Locke’s labor-based property theory, religious views of
the divine origins of nature and human discovery, and 18th through 20th
Century legal standards reflecting these limitations). See generally Robert K.
Merton, The Normative Structure of Science, in THE SOCIOLOGY OF SCIENCE:
THEORETICAL AND EMPIRICAL INVESTIGATIONS 267, (Norman W. Storer ed., U.
of Chi. Press 1973) (1945).
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the common stock.”201 These and similar deontological moral
concerns have informed legislative prohibitions of patents on
human organisms202 and on human and animal diagnostic and
medical treatment methods.203 Yet other deontological concerns
(addressing freedom of thought or freedom from exclusive
rights in various domains of life, particularly where patent
incentives are thought to be unnecessary) may be at issue in
regard to patents on business methods, software, mental acts,
games, and the like.204 It should be obvious from this brief
discussion that patents on fundamental or emerging
technologies will be highly controversial.
Even without regard to concerns about “owning” science
and nature, broad fundamental patents raise important
problems for sequential innovation. Allocating broad new
technological fields to a single patent holder can stifle
innovation by others who might be in a better position to
improve and advance the technology.205 Patentable
improvements to pioneering inventions may block commercial
production by requiring licenses from both the pioneering and
201. Speech by Lord Camden (Feb. 21, 1774), in 17 THE PARLIAMENTARY
HISTORY OF ENGLAND 999 (T.C. Hansard ed. 1813) (1774).
202. See Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112–29, § 33, 125
Stat. 284 (2011). See generally Yaniv Heled, On Patenting Human Organisms
or How the Abortion Wars Feed into the Ownership Fallacy, 36 CARDOZO L.
REV. 241, 253 (2014) (discussing the Section 33 and the Weldon Amendment,
which affirmed 1987 USPTO policy “restricting funds for issuing patents on
human embryos [and] human organisms”).
203. See, e.g., European Patent Convention, supra note 196 art. 53(c)
(“European patents shall not be granted in respect of... (c) methods for
treatment of the human or animal body by surgery or therapy and diagnostic
methods practised on the human or animal body . . . .”).
204. See, e.g., id. art. 52(2)(b)–(d) (“(b) aesthetic creations; (c) schemes,
rules and methods for performing mental acts, playing games or doing
business, and programs for computers; (d) presentations of information”); id.
art. 53(a)–(b) (“(a) inventions the commercial exploitation of which would be
contrary to ‘ordre public’ or morality . . . (b) plant or animal varieties or
essentially biological processes for the production of plants or animals . . . .”);
Sarnoff, Patent-Eligible Inventions After Bilski, supra note 199, at 62–63
(“These moral norms include valuing our common heritage, protecting freedom
of thought and expressive communication, preserving bodily integrity and
personality, and maintaining certain activities or things free from the patent
system or subject to certain kinds of equal treatment, as for tax planning
methods and human organisms or sporting activities.”). See generally John R.
Thomas, The Patenting of the Liberal Professions, 40 B.C. L. REV. 1139, 1179
(1999).
205. See, e.g., Brian Love, Interring the Pioneer Invention Doctrine, 90 N.C.
L. REV. 380, 436–56 (2012) (describing the friction between the pioneering
inventor and subsequent improvers).
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improvement patent holders.206 Numerous patent law doctrines
are intended to prevent patents from claiming technologies
that are broader than their actual contribution to the art.207
However, these doctrines do not preclude the issuance of broad
patents on pioneering discoveries or on claiming inventions
using broad functional language, which may then dominate a
wide swath of later-developed technologies.208 As Robert
Merges and Richard Nelson have argued, “the granting of
broad patents in many cases has stifled technical advance and
that where technical advance has been rapid there almost
always has been considerable rivalry.”209 Because SCE is an
emerging technology in an untested market, the potential for
broad functional and preclusive patent claims is a possibility.
As a result of these concerns, a number of scholars have
studied alternatives to the patent system that may promote
innovation in particular technical areas. These alternative
mechanisms include tax credits for desirable R&D activities,
funding research priorities through grant awards, and issuing
prizes to those who successfully achieve desired technical
milestones.210 Some of these mechanisms have been used to
206. See, e.g., Merges & Nelson, supra note 194, at 860–68.
207. See, e.g., Dennis Crouch & Robert Merges, Operating Efficiently Post-
Bilski by Ordering Patent Doctrine Decision-Making, 25 BERKELEY TECH. L.J.
1673, 1684–86 (2010).
208. See 35 U.S.C. § 112(a)–(b)&(f) (2012) (enablement and written
description, definiteness, and functional claiming doctrines); Jason Rantanen,
Teva, Nautilus, and Change Without Change, 18 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 538, 548
(2015) (discussing the indefiniteness doctrine for patent claims); Kevin T.
Richards, Experimentation and Patent Validity: Restoring the Supreme Court’s
Incandescent Lamp Patent Precedent, 101 VA. L. REV. 1545, 1554–55 (2015)
(discussing the enablement doctrine for patent claims); Mark A. Lemley,
Software Patents and the Return of Functional Claiming, 2013 WIS. L. REV.
905, 964 (2013) (discussing the need for better limits on use and interpretation
of functional claiming language in patents). See generally Jeffrey A. Lefstin,
The Formal Structure of Patent Law and the Limits of Enablement, 23
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1141 (2008).
209. Merges & Nelson, supra note 194, at 877.
210. See generally SUZANNE SCOTCHMER, INNOVATION AND INCENTIVES
31–58 (2004); MARIANA MAZZUCATO, THE ENTREPRENEURIAL STATE:
DEBUNKING PUBLIC VS. PRIVATE SECTOR MYTHS 52–54 (Kevin Gallgher et al.
eds, Anthem Press 2013); Joshua D. Sarnoff, Government Choices in
Innovation Funding (with Reference to Climate Change), 62 EMORY L.J. 1087,
1119 (2013) [hereinafter Sarnoff, Government Choices]; NAT. RES. COUNCIL OF
THE NAT’L ACADS., RISING TO THE CHALLENGE: U.S. INNOVATION POLICY FOR
THE GLOBAL ECONOMY 53–56 (Charles W. Wessner & Alan Wm. Wolff eds.,
2012) (discussing government funding and other government sponsored
incentives).
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achieve governmental technology development goals for some
time. Governmental grants to academic institutions and
private industry have been used in the United States since
World War II to foster the development of technologies ranging
from advanced weapons to spacecraft to the majority of
biomedical research conducted today.211 Prizes have an even
longer history, and many scholars cite the famous account of
the British government’s £20,000 prize offered to the developer
of the first successful means for determining longitude at
sea.212 Since then, both governments and private foundations
have offered a range of prizes for technological developments.213
Significantly, such measures may be supplied by governments
either as alternatives or as additions to patent rights, and
where the additional measures may not eliminate concerns
over such rights.
B. THE POTENTIAL FOR PATENT THICKETS AND ANTI-COMMONS
When numerous patents exist in a technological field, it is
possible for a “thicket” or an “anti-commons” to develop. In
such situations, it becomes costly and time-consuming—if not
impossible—for other market participants to conduct research
and improve upon the patented technology.214 This
phenomenon has been part of the patent system for a very long
211. See, e.g., Peter Galison, The Many Faces of Big Science, introduction to
BIG SCIENCE: THE GROWTH OF LARGE-SCALE RESEARCH 1, 3 (Peter Galison &
Bruce Hevly, eds., 1992); SCOTCHMER, supra note 210, at 16–26; INST. OF
MED., LARGE-SCALE BIOMEDICAL SCIENCE: EXPLORING STRATEGIES FOR
FUTURE RESEARCH 29–79 (Sheryl J. Nass & Bruce W. Stillman, eds., 2003)
(offering numerous examples of large-scale government funded projects).
212. See generally DAVA SOBEL, LONGITUDE: THE TRUE STORY OF A LONE
GENIUSWHO SOLVED THE GREATEST SCIENTIFIC PROBLEM OF HIS TIME (1995)
(telling the story of John Harrison and his invention that led to the discovery
of longitude); Jonathan R. Siegel, Law and Longitude, 84 TUL. L. REV. 1, 3–4
(2009).
213. See, e.g., Fiona Murray et al., Grand Innovation Prizes: A Theoretical,
Normative, and Empirical Evaluation, 41 RES. POL’Y 1779, 1780–81 (2012);
KNOWLEDGE ECOLOGY INT’L, SELECTED INNOVATION PRIZES AND REWARD
PROGRAMS, (2008), http://keionline.org/misc-docs/research_notes/kei_rn_2008
_1.pdf; SCOTCHMER, supra note 210, at 8–11.
214. See, e.g., Carl Shapiro, Navigating the Patent Thicket: Cross Licenses,
Patent Pools, and Standard Setting, 1 INNOVATION POL’Y & THE ECON. 119,
119–22 (2001); Michael A. Heller & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Can Patents Deter
Innovation? The Anticommons in Biomedical Research, 280 SCIENCE 698, 700
(1998); MICHAEL HELLER, THE GRIDLOCK ECONOMY: HOW TOO MUCH
OWNERSHIP WRECKS MARKETS, STOPS INNOVATION, AND COSTS LIVES 43
(Basic Books 2008).
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time, tracing back to the “sewing machine wars” of the
nineteenth century215 through the development of airplanes in
the early twentieth century216 to numerous computer and
communications technologies in the late twentieth century.217
Again, as Merges and Nelson have observed, “[i]n what we
have called cumulative technologies, particularly when the
product in question was a multicomponent system, broad
patents on components led to [R&D] blockages.”218
The emergence of an anti-commons was a particular
concern in regard to patenting in the newly developing field of
biotechnology, in which numerous applicants in the early 1990s
sought to patent expressed sequence tags (ESTs), small
fragments of genetic material that were useful as probes in
identifying genes and other functional DNA sequences.219
Numerous patents on ESTs were issued until the practice was
halted, among other things, following efforts of the U.S.
National Institutes of Health (NIH) to convince the USPTO to
deny such patents based on their lack of known utility.220 The
judiciary subsequently upheld the USPTO’s restrictive
approach.221
Concerns about blocking sequential innovation and for
triggering an anti-commons are particularly high for
pioneering new technologies.222 This heightened concern exists
215. Adam Mossoff, The Rise and Fall of the First American Patent Thicket:
The Sewing Machine War of the 1850s, 53 ARIZ. L. REV. 165, 166 (2011).
216. See discussion infra Subsection V.B.1.
217. See generally Shapiro, supra note 214, at 127–44.
218. Merges & Nelson, supra note 194, at 908.
219. See, e.g., Linda J. Demaine & Aaron X. Fellmeth, Reinventing the
Double Helix: A Novel and Nonobvious Reconceptualization of the
Biotechnology Patent, 55 STAN. L. REV. 303, 323–29 (2002); Heller &
Eisenberg, supra note 214, at 699.
220. See 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2012) (authorizing patents for “new and useful”
categories of eligible subject matter); see also Jorge L. Contreras, Bermuda’s
Legacy: Policy, Patents, and the Design of the Genome Commons, 12 MINN. J.L.
SCI. & TECH. 61, 83–84 (2011) [hereinafter Contreras, Bermuda’s Legacy].
221. See In re Fisher, 421 F.3d 1365, 1379 (2005) (“[E]ach of the five
claimed ESTs lacks a specific and substantial utility and . . . they are not
enabled. Accordingly, the Board’s decision affirming the final rejection of claim
1 of the ‘643 patent for lack of utility under § 101 and lack of enablement
under § 112, first paragraph, is affirmed.”).
222. See, e.g., Christopher A. Cotropia & Mark A. Lemley, Copying in
Patent Law, 87 N.C. L. REV. 1421, 1434–35 (2009); Craig A. Nard, A Theory of
Claim Interpretation, 14 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1, 40–41 (2000); Arti K. Rai,
Regulating Scientific Research: Intellectual Property Rights and the Norms of
Science, 94 NW. U. L. REV. 77, 106 (1999).
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in part because foundational technological breakthroughs are
often essential for subsequent R&D yet difficult or impossible
to “design around” (for example, to develop a new technology
that does not include some feature of the patented technology),
thereby avoiding the broad patent rights of the foundational
technology.223 For this reason, scholars have raised significant
concerns regarding patenting of the foundational and upstream
inputs to biotechnology, such as ESTs and other genetic
sequences, single nucleotide polymorphisms (SNPs), cell
receptors, etc.224
For example, the early and broad patents on genetic
mutations giving rise to significantly elevated risk of breast
and ovarian cancer (BRCA1 and BRCA2) have been alleged to
have imposed significant delays and social costs on the
research, development, and implementation of diagnostic
methods for these diseases, arguably impeding both public
health and innovation.225 The company that owned the patents,
Myriad Genetics, continues to maintain its dominant position
in genetic testing for breast cancer through its trade secret
databases of the sequences that it analyzed while excluding
competition through its patent rights.226 These social and
innovation costs are particularly salient, given that the genetic
sequence patents were later held invalid by the Supreme
Court, and the process patents for comparing sequences to
determine genetic defects were invalidated by the lower
courts.227 Similarly, recent research has documented how
threats and actual litigation against universities and scientists
by owners of the patents on certain genes related to
223. See, e.g., Cotropia & Lemley, supra note 222, at 1434–35.
224. See Heller & Eisenberg, supra note 214, at 699.
225. See, e.g., Robert Cook-Deegan et al., Impact of Gene Patents and
Licensing Practices on Access to Genetic Testing for Inherited Susceptibility to
Cancer: Comparing Breast and Ovarian Cancers with Colon Cancers, 12
GENETICS MED. S15, S15–S16 (2010); Mildred K. Cho et al., Effects of Patents
and Licenses on the Provision of Clinical Genetic Testing Services, 5 J.
MOLECULARDIAGNOSTICS 3, 3–8 (2003).
226. See, e.g., Robert Cook-Deegan et al., The Next Controversy in Genetic
Testing: Clinical Data as Trade Secrets?, 21 EUR. J. HUM. GENETICS 585, 585–
86 (2013).
227. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, 133 S. Ct. 2107,
2116–19 (2013); Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent & Trademark
Office, 689 F.3d 1303, 1333–35 (Fed. Cir. 2012). The lower courts also held the
probe and primer and methods of screening claims to be invalid. In re BRCA1-
and BRCA2-Based Hereditary Cancer Test Patent Litig., 774 F.3d 755, 759–66
(Fed. Cir. 2014).
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Alzheimer’s disease delayed scientific discovery and impeded
public health.228
Scholars have also raised concerns regarding the potential
for patents at an early stage to retard the development and
deployment of nanotechnology inventions.229 Patenting levels
on basic nanotechnology research and early technological
developments have been significant, notwithstanding the fact
that the government largely funded these developments in
order to stimulate basic research.230 Accordingly, the patents
that have so far been issued—many of them to universities
because of the Bayh-Dole Act231—pose significant concerns
precisely because they cover fundamental and upstream
discoveries and technologies:
The lack of current commercial value notwithstanding, however,
much of basic nanotechnology research is protected under patent. In
fact, very few of the nanotechnology inventions created thus far
ha[ve] not been patented . . . .
. . . .
. . . [N]anotechnology’s cross-disciplinarity multiplies its
potential applications, giving patents in nanotechnology unusually
228. See Tania Bubela et al., The Mouse that Trolled: The Long and
Tortuous History of a Gene Mutation Patent That Became an Expensive
Impediment to Alzheimer’s Research, 2 J.L. & BIOSCI. 213, 231–32 (2015). Cf.
Jon F. Merz, et al., Commentary, Diagnostic Testing Fails the Test: The
Pitfalls of Patents Are Illustrated by the Case of Haemochromatosis, 415
NATURE 577, 577 (2002) (discussing similar concerns in regard to
haemochromatosis patents). It is notable that representative of the patent
holders publicly (but falsely) denied threatening researchers with litigation.
See Bubela et al., supra, at 232. To the extent that much scientific research is
conducted through either intentional or unwitting infringement, the lack of
forbearance reflected by such actions significantly threatens the research
enterprise, absent restoration of a meaningful “experimental use exception” as
a limit of the scope of the patent infringement right. See Joshua D. Sarnoff,
The Patent Law Duchy of Grand Fenwick: A Comment on The Mouse that
Trolled: The Long and Tortuous History of a Gene Mutation Patent That
Became an Expensive Impediment to Alzheimer’s Research, 2 J.L. & BIOSCI.
723, 726–27 (2015).
229. See Mark A. Lemley, Patenting Nanotechnology, 58 STAN. L. REV. 601,
618–20 (2005). But cf. Emily M. Morris, The Irrelevance of Nanotechnology
Patents 1–2 (Dec. 29, 2015) (unpublished draft) (on file with the Connecticut
Law Review), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2708833
(last visited Nov. 18, 2016) (arguing that to date other constraints such as
“technological and economic uncertainty . . . tacit knowledge, lack of funding,
and even regulatory and safety issues” have retarded nanotechnology far more
than patent rights, while not dismissing the potential for patent rights in the
future to generate an anti-commons or otherwise interfere with
nanotechnology development).
230. See Lemley, supra note 229, at 603; Morris, supra note 229, at 5.
231. SeeMorris, supra note 229, at 6.
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broad effects in many different areas of development. Those who
work in downstream nanotech development may need to negotiate
licensing from patent holders outside of their own fields and often
may be caught infringing patents from fields well outside of what
they might reasonably have been expected to review.232
Similarly, producing multi-component products may
require the licensing of numerous patented inputs.233 This is
common in many information and communications technologies
that rely on interoperability standards234 and for multi-input
technologies that may include products in fields as diverse as
synthetic biotechnology, nanotechnology, and sustainable
building materials.235 Broad patenting has also raised concerns
over development of an anti-commons and over interference
with development or implementation of multi-component
standards.236 As a result, any given patent may block
competitors from producing such products.237 Some of the
measures discussed below in Part V were developed to address
the need for cross-licensing in regard to such standardized or
multi-input technologies.238
Further, the lack of readily accessible prior art in a field
can result in improperly broad or otherwise invalid patents on
non-novel inventions, as is thought to have happened in the
context of software patenting beginning in the 1990s.239 More
recently, concerns have arisen that patents on software and
business methods in the United States have encouraged the
emergence of patent assertion entities (PAEs) whose principle
business model is to assert patents of questionable validity so
as to obtain nuisance-value settlements (so-called “patent
trolling”).240 Of course, most countries have historically been
232. Id. at 5, 10.
233. See, e.g., NATL. RES. COUNCIL OF THE NAT. ACADS., PATENT
CHALLENGES FOR STANDARD-SETTING IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY: LESSONS
FROM INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY 15–17 (Keith Maskus
& Stephen A. Merrill eds., 2013).
234. See, e.g., id.
235. See, e.g., id. at 17–19.
236. See, e.g., David S. Evans & Anne Layne-Farrar, Software Patents and
Open Source: The Battle Over Intellectual Property Rights, 9 VA. J.L. & TECH.
1, 12–18 (2004).
237. Id.
238. See discussion infra Parts V.A.3, V.A.4, V.B.1 & V.B.2.
239. See, e.g., Evans & Layne-Farrar, supra note 236, at 11–15 (discussing
“bad patents” and the flaws in the patent process).
240. See, e.g., Mark A. Lemley & A. Douglas Melamed, Missing the Forest
for the Trolls, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 2117, 2126–28 (2013) (discussing problems
of aggregation that are not unique to PAEs); Sean P. Miller, Patent “Trolls”:
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more reluctant than the United States to issue software and
(particularly) business method patents.241 Because such
litigation behaviors have been developing more slowly outside
the United States,242 the scope of these problems varies by
jurisdiction.
C. RELATIONSHIP TO TRADE SECRETS
It is possible that private entities will acquire specialized
knowledge in effectively constructing, deploying, and operating
some future SCE technologies. Trade secrets, rather than
patents, are more likely to protect these commercial
advantages, particularly as they are unlikely to be readily
reverse engineered.243 For example, in an analysis of “clean
energy” solar photovoltaic, biofuel, and wind technologies, John
Barton concluded that patents in those areas mostly focused on
narrow improvements.244 Accordingly, in such areas trade
secrecy was more likely than patent rights to be a significant
constraint on technology research, development, and
Rent Seeking Parasites or Innovation-Facilitating Middlemen (Apr. 26, 2010)
(unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Stanford University) (on file with the
Stanford University library system), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm
?abstract_id=1885538 (last visited Nov. 18, 2016) (finding that PAEs tend to
assert patents of higher validity than practicing entities). But see Christopher
A. Cotropia, Jay P. Kesan & David L. Schwartz, Unpacking Patent Assertion
Entities (PAEs), 99 MINN. L. REV. 649, 649–53, 699–70 (2014) (concluding that
PAEs and their lawsuits may be considered a sign of health of the U.S. patent
system).
241. See, e.g., Evans & Layne-Farrar, supra note 236, at 5–8, 12.
242. See generally Brian J. Love, et al., Patent Assertion Entities in Europe,
in PATENT ASSERTION ENTITIES AND COMPETITION POLICY (D. Daniel Sokol
ed., forthcoming 2017).
243. See Strandburg, supra note 190, at 113–14 (“[T]he trade-secret return
increases because it is reasonable to assume that, without the aid of the
patent disclosure, third parties will take relatively longer to come up with
follow-on inventions when there is a larger return to trade secret protection,
indicating that the invention is more difficult to reverse engineer or invent
independently.”).
244. This was in part because broad patents had expired. See Barton,
supra note 124, at 18 tbl.3; see also JOHN H. BARTON, MITIGATING CLIMATE
CHANGE THROUGH TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER: ADDRESSING THE NEEDS OF
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES, (2008), https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/files
/chathamhouse/public/Research/Energy,%20Environment%20and%20Develop
ment/1008barton.pdf; Charles R. McManis & Jorge L. Contreras, Compulsory
Licensing of Intellectual Property: A Viable Policy Lever for Promoting Access
to Critical Technologies?, in TRIPS AND DEVELOPING COUNTRIES—TOWARDS A
NEWWORLDORDER? 109, 129 (Gustavo Ghidini et al. eds., 2014).
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deployment.245 Similarly, in the context of advanced building
materials, producers have been slow to seek patents, relying
primarily on trade secrecy and a variety of other commercial
strategies to obtain and maintain market share.246 To the
extent that significant patenting of broad or upstream
technologies is avoided in SCE, concerns over trade secrecy will
be correspondingly greater.
Further, trade secrets in SCE technologies may result in
significant differences in the structure or operation of systems
across vendors or jurisdictions. This may become problematic if
the technologies or methods of using them would need to be
interoperable to achieve optimal results, cost effectiveness or
safe operation.247
Trade secret owners, moreover, could be unwilling to share
their skill and knowledge freely to enable the broad, rapid, and
responsible diffusion of SCE technologies. It is much more
difficult for a government procurement agency to compel
sharing of trade secret knowledge—particularly if it is not
codified but rather must be disclosed by individuals who
possess that knowledge—than to compel the licensing of
patents or other IP.248 To the extent that the disclosure of such
trade secrets are not made up-front conditions of governmental
contracts, the forcible public disclosure of the trade secrets
would destroy their secrecy and thus might potentially be
considered a “taking,” “condemnation,” or “expropriation” of
property that would require compensating the trade secret
owner or would provide it with a claim under international
trade laws.249 Obviously, significant concerns (as well as
245. See, e.g., Strandburg, supra note 190, at 113–14 (discussing how the
secrecy aspect of trade secrets likely causes third parties to take longer to
develop “follow-on inventions”).
246. See Jorge L. Contreras & Charles R. McManis, Intellectual Property
Landscape of Material Sustainability Standards, 14 COLUM. SCI. & TECH. L.
REV. 485, 502, 507 (2013).
247. Although some variation in the application to local conditions is likely
to be necessary, it is unlikely that the use or effects of SCE technologies can be
restricted to those jurisdictions.
248. See Elizabeth A. Rowe, Striking a Balance: When Should Trade-Secret
Law Shield Disclosures to the Government?, 96 IOWA L. REV. 791, 800–03
(2011). See generally Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986 (1984)
(discussing whether disclosures of trade secrets to the EPA are protected by
the Fifth Amendment’s taking clause).
249. See Rowe, supra note 248, at 800–03; Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co.,
467 U.S. at 986.
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substantial liability) might result from the need to disseminate
such knowledge broadly.
D. PATENTSACROSS BORDERS
Patents are, by their nature, limited in scope to the
jurisdiction that issues them.250 In contrast, SCE technologies
and effects are unlikely to respect international borders.
Depending on how patents claim those technologies, difficult
questions will likely arise as to whether the use of a technology
in one jurisdiction would infringe a patent in another
jurisdiction. For example, if a patent claims a new substance
that has high reflectivity and thus can be used for SCE, would
its release in the atmosphere in one jurisdiction trigger patent
infringement in a jurisdiction to which that product
inadvertently (but inevitably) migrates? Similar concerns have
been raised concerning patent infringement by farmers
growing genetically engineered grain resulting from
contamination of their crops caused by windborne seed drift.251
Another question is the degree to which a patented SCE
process would be infringed when acts performed in one
jurisdiction necessarily cause some element of a claim to be
performed in another jurisdiction. Such concerns have been
raised in regard to so-called “divided infringement,” in which
some of the steps of a method have been performed outside of
the patent-issuing jurisdiction specifically to avoid
infringement, but the benefits of performing the method are
obtained within the jurisdiction.252 These are concerns that
could potentially be addressed through multilateral treaty
agreements, though no significant progress in this area has
been made to date.
250. See Sean Cunningham & Ronald Yin, Filing and Defending Patents in
Different Jurisdictions, IPHANDBOOK.ORG, http://www.iphandbook.org
/handbook/ch10/p08/ (last visited Nov. 19, 2016).
251. See, e.g., Monsanto Canada Inc. v. Shmeiser, [2004] S.C.R. 902 (Can.)
(concerning windborne seed drift).
252. See 35 U.S.C. § 271(g) (2012) (prohibiting importation into the United
States of products made abroad using a process patented in the United
States). See generally Eolas Tech. Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 399 F.3d 1325 (Fed.
Cir. 2005) (discussing the application of patent law when software code was
sent outside the United States); NTP, Inc. v. Res. in Motion, Ltd., 418 F.3d
1282 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (assessing whether patent law applies to systems and
methods used in part outside of the United States).
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E. PATENTHOLDERS INFLUENCING POLICY
Among the concerns frequently cited in the literature
concerning SCE is that SCE research, if funded at a sufficient
scale, could catalyze the growth of private interests in these
technologies.253 The potential for broad patent rights would
then further attract such interests, but potentially could hinder
socially optimal technological development.254 Such rent-
seeking interests might then influence decision-makers so that
SCE would be researched more vigorously; implemented
sooner, at a larger scale, or in a particular manner; or weakly
regulated. Some of the resulting policies might be beneficial;
others might be socially suboptimal.255 Jane C. S. Long and
Dane Scott outline potential incentives for SCE researchers to
influence policy.256 Among their recommended policy responses
is that “publicly funded research should not lead to patenting
that would produce financial vested interests.”257 Of course,
concerns about money and power influencing public policy
(including research funding and technological developments) is
neither new nor limited to SCE.258
In fact, worries about scientists’ patents and self-interested
control over research pathways have already affected the
course of SCE research. In 2010, the project “Stratospheric
Particle Injection for Climate Engineering” (SPICE) began,
supported by the U.K. public funding bodies and carried out at
253. See, e.g., Marion Hourdequin, Geoengineering, Solidarity, and Moral
Risk, in ENGINEERING THE CLIMATE: THE ETHICS OF SOLAR RADIATION
MANAGEMENT 15, 27 (Christopher J. Preston ed., 2012) (claiming that
interests “may create momentum to implement SRM strategies despite the
risks or before just decision-making procedures are established”).
254. See generally Gordon Tullock, Efficient Rent Seeking, in TOWARD A
THEORY OF THE RENT-SEEKING SOCIETY 97 (James Buchanan et al. eds.,
1980).
255. This is part of a more general concern, often called the “slippery
slope,” that some writers express. In this, SCE research makes its
implementation more likely, perhaps unduly so.
256. Jane C. S. Long & Dane Scott, Vested Interests and Geoengineering
Research, 29 ISSUES SCI. & TECH. 45, 48 (2013) (discussing proper use of the
“four F’s,” fortune, fame, fear, and fanatacism, in incentivising proper
geonengineering research and avoiding manipulation of the process, which
would occur in part due to a misapplication of the four F’s); see also Gareth
Davies, Privatisation and De-Globalisation of the Climate, 7 CARBON &
CLIMATE L. REV. 187, 189 (2013).
257. Long & Scott, supra note 256, at 50.
258. See, e.g., Joshua D. Sarnoff, The Likely Mismatch Between Federal
Research & Development Funding and Desired Innovation, 18 VAND. J. ENT. &
TECH. L. 363, 368 (2016).
58 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. [Vol. 18:1
Bristol, Cambridge, Edinburgh, and Oxford universities.259 One
part of SPICE was to be a field test of delivery equipment for
stratospheric aerosol injection.260 In this test, seawater would
be pumped up a one-kilometer hose that would be held aloft by
a balloon.261 Because this would have been the first outdoor
SCE test, SPICE’s funders and lead investigators agreed to a
staged process, in which the decision whether to proceed
further would be evaluated during the research project.262 It
later came to light that one of the investigators and a person
involved in the funding process were listed as inventors on a
relevant patent application.263 This was one of the reasons that
the project’s leaders canceled the outdoor test.264
F. TECHNOLOGICAL LOCK-IN
Some commentators are concerned that technological (as
well as broader, social) lock-in may shape the future course of
SCE research and possible implementation.265 In this scenario,
an existing solution or technical pathway becomes entrenched
due to causes unrelated to its technical merit or economic
viability.266 Subsequent, superior innovations are then not
adopted, or adopted to a suboptimal degree.267 Economists and
historians of science and technology have observed that early
decisions regarding technological design, implementation, and
dissemination strongly influence future decision-making.268 A
handful of economic and other incentives or effects can cause
259. Cressey, supra note 55; see also Spice Project Update, ENGINEERING
AND PHYSICAL SCIENCES RESEARCH COUNCILS (May 22, 2012),
https://www.epsrc.ac.uk/newsevents/news/spiceprojectupdate/.
260. Spice Project Update, supra note 259.
261. Cressey, supra note 55.
262. See Spice Project Update, supra note 259 (mentioning the stage gate).
263. Cressey, supra note 55.
264. Matt Watson, Testbed News, THE RELUCTANT GEOENGINEER (May 16,
2012, 12:03 AM), http://thereluctantgeoengineer.blogspot.nl/2012/05/testbed-
news.html.
265. See Rose C. Cairns, Climate Geoengineering: Issues of Path-
dependence and Socio-technical Lock-in, 5 WIRES CLIMATE CHANGE 649, 649–
50 (2014); Albert C. Lin, The Missing Pieces of Geoengineering Research
Governance, 100 MINN. L. REV. 2509, 2513 (2016).
266. See Stan J. Liebowitz & Stephen E. Margolis, Path Dependence, Lock-
in and History, 11 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 205 (1995).
267. See id.
268. See Paul A. David, Path Dependence: A Foundational Concept for
Historical Social Science, in LAW, ECONOMICS AND EVOLUTIONARY THEORY 88,
101 (Peer Zumbansen & Gralf-Peter Calliess eds., 2010).
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technological lock-in, such as: economies of scale of production
or adoption; learning effects; socially shared expectations;
barriers to entry; and network effects.269 Social, political, and
cultural conditions can reinforce lock-in.270 As consequences of
this path dependency, an inferior technology may become
dominant and superior ones may fail to develop or acquire
market share.271 Scholars assert that lock-in has occurred in a
diverse range of industries and markets ranging from
typewriter keyboards272 and railroads273 to nuclear reactors274
and fossil fuels.275 However, others contest the empirical
evidence of technological lock-in in certain industries.276
IP policy might be able to influence the probability and
severity of lock-in. Clearly, broad foundational patents that are
difficult to work around may cause future R&D to rely
suboptimally upon certain technologies within the scope of the
broad patent that the patent holder controls or directs. At the
same time, nontraditional IP arrangements that are intended
to avoid common shortcomings can have similar effects.277 For
example, a patent pool could be so convenient and offer such
reduced transaction costs that alternative avenues of research
may go underexplored.278
269. See generally Michael L. Katz & Carl Shapiro, Network Externalities,
Competition, and Compatibility, 75 AM. ECON. REV. 424 (1985) (reviewing the
theoretic bases of lock-in).
270. See Andy Stirling, “Opening Up” and “Closing Down”: Power,
Participation, and Pluralism in the Social Appraisal of Technology, 33 SCI.
TECH. & HUM. VALUES 262 (2008) (proposing how social forces can influence
technologies’ paths).
271. Id. (“Lock-in often results not from obvious technical superiority but
rather from processes of path-dependence.”).
272. Paul A. David, Clio and the Economics of QWERTY, 75 AM. ECON.
REV. 332, 334 (1985).
273. Douglas J. Puffert, The Standardization of Track Gauge on North
American Railways, 1830-1890, 60 J. ECON. HIST. 933, 938–39 (2000).
274. Robin Cowan, Nuclear Power Reactors: A Study in Technological Lock-
in, 50 J. ECON. HIST. 541, 541 (1990).
275. Gregory C. Unruh, Understanding Carbon Lock-in, 28 ENERGY POL’Y
817, 817–18 (2000).
276. See Stan J. Liebowitz & Stephen E. Margolis, The Troubled Path of
the Lock-in Movement, 9 J. COMPETITION L. & ECON. 125 (2013) (challenging
“the empirical support for [lock-in] theories and their real-world
applicability”).
277. See, e.g., Subsection VI.A.3 infra.
278. It is for this reason that antitrust authorities have typically frowned
upon the formation of patent pools that include technologies that are
substitutes for one another. See Subsection VI.A.3 infra.
60 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. [Vol. 18:1
G. PATENTABLE SUBJECTMATTER
A common, deep critique of SCE is that it would represent
a magnitude and category of intervention in the natural world
that is or should be beyond humanity’s reach.279 Such
arguments appear frequently both outside of academic
scholarship and in public opinion surveys, focus groups, and
the popular press.280 Environmental advocates are among those
who claim that SCE would be “playing God.” For example,
Green activist Clive Hamilton asserts that
there are certain qualities that humans cannot and should not
aspire to, both because they are beyond us and because aspiring to
them invites calamity . . . . Playing God entails humans crossing a
boundary to a domain of control or causation that is beyond their
rightful place. In this view, there is a limit to what humans should
attempt or aspire to because the division between domains is part of
the proper order of things.281
As SCE’s visibility increases, such accusations may also take
on more explicitly religious framings.282
279. See e.g., Wylie Carr et al., Public Concerns about the Ethics of Solar
Radiation Management, in ENGINEERING THE CLIMATE: THE ETHICS OF SOLAR
RADIATION MGMT. 169, 175–177 (Christopher J. Preston ed., 2012); Kate
Elizabeth Porter & Mike Hulme, The Emergence of the Geoengineering Debate
in the UK Print Media: A Frame Analysis, 179 GEOGRAPHICAL J., 342, 349
(2013); Victoria Wibeck et al., Questioning the Technological Fix to Climate
Change: Lay Sense-Making of Geoengineering in Sweden, 7 ENERGY RES. &
SOC. SCI. 23, 26 (2015).
280. See, e.g., Dale Jamieson, Ethics and Intentional Climate Change, 33
CLIMATIC CHANGE 323, 325 (1996); James R. Fleming, The Climate Engineers,
31 WILSONQ. 46, 49 (2007); Stephen M. Gardiner, Is “Arming the Future” with
Geoengineering Really the Lesser Evil?: Some Doubts about the Ethics of
Intentionally Manipulating the Climate System, in CLIMATE ETHICS:
ESSENTIAL READINGS 284, 303 (Stephen M. Gardiner et al. eds., 2010); Karen
N. Scott, Engineering the ‘Mis-Anthropocene’: International Law, Ethics and
Geoengineering, 29 OCEAN Y.B. 61, 63 (2015); KIRSTEN MEYER & CHRISTIAN
UHLE, INTEGRATIVE RESEARCH INST. ON TRANSFORMATIONS OF HUMAN-ENV’T
SYS., GEOENGINEERING AND THE ACCUSATION OF HUBRIS (2015),
https://www.iri-thesys.org/discussion-papers/paper-pdfs/discussion-paper-2015
-3-final.pdf.
281. CLIVE HAMILTON, EARTHMASTERS: PLAYING GOD WITH THE CLIMATE
178 (2013); see also Press Release, ETC Group, Announcing the Launch of
GeoengineeringMonitor.org (Feb. 9, 2015), http://www.etcgroup.org/content
/announcing-launch-geoengineeringmonitororg (last visited Nov. 20, 2016).
282. See, e.g., Forrest Clingerman, Geoengineering, Theology, and the
Meaning of Being Human, 49 ZYGON 6, 6 (2014); Wylie Carr, This is God’s
Stuff We’re Messing With, in GEOENGINEERING OUR CLIMATE, supra note 82;
Bronislaw Szerszynski, Geoengineering and Religion: A History in Four
Characters, in GEOENGINEERING OUR CLIMATE, supra note 82.
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This line of argument is reminiscent of previous societal
debates concerning new technologies, particular those involving
human genetics and reproduction.283 As with those techniques,
opponents may make the case that SCE inventions should not
be eligible for private control through patent rights, based on
moral and ethical grounds. Indeed, as discussed above, the
laws of most countries have excluded some categories of
discoveries and inventions from patentability for reasons of
deontological morality.284 Such exclusions are permissible
under international IP treaties285 and (as discussed further
below in Section VI.B) current U.S. and European Union laws
to some extent may already restrict or would authorize further
restriction on SCE patenting. A related, but rarely made,
critique is that scientists’ moral duties should preclude them
from seeking to maintain their discoveries as trade (or other)
secrets. It remains premature to suggest whether certain
proposed SCE technologies, if any, should be ineligible for IP
protection beyond existing exclusions for deontological reasons,
as further consensus within the social discourse is required in
this area.
H. DATA SHARING AND FRAGMENTATION
It is likely that large quantities of observational and
experimental data will be generated by research, development,
and possible implementation of SCE technologies. Such data
may be collected via a variety of means including earth-based
systems, seagoing vessels, aircraft, and satellites, and by
numerous different governmental and non-governmental
organizations. In order to maximize understanding and usage
of SCE data, and to provide the greatest amount of information
to policy makers weighing the risks and benefits of different
SCE approaches, it is critical that such data be shared as
broadly and rapidly as possible.
283. See, e.g., PAUL RAMSEY, FABRICATED MAN: THE ETHICS OF GENETIC
CONTROL (1970) (discussing the moral and religious implications of scientific
advancements such as genetic control, cloning, and self-modification).
284. See supra notes 200–04 and accompanying text.
285. See Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property
Rights art. 27, 1994, 33 ILM 1197 [hereinafter TRIPS Agreement]; infra note
354 and accompanying text. See generally Jasemine Chambers, Patent
Eligibility of Biotechnical Inventions in the United States, Europe, and Japan:
How Much Patent Policy Is Public Policy?, 34 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 223
(2002) (discussing the applicability of patent law to biological creations such
as microorganism, plant, and human chimeras).
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Because of SCE’s politically controversial character and
capacity for widespread effects, a number of scholars have
emphasized the particular importance of transparency of
research efforts and results in this area.286 Transparency is
normatively desirable in its own right, and instrumentally as a
means to inform and engage the public, to improve decision-
making, to establish legitimacy, to build trust among actors, to
prevent publication bias, to facilitate cooperation among
researchers, to make research more efficient, to lower
transaction costs, and to help manage risk. Weak transparency
results when research data and analysis remain unpublished,
are maintained as secrets, are difficult to obtain, or are difficult
to understand without the efforts of the primary researchers.287
There are many reasons that may influence researchers to
favor weak transparency, including desires of private interests
to protect confidential information, those of researchers to
suppress negative results, lack of coordination among
producers of research data, or simply the high costs to maintain
transparency. Neil Craik and Nigel Moore emphasize that
transparency is essential in order to reduce SCE’s
environmental and social risks and to establish and maintain
legitimacy.288 For example, the availability and accessibility of
relevant data will be necessary for public participation.289
Indeed, all of the suggested principles for SCE have
emphasized the necessity of openness and transparency.290
286. See, e.g., John P. Walsh et al., Effects of Research Tool Patents and
Licensing on Biomedical Innovation, in PATENTS IN THE KNOWLEDGE-BASED
ECONOMy 319–22 (Wesley M. Cohen & Stephen A. Merrill eds., 2003); NEIL
CRAIK & NIGEL MOORE, CENTRE FOR INTERNATIONAL GOVERNANCE
INNOVATION, DISCLOSURE-BASED GOVERNANCE FOR CLIMATE ENGINEERING
RESEARCH (2014), https://www.cigionline.org/publications/disclosure-based-
governance-climate-engineering-research; William C. G. Burns & Jane A.
Flegal, Climate Geoengineering and the Role of Public Deliberation: A
Comment on the US National Academy of Sciences’ Recommendations on
Public Participation, 5 CLIMATE LAW 252 (2015).
287. See, e.g., Walsh, et al., supra note 286, at 319–22 (discussing concerns
over delays in publication, sharing of data and materials, etc.).
288. CRAIK&MOORE, supra note 286.
289. See generally Burns & Flegal, supra note 286.
290. SHEPHERD ET AL., supra note 23, at xii; Margaret Leinen, The
Asilomar International Conference on Climate Intervention Technologies:
Background and Overview, 4 STAN. J.L. SCI. & POL’Y 1, 4 (2011),
https://journals.law.stanford.edu/sites/default/files/stanford-journal-law-
science-policy-sjlsp/print/2011/05/leinen_intro_perspective_final.pdf; SOLAR
RADIATIONMGMT. GOVERNANCE INITIATIVE, SOLAR RADIATIONMANAGEMENT:
THE GOVERNANCE OF RESEARCH 39 (2011), https://royalsociety.org/~/media
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The customary means of disseminating results in the
sciences is through publication in peer-reviewed scientific
journals. The results and data reported in journal articles,
however, must be distinguished from the much larger quantity
of experimental and observational data generated in the course
of research and upon which published results are based. While
published data are often essential to support a researcher’s
analysis, the data reported in a journal article are typically
only a small fraction of the “raw” data collected or observed.
Traditionally, a researcher who wished to access or use
another’s raw data, whether to validate the prior researcher’s
results or to build upon those results, had to rely on informal
requests made by telephone or e-mail.291 Such informal
requests were typically fulfilled, if at all, subject to workloads,
staff availability and other logistical factors.292
Today, large electronic databases and high-speed computer
networks enable the dissemination of scientific data in a
/Royal_Society_Content/policy/projects/solar-radiation-governance/DES2391
_SRMGI%20report_web.pdf (last visited Nov. 20, 2016); BIPARTISAN POL’Y
CENTER, GEOENGINEERING: A NATIONAL STRATEGIC PLAN FOR RESEARCH ON
THE POTENTIAL EFFECTIVENESS, FEASIBILITY, AND CONSEQUENCES OF
CLIMATE REMEDIATION TECHNOLOGIES 14 (2011), http://cdn.bipartisanpolicy
.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/default/files/BPC%20Climate%20Remediation
%20Final%20Report.pdf (last visited Nov. 20, 2016); Rayner et al., supra note
26, at 503; Anna-Maria Hubert & David Reichwein, An Exploration of a Code
of Conduct for Responsible Scientific Research Involving Geoengineering, 86–
92 (Inst. Advanced Sustainability Stud., Working Paper, 2015),
http://www.iass-potsdam.de/sites/default/files/files/code_of_conduct_0.pdf (last
visited Nov. 20, 2016).
291. See J.H. Reichman & Paul F. Uhlir, A Contractually Reconstructed
Research Commons for Scientific Data in a Highly Protectionist Intellectual
Property Environment, 66 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 315, 343–348 (2003)
(discussing the characteristics of informal data sharing arrangements between
scientists).
292. See id. There is a growing body of empirical evidence demonstrating
that requests for data sharing among scientists are often ignored or refused.
See, e.g., Blumenthal et al., Withholding Research Results in Academic Life
Science: Evidence From a National Survey of Faculty, 277 J. AM. MED. ASS’N
1224, 1226 tbl.1 (2007) (reporting that 8.9% of academic life scientists have
refused to share research results with other scientists within the past three
years); Blumenthal et al., Data Withholding in Genetics and the Other Life
Sciences: Prevalences and Predictors, 81 ACAD. MED. 137 (2006) (concluding,
on the basis of similar data to that presented in the authors’ 2002 paper, that
“data withholding is common in biomedical science”); Eric G. Campbell et al.,
Data Withholding in Academic Genetics: Evidence from a National Survey, 287
J. AM. MED. ASS’N 473, 477 (2002) (reporting that 47% of geneticists who
requested information relating to published research were denied at least once
in the preceding three years, and 10% of all post-publication data results were
denied).
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systematic and global manner. Initially developed by
government laboratories and agencies such as the U.S.
Geological Survey, National Aeronautics and Space
Administration (NASA), and National Oceanic and
Atmospheric Administration (NOAA),293 these aggregations of
public scientific data, sometimes referred to as “science
commons” or “research commons,” have become vital resources
for the international scientific community. More recently,
research commons have come to include data generated by
academic or research institutions funded in whole or in part by
government grants.294 In a typical arrangement of this nature,
a government agency will fund these research centers to
procure equipment and generate data in a coordinated or
collaborative manner, either in fulfillment of a broader
governmental program or as part of a research proposal made
by the requesting institution.295 The resulting data are then
deposited in a government-operated database such as
GenBank, operated by the National Library of Medicine, and is
made accessible to other researchers around the world. The
existence of these research commons enables the efficient,
rapid, and cost-effective sharing of new knowledge and enables
study and analysis that otherwise might have been impossible.
It is likely that such a global data sharing infrastructure would
benefit SCE research, which is inherently transboundary and
international.
Despite the potential benefits from large-scale scientific
data sharing, obstacles to sharing exist. Industry-sponsored
research is often subject to written confidentiality agreements
or trade secret restrictions that explicitly prevent researchers
from sharing resulting data and methods with others and, in
some cases, delaying or even prohibiting the publication of
293. See, e.g., NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL ET AL., BITS OF POWER: ISSUES IN
GLOBAL ACCESS TO SCIENTIFIC DATA 150–53 box 5.4 (1997); National Centers
for Environmental Information, NOAA.GOV, http://www.ncdc.noaa.gov
(formally National Climatic Data Center (NCDC)); BRIT. ATMOSPHERIC DATA
CTR., http://badc.nerc.ac.uk (discussed in PHILIP LORD ET AL.,
BIOTECHNOLOGY & BIOLOGICAL SCIS. RESEARCH COUNCIL ET AL., LARGE-
SCALE DATA SHARING IN THE LIFE SCIENCES: DATA STANDARDS, INCENTIVES,
BARRIERS AND FUNDING MODELS (THE “JOINT DATA STANDARDS STUDY”), app.
A-19 (2005), http://www.nesc.ac.uk/technical_papers/UKeS-2006-02.pdf.
294. Paul N. Schofield et al., Sustaining the Data and Bioresource
Commons, 330 SCIENCE 592, 592 (2010).
295. Id.
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their results.296 Academic researchers themselves often have
strong incentives to keep scientific data confidential, at least
until the time of publication, and these incentives are
supported, if not mandated, by university policies and
procedures.297 Competitive researchers, wishing to gain as
much advantage as possible from data collected by their
laboratories or groups, may drag their feet before depositing
data to public repositories, or make deposits of data that are
incomplete or lacking critical interpretive information. IP
protection for databases and data, particularly in Europe where
such protection is strongest, may also hinder the willingness of
researchers, and their institutions, to share data with others.298
In some cases, even data that might otherwise be in the public
domain (such as mapping and geographic data developed under
contract to the U.S. Federal Government) may be stored in
proprietary databases that are accessible only by paid
subscribers.299 In several areas, the “privatization” of
governmental data is proceeding at a rapid pace due to
perceptions of inefficiency and poor quality of governmental
databases.300 In other cases, large repositories of scientific data
maintained by governmental agencies may be discontinued or
turned over to private hands due to the high costs of
maintaining them.301 Finally, restrictive licensing of patented
technologies may provide patent holders with substantial
amounts of data that can be maintained as proprietary
information and protected by trade secrecy, long after the
patent rights expire or the patents are invalidated.302
296. See NAT’L ACAD. OF SCIS. ET AL., ENSURING THE INTEGRITY,
ACCESSIBILITY, AND STEWARDSHIP OF RESEARCH DATA IN THE DIGITAL AGE 67
(2009) [hereinafter NAS INTEGRITY, ACCESSIBILITY, AND STEWARDSHIP];
MARGIE PATLAK ET AL., INST. OF MED. OF THE NAT’L ACADS., EXTENDING THE
SPECTRUM OF PRECOMPETITIVE COLLABORATION IN ONCOLOGY RESEARCH:
WORKSHOP SUMMARY 36 (2010) (“Competing companies often compel their
employees to keep silent about their endeavors, and the sharing of information
is often frowned on lest information be divulged that might compromise the
company’s competitive advantage”).
297. See PATLAK ET AL., supra note 296, at 36–37.
298. See Reichman & Uhlir, supra note 291, at 355.
299. See NAT’L ACAD. OF SCIS. ET AL., supra note 296, at 65 box 3-3.
300. See Reichman & Uhlir, supra note 291, at 396.
301. See, e.g., Jocelyn Kaiser, Funding for Key Data Resources in Jeopardy,
351 SCIENCE 14 (2016) (describing NIH plans to discontinue multiple model
organism databases due to high costs of maintenance).
302. See, e.g., Brenda M. Simon & Ted M. Sichelman, Data Generating
Patents, 111 NW. U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2017), https:// papers.ssrn.com
/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2753547.
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Even when researchers wish to share data broadly, legal
and technical obstacles often intervene. Significant challenges
exist in making data collected by multiple agencies,
institutions and private firms interoperable so that they can be
accessed, searched, and analyzed in an efficient and effective
manner.303 These difficulties are compounded when data is
shared across national boundaries and must comply with a host
of different data privacy, protection, and national security
regulations.304 In summary, concerns over access to and
sharing of data and research results are particularly salient in
regard to SCE, given the high stakes involved and the
widespread effects SCE R&D may have.
I. MATERIALS TRANSFERS
Finally, it bears noting that scientific researchers have also
encountered significant constraints on and delays in obtaining
physical research materials, due to other researchers’
unwillingness to share such materials and to the cost, time,
and complexity of negotiating material transfer agreements
(MTAs).305 Restrictive practices relating to physical research
materials have been increasing, and may be attributable at
least in part to the increased commercial incentives of
universities resulting from their patenting activities: “the
commercial activities fostered by patent policy do seem to
restrict sharing, as do the burden of producing the materials
and scientific competition.”306 Similar legal and technical
obstacles could apply to efforts to share SCE-related research
materials internationally, particularly if the materials pose
significant health and safety or security risks. To the extent
that such materials are genetic resources subject to the CBD,
national laws may prevent access to and use of the materials
without obtaining “prior informed consent” of the country from
303. See, e.g., Susanna-Assunta Sansone et al, Toward Interoperable
Bioscience Data, 44 Nature Genetics 121 (2012); Jorge L. Contreras & A.
James Cuticchia, Technical Standards and Bioinformatics, in
BIOINFORMATICS LAW: LEGAL ISSUES FOR COMPUTATIONAL BIOLOGY IN THE
POST-GENOME ERA (Jorge L. Contreras & A. James Cuticchia, eds., 2013).
304. See Jorge L. Contreras & Jerome H. Reichman, Sharing by Design:
Data and Decentralized Commons, 350 SCIENCE 1312, 1314 (2015) (describing
issues in terms of “legal interoperability”).
305. See, e.g., Walsh et al., supra note 286, at 319–22; John P. Walsh et al.,
View from the Bench: Patents and Material Transfers, 309 SCIENCE 2002,
2002–03 (2005) [hereinafter Walsh et al. View from the Bench].
306. Walsh et al. View from the Bench, supra note 305, at 2003.
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which the materials are accessed.307 Further, any commercial
benefits that derive from scientific research with those
materials are supposed to be shared “fairly and equitably” and
subject to “mutually agreed terms.”308 These concerns with
sharing of physical materials, however, are not addressed
further, except to note here that our proposal in Section VI.B
below for a research commons and IP pledges may help to
promote the development of norms to share such materials.
V. EXISTING APPROACHES TO FACILITATE SHARING,
DISSEMINATION AND DEPLOYMENT OF INNOVATIONS
In order to facilitate the responsible R&D of SCE
technologies on a global scale while evaluating and managing
their risks before any decision to implement such technologies
may occur, novel governance approaches will be needed.
Although the challenges of choosing among various approaches
and adopting them will be substantial,309 SCE funders,
researchers, developers, and regulators need not start from
scratch. In assessing the available governance options and
modalities for SCE, it is useful to consider approaches that
have successfully been adopted in other fields. In this Part, we
describe a range of historical approaches to the governance of
IP for complex scientific and technological research efforts.
These approaches can broadly be categorized as involving
either state action or private ordering (and often a combination
of the two). Within each of these broad categories are numerous
different approaches. Below we summarize their general
parameters, together with examples of their utilization.
A. STATE INTERVENTIONS
IP systems are fundamentally creatures of the state. As
such, state-based political, legislative, and administrative
processes can modify and adapt their parameters—the
protections they offer as well as limitations and exceptions to
those protections. The state can intervene in technology
development, information distribution, and IP systems at many
different levels.310 In this Section, we describe the principal
307. CBD, supra note 100, arts. 15(1) & 15(5).
308. Id. at art. 15(7).
309. See, e.g., Bodansky, supra note 23, at 540–49.
310. One of the authors has identified nine distinct roles for the state in
the creation and maintenance of scientific research commons: creator, funder,
convenor, collaborator, endorser, curator, regulator, enforcer, and consumer.
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roles that the state has historically played with respect to
patents and data dissemination concerning new and emerging
technologies.
1. Legislative Enactments
In most countries, national-level statutes authorize the
issuance of patents. In the United States, the Patent Act (35
U.S.C.) was first enacted in 1790 and most recently amended in
2011.311 It contains numerous provisions responsive to the
needs of specific industry sectors. For example, the Bayh-Dole
Act of 1980312 amended the Patent Act to enable academic
institutions and small businesses receiving federal funds for
research to patent the inventions that result therefrom. The
Physician’s Immunity Statute313 amended the Patent Act to
immunize most medical practitioners from patent infringement
remedies for the performance of infringing medical procedures.
The 2011 Leahy-Smith America Invents Act (AIA) amended the
Patent Act to limit patents claiming tax strategies and to
prohibit patents on human organisms.314 Other statutory
provisions not contained in or directly amending the Patent Act
also limit the ability to seek and enforce patents in specified
fields. For example, the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (AEA)
significantly restricts the ability of applicants to obtain and
enforce patents covering atomic weapons technology.315
Jorge L. Contreras, Leviathan in the Commons: Biomedical Data and the
State, in GOVERNING MEDICAL RESEARCH COMMONS (Brett Frischmann et al.,
eds., Cambridge Univ. Press forthcoming 2017). Each of these roles, while
often overlapping, possesses unique characteristics and degrees of influence
over research outcomes, dissemination, and commercial deployment.
311. See Patent Act of 1790, ch. 7, 1 Stat. 109, 109–12 (1790); Leahy-Smith
America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284 (2011) (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C., 28 U.S.C., 35 U.S.C.).
312. Patent and Trademark Law Amendments Act, Pub. L. No. 96-517, 94
Stat. 3015, 3019 (1980) (codified at 35 U.S.C. § 200).
313. Omnibus Consolidated Appropriations Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 104-
208, § 616, 110 Stat. 3009, 3009–67 (1996) (codified at 35 U.S.C. § 287(c)).
314. America Invents Act §§ 14, 33.
315. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2181–2190 (2012); see also Stefan A. Riesenfeld, Patent
Protection and Atomic Energy Legislation, 46 CAL. L. REV. 40, 51–53 (1958).
Some refer to the Atomic Energy Act as creating a “sui generis patent system”
for “the patentability of technology related to nuclear weapons and energy.”
Shobita Parthasarathy et al., A Public Good? Geoengineering and Intellectual
Property 9–10 (Univ. of Mich. Gerald R. Ford Sch. of Pub. Pol’y, Sci., Tech., &
Pub. Pol’y Program, STTP Working Paper 10-1, 2010), http://stpp.fordschool
.umich.edu/policy-consultations/GAO%20papers/Item%20B15-A%20Public
%20Good,%20GAO%20STPP%20Working%20Paper%2010-1.pdf. This termin-
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Further, the Drug Price Competition and Patent Term
Restoration Act (commonly known as the Hatch-Waxman
Act)316 amended both the Patent Act and the Federal Food,
Drug and Cosmetic Act so as to exclude from the definition of
patent infringement activities with the patented invention
reasonably related to the submission of a request to the U.S.
Food & Drug Administration for marketing approval of generic
pharmaceuticals and medical devices.317
Although one of the basic arguments for the patent system
is to provide incentives to develop and disseminate new
technologies (as discussed in Part IV above318), some
commentators have suggested that amendments to existing
statutory regimes, particularly to restrict patentability, may
better encourage the responsible research, development, and
possible implementation of SCE technologies. For example,
Parthasarathy et al. and Chavez look to the patent-limiting
features of the AEA as models for potentially limiting the
patentability of climate engineering technologies.319 We
address these proposals and other possible restrictions on
patentability in Part VI below.320
In a different vein, states also have the power to regulate
commerce and industry within their borders. In most developed
countries, the government seeks to protect the environment
through regulation of industrial pollution, vehicular emissions,
water contamination, and the like. Governments have
increasingly turned to environmental regulatory and market-
based regulation to mitigate the onset of climate change.321 The
ology is puzzling, as the AEA creates no sui generis form of protection, as that
term is generally understood, but merely limits the ability of applicants to
obtain patents that would claim atomic weapons technology, and imposes
various disclosure and ownership transfer provisions relating to such patents.
The resulting patents, however, are the same types of patents issued by the
USPTO on other forms of technology.
316. Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act, Pub. L. No.
98-417, 98 Stat. 1585 (1984) (codified at 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)).
317. See 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1) (2012).
318. See supra notes 187–308 and accompanying text.
319. See, e.g., Parthasarathy et al., supra note 315, at 9–12; Chavez, supra
note 125, at 18–19.
320. See infra notes 453–83 and accompanying text.
321. See, e.g., Carbon Pollution Emission Guidelines for Existing
Stationary Sources: Electric Utility Generating Units, 80 Fed. Reg. 64,661
(Oct. 23, 2015) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 60) (Clean Power Plan for
existing fossil-fuel-fired generating units); 2017 and Later Model Year Light-
Duty Vehicle Greenhouse Gas Emissions and Corporate Average Fuel
Economy Standards, 77 Fed. Reg. 62623 (Oct. 15, 2012) (codified at 40 C.F.R.
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imposition of stricter environmental controls, such as emission
limitations and tradable permit systems,322 and the creation of
financial incentives for clean-technology development and
usage, such as plug-in electric or hybrid vehicle tax
incentives,323 as well as government procurement of clean
energy technologies,324 are likely to be increasingly relied on as
measures to control carbon and other GHG emissions. This is
particularly the case given the ambitious emissions abatement
and financing goals contained in the recently signed Paris
Agreement.325 An extensive literature has developed
addressing the effects of product and process, information, and
market regulation on promoting or restricting technology
development.326 While using such regulatory approaches to
promote SCE technology development may prove useful,
proscriptive regulations do not directly address the IP
governance issues that are the central concern of this article,
and thus are not addressed further.
2. Administrative Actions
Administrative actions of government agencies can have a
significant effect on incentives and conditions for technology
and information development, sharing, and dissemination. For
pt. 85, 86, 600) (regulating vehicle fuel efficiency standards); Directive
2003/87/EC, 2003 OJ (L 275) 32, http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN
/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:02003L0087-20140430&from=EN (last visited Feb.
12, 2015).
322. See, e.g., source cited supra note 321; Lawrence H. Goulder & Andrew
R. Schein, Carbon Taxes v. Cap and Trade: A Critical Review, 4 CLIMATE
CHANGE ECON. 1350010, at 1 (2013).
323. See, e.g., Jim Motavalli, China to Subsidize Electric Cars and Hybrids,
N.Y. TIMES (June 2, 2010), http://wheels.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/06/02/china-
to-start-pilot-program-providing-subsidies-for-electric-cars-and-hybrids/.
324. See, e.g., Directive 2009/33/EC, 2009 O.J. (L 120) 5, http://eur-lex
.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2009:120:0005:0012:EN:PDF
(last visited Feb. 12, 2015).
325. See U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change, Draft Decision
for the Adoption of the Paris Agreement of the Parties on Its Twenty-First
Session, arts, 2.1, 3, 4.3, 9.1, U.N. Doc. FCCC/CP/2015/L.9/Rev.1, Annex (Dec.
12, 2015), https://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2015/cop21/eng/l09.pdf (last visited
Feb. 12, 2016).
326. See, e.g., Sarnoff, Government Choices, supra note 210, at 1143–48
(citing, inter alia, David Popp et al., Energy, the Environment, and
Technological Change 4–6 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper
No. 14832, 2009); Nicholas A. Ashford et al., Using Regulation to Change the
Market for Innovation, 9 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 419 (1985); Shameek Konar &
Mark A. Cohen, Information as Regulation: The Effect of Community Right to
Know Laws on Toxic Emissions, 32 J. ENVTL. L. ECON. & MGMT. 109 (1997)).
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example, prior to the Bayh-Dole Act of 1980, government
agencies adopted different policies regarding whether to obtain
patents on technologies developed with government funds and
license them to industry or to allow the recipients of federal
grants, contracts, and other subsidies to obtain patents
themselves.327 This uncoordinated diversity of federal policies
is widely believed to have stymied the commercialization of
many federally funded technologies.328
As discussed below, the NIH has had a profound effect on
publication of research results and of underlying data, by
requiring funding recipients to make all publications based on
NIH-funded research publicly available through the National
Library of Medicine’s PubMed Central database within one
year after publication.329
Of course, agencies also can make a big difference to
technology development and market incentives concerning the
substantive rules or policies they adopt over IP rights. These
actions may include rules or policies regarding grants of such
rights (such as the restrictive policy that the USPTO adopted
in regard to EST patents, discussed above),330 fees imposed on
acquisition or maintenance of such rights,331 and market
regulation or competition law policies affecting use or licensing
of IP rights.332 Agencies can also adopt measures such as
administrative subsidies, which may include waiving or
lowering fees to acquire such rights or processing applications
more quickly.333 One notable example was the “Green
327. See, e.g., WENDY H. SCHACHT, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL32076, THE
BAYH-DOLE ACT: SELECTED ISSUES IN PATENT POLICY AND THE
COMMERCIALIZATION OF TECHNOLOGY (2012), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc
/RL32076.pdf (last visited Feb. 12, 2016).
328. See Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Public Research and Private Development:
Patents and Technology Transfer in Government-Sponsored Research, 82 VA.
L. REV. 1663, 1676 (1996); NAT’L RES. COUNCIL OF THE NAT’L ACADS.,
MANAGING UNIVERSITY INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE PUBLIC INTEREST 19
(Stephen A. Merrill & Anne-Marie Mazza, eds., 2010).
329. NAT’L INSTS. OF HEALTH, NOT-OD-08-033, REVISED POLICY ON
ENHANCING PUBLIC ACCESS TO ARCHIVED PUBLICATIONS RESULTING
FROM NIH-FUNDED RESEARCH (2008) [hereinafter NIH REVISED POLICY].
330. See supra notes 219–21 and accompanying text.
331. See, e.g., 35 U.S.C. § 41 (2012) (legislatively specified fees and
administrative fee setting authority).
332. See, e.g., DOJ & FTC ANTITRUST GUIDELINES, supra note 106. See
generally Richard Gilbert & Carl Shapiro, Antitrust Issues in the Licensing of
Intellectual Property: The Nine No-No’s Meet the Nineties, 1997 BROOKINGS
PAPERS: MICROECONOMICS 283 (1997).
333. See, e.g., Sarnoff, Government Choices, supra note 210, at 1121–22.
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Technology Pilot Program” of the USPTO, which permitted
certain applications (including those for GHG reduction
technologies) to be “made special” and considered more quickly
(presumably to accelerate grants so as to provide greater
investment incentives and to move the technology to market
more quickly).334 Although such administrative subsidy
measures may have some beneficial effects,335 they are likely to
be much less significant than substantive agency rules and
policies and market regulation policies like those noted above.
3. Governmental Use and March-In Rights
In addition to altering legislative or administrative rules
pertaining to a particular subject area or industry, state actors
may exercise rights under existing statutory regimes in order
to address perceived problems or broader social needs.
For example, under 28 U.S.C. § 1498 (which acts as a
waiver of sovereign immunity from suit and an assumption of
liability for patent infringement),336 the U.S. Government
reserves the right (itself and through its contractors) to use or
manufacture any patented article, provided that the
government pays “reasonable and entire compensation” to the
patent holder.337 This provision has been invoked numerous
times against the federal government in cases relating to
military contracting and technology development and use,338
although it applies to all governmental actions and actors (such
as the U.S. Postal Service).339
334. U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARKOFF., GREEN TECHNOLOGY PILOT PROGRAM—
CLOSED, http://www.uspto.gov/patents/init_events/green_tech.jsp (last
visited Oct. 7, 2016).
335. See, e.g., ANTOINE DECHEZLEPRÊTRE, INT’L CTR. FOR TRADE &
SUSTAINABLE DEV., FAST-TRACKING GREEN PATENT APPLICATIONS: AN
EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS vii (Issue Paper No. 37, 2013),
http://ictsd.org/i/publications/154732/ (noting some potential short-term
benefits via diffusion of knowledge).
336. See, e.g., Zoltek Corp. v. United States, 672 F.3d 1309, 1312 (Fed. Cir.
2012) (citing Advanced Software Design Corp. v. Fed. Reserve Bank, 583 F.3d
1371, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2009)).
337. 28 U.S.C. § 1498(a) (2012). Disputes regarding compensation are
adjudicated by the U.S. Court of Federal Claims. Id. For a history and critique
of this provision, see Joshua I. Miller, 28 U.S.C. § 1498(a) and the
Unconstitutional Taking of Patents, 13 YALE J.L. & TECH. 1, 29–30 (2011).
338. See, e.g., Honeywell Int’l, Inc. v. United States, 609 F.3d 1292, 1294,
1296 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (addressing patents on night vision goggles).
339. See, e.g., Paymaster Techs., Inc. v. United States, 180 F. App’x 942,
943 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (non-precedential) (addressing patents on forms).
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The Bayh-Dole Act also provides that the federal
government retains a non-exclusive, paid-up license to practice
any federally funded invention anywhere in the world.340 This
Act also authorizes the federal government to exercise so-called
‘march-in’ rights under which it may compel a federally-funded
researcher to license such inventions to one or more third
parties to the extent necessary to achieve practical application,
to address health or safety needs, and for other reasons.341
Over the years, several petitions have been filed urging the
federal government to exercise its march-in rights under the
Bayh-Dole Act, primarily in cases involving under-supplied or
costly pharmaceutical products.342 Most recently, more than
fifty members of Congress called on NIH to issue detailed
guidelines to describe when the agency would exercise march-
in rights in response to “price gouging” by pharmaceutical
firms.343 In addition, proposals have been made regarding the
340. 35 U.S.C. § 202(c)(4) (2012); 37 C.F.R. § 401.14(b) (2016). The Act
rationalized the previously chaotic rules governing federally-sponsored
inventions and allowed researchers to obtain patents on inventions arising
from government-funded research. Penalties, including forfeiture of rights,
could result from an institution’s failure to pursue patent protection for a
federally-funded invention. 35 U.S.C. § 202(c)(3) (2012); 37 C.F.R. § 401.14(d)
(2016).
341. 35 U.S.C. § 203(a) (2012); 37 C.F.R. §§ 401.6, 401.14(j) (2016).
342. See Joshua D. Sarnoff, The Patent System and Climate Change, 16 VA.
J.L. & TECH. 301, 354–55, 355 n.303 (2011) [hereinafter Sarnoff, The Patent
System and Climate Change] (discussing march-in and various petitions);
CellPro, Inc., (Nat’l Insts. of Health Aug. 1, 1997),
http://www.ott.nih.gov/sites/default/files/documents/policy/cellpro-marchin.pdf
(determination rejecting the petition by CellPro to obtain a license to four
patents that Johns Hopkins University licensed exclusively to Baxter
Healthcare); Abbott Laboratories, Inc., (Nat’l Insts. of Health July 29, 2004),
http://www.ott.nih.gov/sites/default/files/documents/policy/March-In-
Norvir.pdf (determination rejecting the petition that NIH exercise march-in
rights against Abbott Laboratories, which had received NIH funding to
develop the AIDS drug Norvir, after Abbott increased the retail price of the
drug by approximately 400 percent); Genzyme Corp., (Nat’l Insts. of Health
Dec. 1, 2010), https://www.ott.nih.gov/sites/default/files/documents/policy
/March-In-Fabrazyme.pdf (determination rejecting the petition for HHS to
permit alternative manufacturer to product the drug Fabrazyme when patent
holder failed to meet patient demand).
343. Letter from Rep. Lloyd Doggett, U.S. Representative, et al., to Sylvia
Mathews Burwell, Sec’y Dep’t Health & Human Servs., and Francis S. Collins,
Dir. Nat’l Insts. Health (Mar. 28, 2016), http://www.sanders.senate.gov
/download/congressional-letter-to-nih-and-hhs-regarding-xtandi?inline=file;
see also Kimberly Leonard, Can the Government Already Control Drug Prices?,
U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP. (Jan. 11, 2016, 3:41 PM), http://www
.usnews.com/news/articles/2016/01/11/congressional-democrats-urge-nih-to-
act-on-drug-prices.
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use of federal march-in rights to address potential areas of
national importance beyond pharmaceuticals, including climate
emissions abatement technology344 and the electrical smart
grid.345 To date, however, federal agencies have not taken
action in response to these requests or suggestions.
4. Compulsory Licensing
In addition to statutory provisions enabling the
government and its contractors to make use of patented
technologies, the state may, in some instances, have the power
to require a patent holder to license its technology to others
(hence the term “compulsory”) or otherwise authorize
production or use of the technology.346 Where a statute
automatically authorizes a compulsory license, without the
need for the government to act further, it is usually referred to
as a “statutory” license.347 Although compulsory licenses
frequently involve payment of compensation to the patent
holder (as determined by the government authority compelling
the license), they often do not require such payment when
adopted to remedy competition law violations by the patent
holder.348
Statutory licenses are common where the transaction costs
of seeking multiple licenses would be substantial.349 For
example, U.S. copyright law establishes a widely used
compulsory licensing structure for the mechanical reproduction
of previously recorded musical works, and for various
secondary transmissions by cable systems and satellites.350
344. See Sarnoff, The Patent System and Climate Change, supra note 342,
at 354–56.
345. See Jorge L. Contreras, Standards, Patents and the National Smart
Grid, 32 PACE L. REV. 641, 671 (2012).
346. Id. at 672–73.
347. See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. § 122(a)(1) (2012) (stating that secondary
transmissions of a television broadcast within a local market are subject to a
statutory license subject to some conditions).
348. See Lawrence Schlam, Compulsory Royalty-Free Licensing as an
Antitrust Remedy for Patent Fraud: Law, Policy, and the Patent-Antitrust
Interface Revisited, 7 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 467, 470 n.13 (1998) (listing
several cases where compulsory licensing was ordered “to improve the
competitive condition of the . . . marketplace”).
349. See generally 1 PAUL GOLDSTEIN, GOLDSTEIN ON COPYRIGHT § 1.14.2
(3d ed. Supp. 2016) (discussing the law & economics considerations behind
statutory copyright licensing).
350. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 111, 112, 114, 119, 122. Compulsory license authority
is provided for making and distributing phonorecords and for use of certain
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Compulsory licensing exists under the patent law as well.351
For example, the AEA authorizes the compulsory licensing of
patents “[u]seful in the production or utilization of special
nuclear material or atomic energy”352 and the Clean Air Act
authorizes under certain conditions the compulsory licensing of
patents relating to the prevention of air pollution.353
Compulsory licensing is also allowed under international
treaties, most notably the World Trade Organization’s (WTO’s)
Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS)
Agreement.354 Compulsory licensing for exports of
pharmaceutical products was expressly addressed by the
WTO’s Doha Declaration355 and consequent amendment to the
TRIPS Agreement.356 While national governments and scholars
have invoked these instruments primarily to address access to
medicines in the developing world,357 it has been argued that
they may have broader applicability to other critical
technologies, including those directed at climate change
emissions abatement.358
works in connection with non-commercial broadcasting. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 115,
116.
351. E.g., AEA, 42 U.S.C. § 2183(c) (2012).
352. Id.
353. Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7608 (2012).
354. See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 285; Marrakesh Agreement
Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, 1869 U.N.T.S. 299.
355. See World Trade Organization, Ministerial Declaration of 14
November 2001, ¶ 6, WT/MIN(01)/DEC/2, 41 I.L.M. 746 (2001), https://www
.wto.org/english/thewto_e/minist_e/min01_e/mindecl_trips_e.pdf.
356. See World Trade Organization, General Council Decision:
Implementation of Paragraph 6 of the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS
Agreement and Public Health, WT/L/540, Corr. 1 (Sept. 1, 2003), http://www
.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/implem_para6_e.htm; World Trade
Organization, Amendment of the TRIPS Agreement: Decision of 6 December
2005, WT/L/641 (Dec. 8, 2005), http:// www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e
/wtl641_e.htm.
357. See, e.g., Colleen Chien, Cheap Drugs at What Price to Innovation:
Does the Compulsory Licensing of Pharmaceuticals Hurt Innovation?, 18
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 853, 855–56 (2003); J. H. Reichman, From Free Riders to
Fair Followers: Global Competition Under the TRIPS Agreement, 29 N.Y.U. J.
INT’L L. & POLS. 11, 52–53 (1996); Alan O. Sykes, TRIPS, Pharmaceuticals,
Developing Countries, and the Doha “Solution,” 3 CHI. J. INT’L L. 47, 49, 62
(2002).
358. See Daniel R. Cahoy, Inverse Enclosure: Abdicating the Green
Technology Landscape, 49 AM. BUS. L.J. 805, 854–55 (2012) (suggesting the
possibility of emergency use of compulsory licensing in the context of
renewable energy and other green technologies); McManis & Contreras, supra
note 244; cf. Sarnoff, The Patent System and Climate Change, supra note 342,
at 334–35 (suggesting various measures, including retaining government
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5. Funding-Based Controls: Access to Data/Literature
In its 2015 budget, the U.S. Federal Government
apportioned approximately $65 billion to non-defense basic and
applied research.359 This spending level makes the U.S. Federal
Government the largest single funder of scientific research in
the world.360 Other national and state governments also spend
large sums on R&D activity.361
In addition to direct funding of R&D, governments often
act as purchasers of goods and services. The U.S. Federal
Government, for example, spends substantial sums annually in
its procurement capacity on a wide range of goods and
services.362 Large procurement expenditures are also made on
the state and local levels and include everything from the
construction of new roads and schools to the acquisition of
computer systems, communications devices, and online content.
“History and economic studies indicate that public procurement
may be a very significant incentive to technology
development.”363
The procurement power of the state has often been used to
advance a broad range of governmental and social goals by
conditioning governmental expenditures or by imposing
ownership rights and using march-in, as less controversial means than
compulsory licenses to address access restrictions and high prices for climate
change technologies).
359. OFFICE OF SCI. & TECH. POLICY, R&D IN THE 2015 BUDGET (REVISED),
(May 2014), https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/microsites/ostp
/fy2015rdtables.pdf [hereinafter OSTP 2015 R&D BUDGET].
360. NAT’L SCI. FOUND., SCIENCE AND ENGINEERING INDICATORS 2016 at
4-4 (2016), https://www.nsf.gov/statistics/2016/nsb20161/uploads/1/nsb20161
.pdf (“Most of U.S. basic research is conducted at universities and colleges and
funded by the federal government.”).
361. World Development Indicators: Science and Technology, WORLD BANK,
http://wdi.worldbank.org/table/5.13 (last visited Nov. 14, 2016) (showing that
worldwide 2.12% of GDP is spent on R&D).
362. See, e.g., NHE Fact Sheet, CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS.,
https://www.cms.gov/research-statistics-data-and-systems/statistics-trends-
and-reports/nationalhealthexpenddata/nhe-fact-sheet.html (last visited Jan. 2,
2017) (explaining that in 2014 the United States government spent $618.7
billion on Medicare alone).
363. Denis Borges Barbosa & Charlene de Avila Plaza, The Role of
Government Procurement in Regard to Development, Dissemination, and Costs
of Climate Change Technologies, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY AND CLIMATE CHANGE 317 (Joshua D. Sarnoff ed., Edward Elgar
Publ’g 2016).
2017] SOLAR CLIMATE ENGINEERING & IP 77
requirements on the recipients of governmental funds.364
Requirements imposed on funding recipients and contractors
are often intended to achieve goals beyond the direct
production or delivery of the research, goods, or services
putatively covered by the government expenditure. For
example, the U.S. General Services Administration (GSA),
Department of Housing and Urban Development, and other
federal agencies have adopted aggressive policies to make their
construction and building projects environmentally
sustainable,365 and numerous municipalities and counties have
followed suit.366 This policy approach differs from direct
governmental regulation in that it applies only to private
actors that voluntarily seek or obtain funding from the
government.367
One of the areas in which funding-based regulation has
been used most successfully relates to public access to scientific
publications. In 2008, the NIH implemented regulations
requiring that all publications based on NIH-funded research
364. See, e.g., Rothe Dev. Corp. v. Dep’t of Def., 545 F.3d 1023, 1026–27
(Fed. Cir. 2008) (finding unconstitutional an evaluation preference set-aside
for “small business concerns owned and controlled by ‘socially and
economically disadvantaged individuals,’” in bidding for Defense Department
procurement, R&D, military construction, and maintenance contracts). See
generally MARIANA MAZZUCATO, THE ENTREPRENEURIAL STATE: DEBUNKING
PUBLIC VS. PRIVATE SECTOR MYTHS 74 (2013) (observing that the modern
state can “[use] its procurement, commissioning and regulatory functions to
shape markets and drive technological advance”).
365. U.S. Gen. Servs. Admin., GSA Moves to LEED Gold for All New
Federal Buildings and Major Renovations, GSA.GOV (Oct. 28, 2010),
http://www.gsa.gov/portal/content/197325 (GSA #10691); U.S. DEP’T HOUS. &
URBAN DEV., ENHANCING ENERGY EFFICIENCY AND GREEN BUILDING DESIGN
IN SECTION 202 AND SECTION 811 PROGRAMS 33–39 (2011).
366. See, e.g., Timothy Simcoe & Michael W. Toffel, Government Green
Procurement Spillovers: Evidence from Municipal Building Policies in
California, 13–15 (Harv. Bus. Sch. Tech. & Operations Mgt. Unit Working
Paper No. 13-030), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=
2142085 (describing and offering an explanation for the rapid adoption of
LEED standards in different municipalities).
367. In addition to governmental programs, several charitable
organizations that fund scientific research impose similar requirements.
These include the Howard Hughes Medical Institute, the Wellcome Trust, and
numerous disease-specific advocacy and support groups. See, e.g., Research
Policies – Sharing Published Materials/Responsibilities of HHMI Authors
(SC-300), HOWARD HUGHES MED. INST., http://www.hhmi.org/sites/default
/files/About/Policies/sc_300.pdf (last visited Dec. 1, 2016); Wellcome Trust
Requirements, RES. DATA OXFORD, http://researchdata.ox.ac.uk/funder-
requirements/wellcome-trust/ (last visited Dec. 1, 2016) (compiling Wellcome
Trust research data expectations).
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be deposited in the PubMed Central database, which provides
the public with free access.368 In 2013, the White House Office
of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP) expanded the scope of
this initiative to all Federal agencies having annual research
budgets in excess of $100 million.369 The OSTP directive also
instructed these agencies to develop plans to ensure that all
data arising from agency-funded research be publicly accessible
and searchable “in ways that maximize the impact and
accountability of the Federal research investment.”370 Research
funding agencies in other countries including the UK,
Germany, and Japan have followed suit with similar
requirements for public release of scientific literature following
publication.
In addition to published scientific literature, many federal
agencies including NASA and NOAA have longstanding
policies requiring that scientific data generated using federal
funds be made available to the public.371 In 1998, the Human
Genome Project (HGP)–a jointly funded effort of the U.S. NIH
and Department of Energy, the UK-based Wellcome Trust and
agencies in Japan, Germany, and elsewhere–adopted a policy
mandating that all genetic sequence data be made public
within twenty-four hours after being generated (which also
prevented patents from claiming such sequences).372 And more
recently, the 2013 OSTP directive instructed all covered U.S.
federal agencies to develop strategies for “improving the
public’s ability to locate and access digital data resulting from
federally funded scientific research” and to optimize electronic
search, archival, and dissemination capabilities for this data.373
Policies mandating the public release of research data and
literature have several possible goals and outcomes. First,
many proponents of open access policies argue that publicly
368. NIH REVISED POLICY, supra note 329.
369. Memorandum from John P. Holdren, Dir., Office of Sci. & Tech.
Policy, to the Heads of Executive Departments and Agencies: Increasing
Access to the Results of Federally Funded Scientific Research 2 (Feb. 22,
2013).
370. Id. at 3.
371. See, e.g., NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, BITS OF POWER – ISSUES IN
GLOBAL ACCESS TO SCIENTIFIC DATA 80–82 (1997); NAS INTEGRITY,
ACCESSIBILITY, AND STEWARDSHIP, supra note 296, at 104–05 (noting the
Government-Industry Data Exchange Program’s tenure, as one example of a
long-standing mechanism for sharing research).
372. See Contreras, Bermuda’s Legacy, supra note 220, at 64–66.
373. Holdren, supra note 369, at 2.
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funded research necessarily should inure to the benefit of the
taxpayers and not to private publishers or firms.374 More
generally, there is a belief that public access to research data
will foster innovation and discovery. In particular, much has
been written about the scientific advances that have been
enabled by the culture of rapid and widespread sharing of
genomic data fostered by the HGP.375
Finally, public data release has an impact on the ability of
other researchers to obtain patent protection claiming
inventions potentially anticipated by the released data. This
effect was well-known to the planners of the HGP, who adopted
a de facto patent deterrence policy when they chose to mandate
rapid public release of genomic data.376 In particular, the
Bermuda Principles ensured that HGP data would be made
publicly available before data generators could file patent
applications covering “inventions” arising from that data, and
in a manner that ensured its early availability as prior art
against third party patent filings.377 This result, though
praised by many, was also criticized by those who believed that
NIH’s discouragement of patents contravened the requirements
374. JOHN WILLINSKY, THE ACCESS PRINCIPLE: THE CASE FOR OPEN
ACCESS TO RESEARCH AND SCHOLARSHIP 1–3 (William Y. Arms ed., 2006).
375. See, e.g., Heidi Williams, Intellectual Property Rights and Innovation:
Evidence from the Human Genome 1, 10–12, 24, 121 J. POL. ECON. 1 (2013);
Francis Collins, Opinion, Has the Revolution Arrived?, 464 NATURE 674, 675
(referring to the “radical ethic of immediate data deposit” adopted by the HGP
as the current “norm for other community research projects”); Jane Kaye et
al., Data Sharing in Genomics – Re-shaping Scientific Practice, 10 NATURE
REVS. GENETICS 331, 332 box 1 (2009) (“These policies have created a climate
in which data sharing has become the default, and [grant] applicants must
demonstrate why their data should be exempt from the requirement that it
should be deposited for use by other scientists”).
376. See David R. Bentley, Genomic Sequence Information Should be
Released Immediately and Freely in the Public Domain, 274 SCIENCE 533,
533–34 (1996); JAMES D. WATSON ET AL., RECOMBINANT DNA: GENES AND
GENOMES – A SHORT COURSE 295 (3d ed. 2005); Contreras, Bermuda’s Legacy,
supra note 220, at 86–88; Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Patents and Data-Sharing in
Public Science, 15 INDUS. & CORP. CHANGE 1013, 1025–26 (2006) (discussing
the creation of “patent-defeating” prior art through the HGP’s data release
rules).
377. In jurisdictions such as the European Union and Japan that have so-
called “absolute novelty” requirements, an invention may not be patented if it
has been publicly disclosed prior to the filing of a patent application. See JOHN
GLADSTONE MILLS III ET AL., PATENT LAW FUNDAMENTALS §§ 1:36, 2:30 (2d
ed. 2004). In the United States, a patent application may be filed with respect
to an invention that has been disclosed in a printed publication, but only if the
publication occurred less than one year before the filing of the patent
application. 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2006).
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of the Bayh-Dole Act, which expressly encourages the patenting
of federally funded inventions for the benefit of the U.S.
economy.378 Nevertheless, such a patent deterrence approach
developed during the HGP has continued to be adopted in
many government-funded basic research projects both in the
United States and elsewhere.379 For SCE, it is worth
considering whether there are additional factors when
determining whether data should be made generally public,
including the potential for SCE techniques to be misused.
NIH continued to discourage federal grantees from seeking
patents on the basic tools of biomedical research in its 2005
Best Practices for the Licensing of Genomic Inventions.380 In
that document, the agency set forth guidance regarding
recommended approaches to patenting NIH-funded genomic
discoveries:
Intellectual property protection should be sought when it is clear
that private sector investment will be necessary to develop and make
the invention widely available. By contrast, when significant further
research and development investment is not required, such as with
many research material and research tool technologies, best
practices dictate that patent protection rarely should be sought.381
The guidance continues to explain that even when patent
protection for genomic discoveries is obtained, such inventions
should be licensed on a non-exclusive basis “whenever possible”
in order to facilitate the broad availability of enabling
technologies within the scientific community.382 As such, at
least in the field of genomics and biomedical research, NIH has
established a set of norms and expectations regarding the
limitation of patent encumbrances on federally-funded
378. Bayh-Dole Act of 1980, 35 U.S.C. §§ 200–12 (2012) (“It is the policy
and objective of the Congress to use the patent system to promote the
utilization of inventions arising from federally supported research or
development . . . .”); see also Arti K. Rai & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Bayh-Dole
Reform and the Progress of Biomedicine, 66 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 289, 308
(2003) (“Arguably, NIH has acted outside the scope of its statutory
authority . . . at least with respect to patentable inventions . . . .”); JAMES
SHREEVE, THE GENOME WAR 46 (Ballantine Books Trade Paperback ed. 2005)
(“Strictly speaking, the policy directly contradicted the Bayh-Dole Act . . . .”).
379. See Contreras, Bermuda’s Legacy, supra note 220, at 63–66. But see
Jorge L. Contreras, NIH’s Genomic Data Sharing Policy: Timing and
Tradeoffs, 31 TRENDS IN GENETICS 55 (2015) (noting potential recent NIH
movement away from former patent deterrent stance).
380. NIH, Best Practices for the Licensing of Genomic Inventions, 70 Fed.
Reg. 18,413, 18,415 (Apr. 11, 2005).
381. Id. (emphasis added).
382. Id.
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innovations, at the stage both of patent acquisition and of
subsequent commercialization.383
B. PRIVATEORDERING SOLUTIONS
In addition to governmental action, numerous approaches
for handling patents and research data have emerged through
private ordering and market forces. These fall into three
primary categories: patent pools, patent pledges, and data
commons.
1. Patent Pools
As discussed in Section IV.B above, when multiple entities
each hold patents necessary to conduct research in a particular
field or to exploit a particular technology, blocking or thicket
situations may arise to limit overall innovation and technology
development. Patent pools are private arrangements among
patent holders that enable the participants each to operate
under the others’ patents, to manage and administer the pooled
patents on a centralized basis, and often to grant licenses of the
pooled patents to third parties, with the proceeds split among
the pool members according to an agreed formula.384
Because the holders of complementary patents frequently
are competitors, antitrust considerations are relevant in the
formation of many pools. One of the earliest patent pools
challenged on antitrust grounds involved four leading oil
companies that combined their patents covering the processes
for extracting excess gasoline from crude oil (“cracking”).385 The
pool was challenged by the government as an anticompetitive
agreement among competitors.386 But in Standard Oil Co.
(Indiana) v. United States,387 the Supreme Court held that
“[a]n interchange of patent rights and a division of
royalties . . . is frequently necessary if technical advancement
is not to be blocked by threatened litigation.”388 The Court thus
383. Id. at 18413–15.
384. See, e.g., World Intellectual Prop.Org. (WIPO), Patent Pools and
Antitrust – A Comparative Analysis 3 (Mar. 2014), http://www.wipo.int/export
/sites/www/ip-competition/en/studies/patent_pools_report.pdf (last visited Nov.
16, 2016).
385. See Standard Oil Co. (Ind.) v. United States, 283 U.S. 163, 165–66
(1931).
386. Id.
387. Id.
388. Id. at 171.
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recognized the pro-competitive benefits that could be achieved
by eliminating blocking patent positions and thereby enabling
greater innovation and technological development.
Patent pools exist today in a variety of “high technology”
industries including semiconductors, consumer electronics,
computing, and telecommunications.389 Echoing the Supreme
Court’s reasoning in Standard Oil (Indiana), the Department
of Justice has typically viewed such pools with approval, citing
their ability to “create substantial integrative efficiencies by
reducing the time and expense of disseminating the patents to
interested licensees, clearing blocking positions, and
integrating complementary technologies.”390
Despite the commercial success and broad market adoption
of patent pools in fields such as consumer electronics and
semiconductors, commercial patent pools have not achieved
similar levels of success in other industries. Notably, despite
frequent calls for the pooling of patents in the biotechnology
industry,391 such calls have to date resulted in little patent
pooling activity among commercial firms.392
There are several possible explanations for this failure.
First, patent pools come at a steep cost, driven largely by
antitrust compliance. A patent pool may stifle competition if it
contains patents covering substitute technologies (i.e., it is
desirable for alternative technologies to compete in the
marketplace, which is less likely to occur if potentially
389. See, e.g., Jonathan M. Barnett, The Anti-Commons Revisited, 29
HARV. J.L. & TECH. 127, 191–96 app. (2015) (cataloging more than 100 IP
pools from 1900 onward); Jonathan M. Barnett, From Patent Thickets to
Patent Networks: The Legal Infrastructure of the Digital Economy, 55
JURIMETRICS 1 (2014) (surveying information and communication technology
pooling and cross-licensing arrangements); Michael Mattioli, Communities of
Innovation, 106 NW. U. L. REV. 103 (2012); Richard J. Gilbert, Antitrust for
Patent Pools: A Century of Policy Evolution, 2004 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 3
(2004); CARL SHAPIRO & HAL R. VARIAN, INFORMATION RULES: A STRATEGIC
GUIDE TO THENETWORK ECONOMY 206–24 (1999).
390. U.S. DEP’T OF JUST. & FED. TRADE COMM’N, ANTITRUST
ENFORCEMENT AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS: PROMOTING
INNOVATION AND COMPETITION 71 (2007) [hereinafter ANTITRUST AND IPR],
http://www.ftc.gov/reports/innovation/P040101PromotingInnovationandCompe
titionrpt0704.pdf (last visited Feb. 22, 2016).
391. See, e.g., David B. Resnik, A Biotechnology Patent Pool: An Idea Whose
Time Has Come? J. PHIL SCI. & L., Jan. 2003, at 1; Richard C. Atkinson et al.,
Public Sector Collaboration for Agricultural IP Management, 301 SCIENCE 174
(2003); Heller & Eisenberg, supra note 214, at 698–99.
392. See, e.g., Mattioli, supra note 389, at 114 (listing several such
failures).
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competing patent owners are compensated when the pool is
licensed).393 Thus, the pool must contain only patents claiming
technologies that are complementary, and which do not act as
substitutes for one another. For this reason, the parties
forming patent pools typically engage in a lengthy and
expensive process (usually through external counsel engaged
for the purpose) of vetting each patent that is proposed to be
included in the pool and confirming its essentiality to the
pool.394
Another reason for the limited commercial success of
biotechnology and some other patent pools may be the absence
of market demand for such pools. In contrast to high-
technology industries in which thousands of patents may cover
a single product such as a smartphone, many believe that the
feared “thicket” of biotechnology patents has not emerged in a
way that hinders innovation or product development.395 If not,
then firms may lack the motivation to pool their patents
together in order to conduct desired R&D.
Though patent pools have not gained significant
commercial traction in non-high-technology industries, a
number of pooling arrangements organized principally to
achieve humanitarian ends have achieved some success. For
example “golden rice,” a genetically-engineered Vitamin A-rich
rice variant, was developed by researchers in Europe to address
issues of malnutrition in the developing world.396 Bio-agro firm
Syngenta, another holder of key patents on the technology,
393. See Summit Tech., Inc., 127 F.T.C. 208, 217–24 (1999) (decision and
order); ANTITRUST AND IPR, supra note 390, at 76–78.
394. See, e.g., Essentiality Report, DVD6C LICENSING GRP., http://www
.dvd6cla.com/essential.html (last updated June 10, 2014) (providing detailed
“essentiality reports” for each licensed standard).
395. See, e.g., David E. Adelman & Kathryn L. DeAngelis, Patent Metrics:
The Mismeasure of Innovation in the Biotech Patent Debate, 85 TEX. L. REV.
1677, 1729 (2007); David E. Adelman, A Fallacy of the Commons in Biotech
Patent Policy, 20 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 985 (2005) (showing biotechnology
patenting is not adversely affecting innovation); Edmund W. Kitch, Comment
on the Tragedy of the Anticommons in Biomedical Research, in 50 ADVANCES
IN GENETICS 271 (2003); Richard A. Epstein & Bruce N. Kuhlik, Is There a
Biomedical Anticommons?, 27 REGULATION 54 (2004); Chester J. Shiu, Note,
Of Mice and Men: Why an Anticommons Has Not Emerged in the
Biotechnology Realm, 17 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 413, 450–54 (2009).
396. See Golden Rice and Intellectual Property, GOLDEN RICE PROJECT,
http://www.goldenrice.org/Content2-How/how9_IP.php (last visited Oct. 11,
2016); Amanda L. Brewster, Audrey R. Chapman & Stephen A. Hansen,
Facilitating Humanitarian Access to Pharmaceutical and Agricultural
Innovation, 1 INNOVATION STRATEGY TODAY 203, 205 (2005).
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persuaded more than thirty academic and industrial holders of
patents relevant to golden rice to license these patents to a
non-profit organization for sublicensing on favorable terms for
use by farmers in developing countries.397
Another prominent example of philanthropic patent
pooling for global public health is the Medicines Patent Pool
(MPP), which was launched in 2009 to improve access to
affordable HIV/AIDS medications in the developing world.398
The MPP seeks royalty-free licenses from pharmaceutical
patent holders and in turn grants low- or no-cost sublicenses to
manufacturers that commit to produce and sell drugs to users
in low-income countries.399 A few significant patent holders,
including NIH and Gilead Sciences, have contributed licenses
to the MPP; others who own relevant patents have declined to
participate.400
Just as governments can issue compulsory patent licenses,
they can also encourage the formation of patent pools when
blocking patents or patent thickets may create perceived
problems with technology development or dissemination. For
example, in the early twentieth century, the aviation industry
was subject to a series of patent disputes and litigation
between rival aircraft manufacturers Wright-Martin Aircraft
Corp. (successor to the Wright brothers’ original aviation
patent) and Curtiss Aeroplane & Motor Corp.401 These disputes
gave rise to fears within the United States government
(primarily voiced by then-Acting Secretary of the Navy
Franklin Delano Roosevelt) that the production capacity of the
U.S. aviation industry could be hindered in a manner
detrimental to U.S. engagement in World War I.402 As a result
of this intervention, the U.S. aviation industry formed the
Manufacturers’ Aircraft Association (MAA), a patent pool that
397. See generally GOLDEN RICE PROJECT, supra note 396.
398. See Medicines Patent Pool Announces First Licensing Agreement with
a Pharmaceutical Company, MEDS. PAT. POOL (July 12, 2011), http://www
.medicinespatentpool.org/medicines-patent-pool-announces-first-licensing-
agreement-with-a-pharmaceutical-company/.
399. See About the MPP, MEDS. PAT. POOL, http://medicinespatentpool.org
/about/ (last visited Oct. 11, 2016).
400. SeeMattioli, supra note 389, at 124–25.
401. See Mfrs. Aircraft Ass’n, Inc. v. United States, 77 Ct. Cl. 481 (1933)
(granting royalties for aircraft manufactured with patented technologies).
402. See id. (detailing the difficulties faced by the Army and Navy
regarding patented aircraft technology and wartime production in 1917 and
1918).
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provided for cross-licensing of aviation patents among the pool
members, among other things.403
Proposals regarding patent pools have also been made in
connection with climate change emissions abatement and SCE
technologies.404 These proposals are addressed below in Section
VI.A.
2. Patent Pledges
As discussed above, the formation of a patent pool requires
a substantial amount of legal planning including the definition
of rights as among pool members, the identification and
appointment of a pool administrator, and careful attention to
the relationship among patents included in the pool. Over the
past decade, patents holders have found it increasingly
expedient to make commitments regarding the enforcement
and licensing of their patents without the legal trappings,
infrastructure, and overhead of a formal patent pool.405 These
commitments–“patent pledges”–are promises made by patent
holders to limit the enforcement or other exploitation of their
patents.406 The promises are made not to specific parties, as in
traditional bilateral contracts, but to the market at large.407 A
range of legal theories have been advanced to enable third
parties to rely on patent pledges as legally-binding
commitments.408 For the most part, such pledges are made
403. The formation of the MAA and its aftermath have been discussed
extensively in the literature. See, e.g., Ron D. Katznelson & John Howells, The
Myth of the Early Aviation Patent Hold-Up—How a US Government
Monopsony Commandeered Pioneer Airplane Patents, 24 INDUS. & CORP.
CHANGE 1, 3 (2015); Jorge L. Contreras, A Brief History of FRAND: Analyzing
Current Debates in Standard-Setting and Antitrust through a Historical Lens,
80 ANTITRUST L.J. 39, 69 (2015); Mattioli, supra note 389, 130–33 (2012);
Robert P. Merges, Contracting into Liability Rules: Intellectual Property
Rights and Collective Rights Organizations, 84 CALIF. L. REV. 1293, 1342–47
(1996).
404. See, e.g., Chavez, supra note 125 (advocating for a geoengineering
patent pool).
405. See generally Jorge L. Contreras, Patent Pledges, 47 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 543,
543 (2015) [hereinafter Contreras, Patent Pledges] (offering a “four-part
taxonomy of patent pledges based on the factors that motivate patent holders
to make them and the effect they are intended to have on other market
actors”).
406. See id. at 543
407. See id.
408. See, e.g., Jorge L. Contreras, A Market Reliance Theory for FRAND
Commitments and Other Patent Pledges, 2015 UTAH L. REV. 479 [hereinafter
Contreras, Market Reliance] (describing a range of existing theories for
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without direct compensation or other consideration being
transferred directly to the patent holder.409 This is not to say,
however, that patent pledges are economically irrational; they
may be supported by motivations ranging from promoting
market development to acquiring platform leadership to
improving public relations.410
Another recent trend has been to make pledges that are
likely to reduce the threat of non-practicing entity (NPE)
litigation. For example, in 2015 the non-profit DPL Foundation
launched the Defensive Patent License (DPL) program, in
which firms may publicly post their commitments to license all
of their patents to other firms making similar commitments,
while retaining the right to use the patents for counter-
claiming when sued.411 The license that they promise to grant
is on standardized terms developed by the DPL Foundation,
with input from various communities.412 The express purpose of
the DPL is to discourage transfers of patents to PAEs; and to
that end it permits a patent holder to revoke any DPL license if
the licensee either brings a patent infringement claim against
another DPL pledgor or transfers a patent to an entity that has
not made a DPL pledge.413
Patent pledges range from well-documented, uniform
commitments made by firms participating in technical
standards-setting organizations to relatively informal, one-off
commitments such as the 2014 public announcement by Tesla
Motors CEO Elon Musk that his company would no longer
enforcement of patent pledges including contract, antitrust, servitude, and
reliance-based theories).
409. See Contreras, Patent Pledges, supra note 405, at 546.
410. See id. at 591 (noting the public relations benefits of pledging).
411. Frequently Asked Questions, DEFENSIVE PAT. LICENSE,
http://defensivepatentlicense.org/content/frequently-asked-questions#how-can-
I-start (last visited Oct. 11, 2016); cf. Non-Sticky Defensive Patent License,
GOOGLE, https://www.google.com/patents/licensing/dpl/non-sticky/ (last visited
Oct. 11, 2016) (distinguishing the non-sticky DPL from the sticky DPL by the
ability to withdraw and revoke prior authorizations). See generally Jason
Schultz & Jennifer Urban, Protecting Open Innovation: The Defensive Patent
License as a New Approach to Patent Threats, Transaction Costs, and Tactical
Disarmament, 26 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1 (2012).
412. The Defensive Patent License 1.1, DEFENSIVE PAT. LICENSE,
http://defensivepatentlicense.org/content/defensive-patent-license (last visited
Nov. 11, 2016).
413. Id. § 2(e).
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“initiate patent lawsuits against anyone who, in good faith,
wants to use [its] technology.”414
Patent pledges, such as Tesla’s, have increasingly been
used to promote environmentally friendly “green/clean”
technologies. One of the best-known green patent pledges was
the Eco-Patent Commons (EPC), formed by coalition of large
industrial firms including IBM, Nokia, Sony, DuPont, Dow,
HP, Sony, and Xerox.415 To join EPC, each member firm had to
identify specific environment-related patents and commit not to
assert those patents against any technology that
“reduces/eliminates natural resource consumption,
reduces/eliminates waste generation or pollution, or otherwise
provides environmental benefit(s).”416 The EPC, which was
managed by the Environmental Law Institute in Washington,
DC, reports that over 100 “eco-friendly patents” were pledged
by its members since it was formed in 2008.417 Participants in
the EPC were required to apply to join,418 and comply with a
detailed set of “Ground Rules” that included the terms of the
pledge and other details regarding membership.419 One
criticism of the EPC (and similar pledge communities),
however, is that the participating firms did not make pledges
with respect to core technologies or commercially and
competitively valuable patents.420 A more recent evaluation
found that the pledged patents were more valuable than
average patents held by contributing firms and also more
valuable than comparable patents protecting similar
414. See Elon Musk, All Our Patents Are Belong to You, TESLA BLOG (June
12, 2014), http://www.teslamotors.com/blog/all-our-patent-are-belong-you. See
generally Contreras, Patent Pledges, supra note 405, at 558 (cataloging the
different types of patent pledges made).
415. See THE ECO-PATENT COMMONS, https://ecopatentcommons.org/ (last
visited Nov. 16, 2016).
416. See generally WORLD BUS. COUNCIL FOR SUSTAINABLE DEV., ECO-
PATENT COMMONS GROUND RULES 6, http://www.wbcsd.org/pages/adm
/download.aspx?id=314&objecttypeid=7 [hereinafter EPC GROUND RULES].
417. See Frequently Asked Questions, ECO-PATENT COMMONS, http://
ecopatentcommons.org/frequently-asked-questions#QA14 (last visited Oct. 11,
2016).
418. Joining or Submitting Additional Patents to the Commons, ECO-
PATENT COMMONS, http://ecopatentcommons.org/join (last visited Nov. 16,
2016) (listing the procedures for joining the EPC).
419. See EPC GROUND RULES, supra note 416.
420. See, e.g., Deborah Behles, The New Race: Speeding Up Climate
Change Innovation, 11 N.C. J.L. & TECH. 1, 20 (2009) (emphasizing the
inability of the EPC “to attract the core innovation . . . needed to combat
climate change”).
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technologies, but were for more derivative and narrower
technologies (i.e., less radical inventions) and less central to the
firms’ patent portfolios (suggesting they are not valuable to the
firms owning them).421 Further, although the evidence was
preliminary, pledging of the patents to the EPC had “no
discernible impact on the diffusion” of the patented
technologies.422 The EPC ceased active operations in May 2016,
though the pledges made by its members prior to its
discontinuation remain in effect.423
Not all patent pledges require non-assertion or royalty-free
licensing of the pledgor’s patents. In fact, the most common
forms of pledges are made in the context of technical standard-
setting. These pledges often commit the patent holder to license
its patents that are essential to a standard to manufacturers of
standardized products, but permit it to charge patent royalties
so long as they are “fair, reasonable and non-discriminatory”
(FRAND).424 There has been significant debate (and litigation)
concerning the precise level of royalties that may be charged
when the patent holder is subject to a FRAND commitment,
whether a FRAND commitment precludes a patent holder from
seeking injunctive relief against infringers, and whether other
types of license terms comply with FRAND obligations.425
Nevertheless, such commitments, at a minimum, ensure access
421. See Bronwyn H. Hall & Christian Helmers, Innovation and Diffusion
of Clean/Green Technology: Can Patent Commons Help? 21 (Nat’l Bureau of
Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 16920, 2011), http://www.nber.org/papers
/w16920.
422. See id.
423. Important Statement from the Board: Eco-Patent Commons to Cease
Active Operations Effective May 18, 2016, ECO-PATENT COMMONS,
https://ecopatentcommons.org (last visited Dec. 1, 2016).
424. See, e.g., Mark A. Lemley & Carl Shapiro, Patent Holdup and Royalty
Stacking, 85 TEX. L. REV. 1991 (2007); Joseph Farrell et al., Standard Setting,
Patents, and Hold-Up, 74 ANTITRUST L.J. 603, 616 (2007); Jorge L. Contreras
& Richard J. Gilbert, A Unified Framework for RAND and Other Reasonable
Royalties, 30 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1451 (2015); J. Gregory Sidak, The
Meaning of FRAND, Part I: Royalties, 9 J. COMPETITION L. & ECON. 931, 931
(2013).
425. See generally Jorge L. Contreras, Patents, Technical Standards and
Standard-Setting Organizations: A Survey of the Empirical, Legal and
Economics Literature, in 2 RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON THE ECONOMICS OF
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW (Peter S. Menell & David Schwartz eds.,
forthcoming 2017), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/Papers.cfm?abstract_id=
2641569 (reviewing extensively the literature on “reasonable royalty” patent
damages and license on terms that are reasonable and non-discriminatory).
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to patents and prevent patent holders from electing to assert
blocking positions against other market participants.
3. Data Commons
While patent pools and patent pledges seek to address
potential barriers to innovation and technology development
that may arise from the existence of blocking patents or patent
thickets, another way to facilitate innovation and development
is through the sharing and dissemination of research data.
When data sharing is conducted in a systematic manner and
data is made available through a broadly accessible repository
or set of repositories, this structure is often referred to as a
“data commons.”426
Many important data commons have arisen as a result of
government-procurement and research-funding requirements
discussed in Subsection V.A.5 above. Today, vast aggregations
of astronomical, atmospheric, geo-locational, genomic, and
other research data are accessible to researchers and the public
worldwide as a result of these programs.427 However, not all
data commons arise as a result of government intervention. In
the 1990s, pharmaceutical giant Merck released a database of
more than 800,000 short DNA sequences known as ESTs to the
public.428 While this data was a boon to genetic research, it is
also believed that Merck created the so-called “Merck Gene
426. See, e.g., Reichman & Uhlir, supra note 291, at 335–36 (highlighting
the importance of the availability of information in the scientific research
community, as compared to industry); Charlotte Hess & Elinor Ostrom, An
Overview of the Knowledge Commons, introduction to UNDERSTANDING
KNOWLEDGE AS A COMMONS: FROM THEORY TO PRACTICE 3 (Charlotte Hess &
Elinor Ostrom, eds. 2007) (exploring the interpretation of “commons” in a
multiple disciplines); Yochai Benkler, Between Spanish Huertas and the Open
Road: A Tale of Two Commons?, in GOVERNING KNOWLEDGE COMMONS 69
(Brett M. Frischmann, Michael J. Madison & Katherine J. Strandburg eds.,
2014) (harmonizing the concepts of commons and property ownership).
427. These include the National Library of Medicine’s GenBank and dbGaP
databases of genomic data, NASA’s National Space Science Data Center, the
National Center for Atmospheric Research (NCAR), and the U.S. Geological
Survey’s Earth Resources Observation Systems (EROS) Data Center.
428. See Press Release, Merck & Co., Inc., First Installment of Merck Gene
Index Data Released to Public Databases: Cooperative Effort Promises to
Speed Scientific Understanding of the Human Genome (Feb. 10, 1995), http://
www.bio.net/bionet/mm/bionews/1995-February/001794.html [hereinafter
Merck Gene Index Press Release] (announcing the beginning of the project);
DON TAPSCOTT & ANTHONY D. WILLIAMS, WIKINOMICS: HOW MASS
COLLABORATION CHANGES EVERYTHING 166 (2006).
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Index” to pre-empt the filing of EST patents by biotechnology
companies seeking to capitalize on these new discoveries.429
In 1999, toward the end of the public HGP, a group of large
pharmaceutical and information technology companies and the
Wellcome Trust formed a joint collaboration referred to as the
SNP Consortium.430 The purpose of this non-profit entity was
to identify and map genetic markers referred to as SNPs and to
contribute the resulting data to the public domain.431 The
consortium ultimately mapped approximately 1.5 million SNPs
and created a genome-wide SNP-based human linkage map.432
As the SNPs were identified, they were validated, mapped, and
deposited in publicly available databases maintained by the
consortium and NIH’s National Center for Biotechnology
Information.433
Like Merck with the Merck Gene Index, the members of
the SNP Consortium wished to generate data for the use of all
researchers, free from patent encumbrances.434 The consortium
adopted a multi-prong approach to ensure that the SNP data it
discovered would not be patented.435 First, it contractually
429. See Eliot Marshall, Bermuda Rules: Community Spirit, With Teeth,
291 SCI.1192 (2001); see also TAPSCOTT & WILLIAMS, supra note 428; Rai,
supra note 222, at 134 (noting that firms including Incyte Pharmaceuticals
and Human Genome Sciences were already seeking to patent and license
ESTs and other genetic data).
430. See Arthur L. Holden, The SNP Consortium: Summary of a Private
Consortium Effort to Develop an Applied Map of the Human Genome, 32
BIOTECHNIQUES 22 (2002).
431. See id.; Contreras, Bermuda’s Legacy, supra note 220, at 95–97.
432. See Holden, supra note 430, at 25–26; see also Gudmundur A.
Thorisson & Lincoln D. Stein, The SNP Consortium Website: Past, Present and
Future, 31 NUCLEIC ACIDS RES. 124, 124–27 (2003) (offering a detailed
description of the consortium’s web-based data resource).
433. See generally S.T. Sherry et al., dbSNP: The NCBI Database of
Genetic Variation, 29 NUCLEIC ACIDS RES. 308, 308–11 (2001) (instructing the
user of the utility as well as procedures for contributing to the SNP database).
434. See, e.g., Holden, supra note 430, at 26 (“The overall IP objective is to
maximize the number of SNPs that (i) enter the public domain at the earliest
possible date, and, (ii) are free of third-party encumbrances such that the map
can be used by all without financial or other IP obligations.”); TAPSCOTT &
WILLIAMS, supra note 428, at 168 (noting the concern of some consortium
members’ regarding announced plans by biotech firms “to patent SNPs and
sell them to the highest bidder”).
435. TSC’s patent deterrence strategies are described in detail in
Contreras, Bermuda’s Legacy, supra note 220, at 95–97. Contreras served as
TSC’s legal counsel responsible for developing and overseeing the
implementation of these strategies. TSC’s defensive patenting strategy has
been favorably cited in the literature. See, e.g., Mattioli, supra note 389, at
129; Robert Merges, A New Dynamism in the Public Domain, 71 U. CHI. L.
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prohibited the sequencing centers performing SNP
identification and mapping activity from filing for patent
protection on their discoveries.436 Second, it released all SNP
data it discovered to public databases, thus creating
voluminous prior art against potential patent filings by
others.437 Finally, it adopted a novel “defensive” patenting
strategy in which it filed patent applications disclosing all
newly identified and mapped SNPs with the USPTO in order to
enter this data into the USPTO prior art database and to
establish clear priority dates to defeat later patent
applications.438 The consortium’s patent applications were later
converted into Statutory Invention Registrations (SIRs) or,
following the 1998 revision to the Patent Act to implement the
WTO TRIPS Agreement,439 published and then allowed to go
abandoned.440 None of the consortium’s applications were
prosecuted to issuance, but instead utilized the USPTO
publication system to deter independent patenting of
discovered SNPs.441
Despite this active patent deterrence program with respect
to basic SNP data, the consortium made it clear that
REV. 183 (2004); Rebecca Eisenberg, The Promise and Perils of Strategic
Publication to Create Prior Art: A Response to Professor Parchomovsky, 98
MICH. L. REV. 2358 (2000).
436. See Contreras, Bermuda’s Legacy, supra note 220, at 93.
437. See id. at 96–97.
438. Although any genomic data released to the public (e.g., through NIH’s
GenBank database) can act as prior art defeating a later patent application, it
is often inconvenient for patent examiners to search databases external to the
USPTO. Moreover, it is often difficult to establish the precise date that data
was uploaded to a particular public database. For these reasons, TSC elected
to submit its SNP data directly to the USPTO by means of provisional patent
applications. See Contreras, Bermuda’s Legacy, supra note 220, at 96–97 n.151
(“The SNP Consortium’s patenting strategy included the filing of patent
applications covering all mapped SNPs and then converting those applications
into statutory invention registrations (SIRs) or abandoning the applications
after publication.”).
439. American Inventors Protection Act of 1999, Pub. L. 106–113, Div. B,
§ 1000(a)(9) [Title IV, § 4502(a)], 113 Stat. 1536 (1999) (codified at 35 U.S.C.
§ 122(b) (2012)) (requiring publication of applications within eighteen months
of their priority date, absent certain conditions or a request based on
certification that the application will not be filed abroad).
440. See Contreras, Bermuda’s Legacy, supra note 220, at 97 n.151.
441. See Jorge L. Contreras, Aris Floratos & Arthur L. Holden, The
International Serious Adverse Events Consortium’s Data Sharing Model, 31
NATURE BIOTECH. 17, 18 (2013) (noting also that “[t]he patent-defeating effect
of such patent filings extends to any other country that is a treaty partner of
the United States”).
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participants were free to pursue patents based on discoveries
made using SNPs.442 Thus, the SNP map created by the SNP
Consortium was intended to act as a public research tool, but
not to prevent patenting of downstream diagnostics or
therapeutics developed by participants or others.443
The SNP Consortium’s data commons approach has served
as a model for the ways that private industry can advance
science by ensuring that data remains free and available for all
to use without patent encumbrances.444
VI. POSSIBLE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY POLICIES FOR
SOLAR CLIMATE ENGINEERING
In this Part, we evaluate proposals for SCE IP policy that
others have made, and offer recommendations of our own.
Before doing so, it is important to highlight a handful of
relevant SCE characteristics that may affect the choice of
approach. First, as described in Part II above, SCE could
eventually develop into a moderately large industry, most
likely supported through public procurement.445 Second, as
described in Part III above, there is presently only a low level
of SCE patenting activity and no evidence of broad trade
secrecy.446 Instead, research is mostly funded by public sources
and occurs at universities and other non-industry research
institutions, at which researchers currently seem to share their
data willingly.447 Third, SCE research and possible
implementation will necessarily be transnational.448 Fourth,
SCE remains politically contested, and public decision makers
442. See generally id. (describing the “data release and IP policies of the
International Serious Adverse Events Consortorium (iSAEC)”).
443. One concern that has been raised regarding such “open data”
approaches is that they do not obligate downstream users from refraining to
seek IP protection on discoveries or inventions made using the data. Open
data approaches are thus unlike so-called “copyleft” or “viral licensing”
approaches that have been adopted in regard to open-source software and
some database licenses (where the initial IP rights or rights of access are used
to obtain reproducible, contractual obligations on downstream behaviors). See
generally BERNARD GOLDEN, SUCCEEDING WITH OPEN SOURCE 44–45 (2005)
(discussing viral licensing).
444. For other examples of private sector data commons in the biosciences,
see, e.g., Contreras et al., supra note 441.
445. See discussion supra Part II.
446. See discussion supra Part III.
447. See supra Subsection V.A.5 and accompanying notes.
448. See supra notes 68–71 and accompanying text.
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presently appear to be reluctant to engage with it.449 Fifth, the
line between SCE and non-SCE research is unclear.450 In
particular, inventions made during the course of SCE research
may have beneficial applications outside of SCE.451 Likewise,
inventions made outside of SCE research may become essential
for the further R&D and potential implementation of SCE.452
Of course, some or all of these characteristics could change as
SCE R&D matures.
A. ASSESSMENT OF EXISTING PROPOSALS
1. Legislative and Administrative Limits on Patentability of
SCE Technologies
As noted above, some commentators have pointed to
legislative enactments such as the patent-limiting features of
the AEA as models for potentially restricting the patentability
of SCE technologies.453 These proposals share a number of
weaknesses. First, proposals to amend patent laws must
consider the national character of patent rights and the likely
international character of any SCE research or
implementation.454 Patent legislation in any single jurisdiction
will not have a substantial impact on research or
implementation activity in other jurisdictions.455 At a
minimum, the principal North American, European, Asian,
Latin American, African, and Oceanic economies would need to
adopt corresponding statutory amendments if they are to be
meaningful. Thus, if SCE is to be addressed through special
patent-related legislation, it would need to be coordinated on
an international scale, most likely through a multinational
treaty or an amendment to TRIPS Article 27.2 that would
require, rather than merely permit, prohibitions on patenting
SCE technologies as “necessary . . . to avoid serious prejudice to
449. See supra Section IV.E.
450. See supra note 174 and accompanying text.
451. See supra note 176 and accompanying text.
452. See supra note 175 and accompanying text.
453. See, e.g., Chavez, supra note 125, at 18–19; Parthasarathy et al.,
supra note 315, at 9–12. See also Anne C. Mulkern, Researcher: Ban Patents
on Geoengineering Technology, SCI. AM., http://www.scientificamerican.com
/article/researcher-ban-patents-on-geoengineering-technology/ (last visited
Feb. 22, 2016) (quoting a leading SCE researcher rejecting SCE patents and
arguing that “[t]he core technologies need to be public domain”).
454. See discussion supra Section IV.D.
455. See id.
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the environment.”456 It is our assessment, particularly given
the recent aggressive pro-patent positions of some developed
countries in international trade negotiations,457 that such
coordination or a new multilateral treaty is unlikely to emerge
in the near future. Nor do we believe that wholesale field-of-
technology-based exclusions should be adopted, absent a clear
demonstration that the technologies pose significant public
safety risks similar to concerns that animated the exclusion for
nuclear weapons technologies.
Further, the question remains whether limitations on the
patentability of SCE technologies would be likely to promote or
hinder innovation in this critical area. The answer is far from
clear. We would be concerned with granting patent rights in
this area to the extent that applicants would seek to claim (1)
scientific or natural discoveries themselves; (2) analogous,
uncreative applications of the discovered properties of natural
phenomena; or (3) trivially modified natural materials
employing the discovered properties for SCE purposes (unless
doing so reflects non-analogous creativity).458 As discussed
above in Section IV.A above, significant deontological as well as
456. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 285, at art. 27.2.
457. See, e.g., William New, Leaked TPP Draft Reveals Extreme Rights
Holder Position of US, Japan Outraged Observers Say, INTELL. PROP. WATCH
(Oct. 17, 2014), http://www.ip-watch.org/2014/10/17/leaked-tpp-draft-reveals-
extreme-rights-holder-position-of-us-japan-outraged-observers-say/; cf. David
Vivas Eugui, A Shift in International Property Policy in US FTAs?, BRIDGES
Aug. 1, 2007, http://www.ictsd.org/bridges-news/bridges/news/a-shift-in-
intellectual-property-policy-in-us-ftas (“In a substantial departure from past
practice, the US recently relaxed several patent-related IP rules in revised
versions of its FTAs with Colombia, Panama and Peru.”).
458. As some of the authors have discussed, at least in the United States,
scientific and natural discoveries by applicants are to be treated as if they are
“prior art” when disclosed in patent applications, thus only creative (or
“inventive”) applications of the discovered science or natural materials should
be considered patent-eligible inventions. See Sarnoff, Patent-Eligible
Inventions After Bilski, supra note 199, at 77–84; Brief of Fifteen Law
Professors as Amici Curiae Supporting of Petitioners, Association for
Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S.Ct. 2107 (2013) (No. 12-
398), 2013 WL 432950; cf. Jeffrey A. Lefstin, Inventive Application: A History,
67 FLA. L. REV. 565, 570, 623–31 (2015) (discussing the relevant English and
American history and arguing that “[i]t was not until 1948, when the Supreme
Court decided Funk Brothers Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., that a test of
inventive application entered the mainstream of American patent law.”);
Joshua D. Sarnoff, Inventive Application, Legal Transplants, Pre-Funk, and
Judicial Policymaking (forthcoming 2017) (on file with author) (arguing that
the creative application requirement was deeply engrained in American
patent law well before Funk Brothers, that it should not be abandoned, and
that other jurisdictions should adopt it).
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utilitarian concerns would arise if patents were granted on
basic scientific principles and natural materials, or on
fundamental, upstream technologies.459 But reaching a
consensus that would span the globe on these highly
contentious issues is unlikely for the foreseeable future.
Fortunately, the authors believe that most SCE technologies
that will be developed are unlikely to be fundamental natural
discoveries or research tools (such as DNA sequences and basic
biomedical discoveries that the NIH and later the USPTO
sought to keep outside of the patent system). Rather, they are
more likely to be specialized, creative applications of well-
known scientific principles, materials, and processes that are
designed for direct deployment and utilization, or product and
process technologies that will facilitate SCE research.460
In summary, in order to make the greatest range of
technical options available to those having responsibility for
assessing the risks and benefits of SCE, competition among as
many different technological approaches as possible is
desirable. Adopting limits to patenting of fundamental
upstream technologies beyond the existing limits on patenting
discoveries (and in some jurisdictions, non-creative applications
of those discoveries) may, in theory, be beneficial and
authorized under current law.461 But in practice, additional
limits on patenting may not be needed given the likely
development pathway for SCE technologies; the likelihood that
such enactments would encounter significant political
opposition; and (most importantly) that such enactments are
not necessarily the most effective means by which governments
459. See supra Part IV.A. Note that the treatment of natural discoveries as
prior art corresponds to the historical deontological views of scientists’
normative duty to freely share their discoveries for the benefit of society, and
that such sharing simultaneously achieves utilitarian goals. See supra note
200 and accompanying text.
460. We see analogies here to the DNA sequencing equipment and
methodologies that were developed during and after the HGP by the private
sector, partially with NIH funding, to facilitate government-funded research.
This equipment and technology was subject to intense commercial
competition, leading to rapid and unpredicted advances in capabilities at
continually decreased cost. See, e.g., KEVIN DAVIES, THE $1,000 GENOME: THE
REVOLUTION IN DNA SEQUENCING AND THE NEW ERA OF PERSONALIZED
MEDICINE 8–11 (2010); Henrik Stranneheim and Joakim Lundberg, Stepping
Stones in DNA Sequencing, 7 BIOTECHNOLOGY. J. 1063, 1063 (2012); Erik
Pettersson et al., Generations of Sequencing Technologies, 93 GENOMICS 105
(2008).
461. See supra notes 220–24 and accompanying text.
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can assure widespread and low-cost access to the relevant
discoveries and applications. This is particularly true when a
government funds the development of the relevant
technologies, and thus may possess rights to use them or to
assure widespread access at reasonable costs, as discussed
below. Accordingly, we do not currently recommend the
adoption of additional legislative or administrative limits on
patenting SCE technologies.
2. Government Limitation, Use, Retention, or March-In of
Patent Rights
Assuming the continued availability of patents on SCE
technologies, some have argued for governments to limit the
exercise of such rights through compulsory licensing.462 We
believe that such proposals fail to recognize the broad range of
powers that governments may exercise in regard to
government-funded inventions. Specifically, as discussed above,
governments may already possess rights to use patented
inventions for free, to impose conditions on the exercise of such
patent rights, or to exercise march-in rights in order to ensure
that critical technologies remain available for broad use at
reasonable costs.463
Under the Bayh-Dole Act, for example, the U.S.
Government retains for any government-funded, privately
patented invention “a nonexclusive, nontransferrable,
irrevocable, paid-up license to practice or have practiced for or
on behalf of the United States any subject invention
throughout the world.”464 Such action would not require any
payments to the patent holder, and would not restrict any
rights of the patent holder (although it may reduce the
compensation that the patent holder expected to receive). As
noted above, the government also may use any patented
technology that is not subject to the governmental licensing
provision for funded inventions, although it then may be
obligated to provide reasonable compensation if successfully
sued for patent infringement.465 This would leave to the courts
the decision of how much compensation is “reasonable.”
Further, for government-funded inventions,
462. See supra note 358 and accompanying text.
463. See discussion supra Section V.A.
464. 35 U.S.C. § 202(c)(4) (2012).
465. See supra Subsection V.A.3.
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the funding agreement may provide for such additional rights;
including the right to assign or have assigned foreign patent rights
in the subject invention, as are determined by the agency as
necessary for meeting the obligations of the United States under any
treaty, international agreement, arrangement of cooperation,
memorandum of understanding, or similar arrangement.466
To the extent that SCE becomes important to meeting
commitments that the United States may make under the
UNFCCC’s Paris Agreement or other international climate
treaties, additional requirements could be added that would
assure widespread access at reasonable cost for third parties to
use the patented technologies.
Additionally, when the U.S. Government funds such
privately patented technologies, it retains the right to require
the patent holder or an exclusive licensee to grant licenses to
others on reasonable terms.467 Although the U.S. Government
has not to date used this authority to compel third-party
licensing of technologies,468 it could do so in the case of SCE
technology. Other countries have similar legal mechanisms as
well as more general compulsory licensing authorities that
could compel such access on reasonable terms.469
Finally, as SCE technologies are likely to be developed in a
monopsony government market,470 there is unlikely to be a
need for governments to “appropriate” privately funded SCE
patent rights by infringing such rights and courting
compensation suits (unless the patent holders negotiate
unreasonably). Our greatest concern with potential
governmental use of SCE patent rights or efforts to assure
third-party access to patented SCE technologies at reasonable
costs, however, arises from the potential impact that such
actions could have on researchers’ behavior. In particular,
researchers, anticipating that the state may later limit their
pecuniary rewards, may react in several ways that would
reduce research and innovation in this important area. For
example, they may reduce R&D expenditures and redirect
them toward other technology areas that are less likely to be
subject to governmental appropriation.
Alternatively, researchers may continue SCE R&D but
shift their legal strategies away from patenting and toward
466. 35 U.S.C. § 202(c)(4).
467. See supra note 341 and accompanying text
468. See supra notes 341–45 and accompanying text.
469. See supra notes 354–57 and accompanying text.
470. See discussion supra II.B.
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trade secrecy. Such a shift could have substantial negative
effects on the development of SCE technologies.471 Overall
knowledge and understanding are less likely to advance when
each organization keeps its results and discoveries secret.
Moreover, increased secrecy in SCE research is likely to reduce
levels of collaboration and cooperation, both among between
academic institutions, governmental agencies, and private
actors. Finally, the existence of trade secrets could serve to
heighten SCE’s political controversy and to hinder its effective
governance.472 All of these effects are likely to reduce
innovation and discovery in a crucial area of research.
3. Patent Pools
Some commentators, looking to the century-old example of
the Wright-Curtiss aviation patent wars and the U.S.
Government’s intervention leading to the formation of the
MAA,473 have suggested a similar approach for SCE
technologies.474 That is, the formation of a formal patent pool,
whether voluntarily or under governmental pressure or
mandate, to aggregate relevant SCE patents and make them
available to all market participants for exploitation.
Despite the initial appeal of such a framework, it is unclear
to us whether a patent pooling approach—especially if
government initiated or compelled—is appropriate or desirable
for SCE. First, the domestic political and industrial landscape
today is very different than it was at the dawn of World War I.
State efforts to compel market participants to form a patent
pool today would be subject to numerous political and legal
challenges. In particular, such a maneuver, absent some
anticompetitive conduct by patent holders or governmental
funding of the patented technology, would likely be challenged
as a governmental appropriation of property rights, and thus
be subject to compensation under the Takings Clause of the
471. See discussion supra Section IV.C.
472. A telling example occurred when BP refused to release large amounts
of environmental and other data relating to the catastrophic Deepwater
Horizon oil spill. See Amanda Mascarelli, Freedom of Spill Research
Threatened, 466 NATURE 538, 538 (2010), http://www.nature.com/news/2010
/100728/full/466538a.html; Lauren Schenkman, After Outcry, Oil Data Inches
into the Open, 329 SCIENCE 888, 888 (2010) (describing BP’s retreat from its
initial position following public criticism of its data concealment practices).
473. See supra notes 401–03 and accompanying text.
474. See Chavez, supra note 125, at 28–29.
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Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.475 Although the
outcome of such a suit would be uncertain (particularly if the
government did not require royalty free licensing), it would
again raise significant concerns about redirecting investment
and legal strategies towards trade secrecy.
Moreover, unlike the production of military aircraft to
support the national war effort (a domestic issue), the research,
development, and possible implementation of SCE technologies
is inherently international. Thus, a U.S.-only patent pool, no
matter how comprehensive, would fall short of achieving
necessary global acceptance. Yet the prospect of compelling
firms worldwide to participate in an international patent pool,
without any credible international governmental leverage,
seems a daunting task.
Of course, market participants often enter patent pooling
initiatives voluntarily, without governmental pressure or
intervention. The voluntary formation of one or more formal,
centralized patent pools among holders of SCE patents thus
seems possible. However, we do not view such a development
as necessary (and it may not even be beneficial) for SCE
research, development, and implementation.
One reason a patent pool is likely to yield limited benefits
is that, as discussed above,476 under current U.S. and European
competition and antitrust laws, patent pools may only include
patents claiming technologies that are complementary to one
another, and not technologies that are substitutes.477
Accordingly, patent pools will only be necessary if significant
patent blocking or thickets develop, and currently there are few
patents on SCE technologies.478 Another reason is that, while
pooling approaches are beneficial in markets in which many
patents cover relatively narrow technical solutions (such as
particular standards for data encoding or compression),479 they
are less beneficial when the market has not yet settled on a
475. See, e.g., United States v. Hartford-Empire Co., 323 U.S. 386, 414–15
(1945) (holding that a court-ordered mandatory royalty-free patent license
would constitute an unjustified “confiscation” of the patent holder’s property).
476. See supra notes 391–95 and accompanying text.
477. See ANTITRUST AND IPR, supra note 390, at 76–78; cf. Jorge L.
Contreras, Fixing FRAND: A Pseudo-Pool Approach to Standards-Based
Patent Licensing, 79 ANTITRUST L.J. 47, 77 n.115 (2013) [hereinafter,
Contreras, Fixing FRAND] (citing cost of $10,000 to $15,000 per patent for
essentiality evaluation in pool formation).
478. See supra Section III.A.
479. See supra note 389 and accompanying text.
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preferred technical direction or technology. Thus, in a field
such as SCE, in which no particular technical approach has
become dominant and in which many potential directions are
likely to emerge,480 the creation of one or a few patent pools
around particular, but uncertain and untested, approaches
appears to be of limited use. In other words, a patent pool could
help to generate undesirable technological lock-in. At this early
stage of research and technology development, the field will
likely benefit from the emergence of as many different and
innovative ideas as possible, rather than from the consolidation
of patent positions around one or a few early technologies.
4. Defensive Patenting and Publishing
Some SCE researchers have already begun to file patent
applications on certain SCE technologies and approaches not
with a goal of commercializing or profiting from such
protection, but in order to preclude patenting by others.481 This
“defensive” patenting approach, which is similar to that
discussed in Subsection V.B.3 above,482 can place relevant prior
art into patent office databases, thereby making it easier for
patent examiners to disallow subsequent patent claims on the
technology. Similar results may be achieved by publishing
research findings in publicly-available literature (so-called
“defensive publication”),483 though the specificity and prior art
value of publications is usually less than that of other patent
applications. The advantage of publication over patenting, of
course, are reduced cost and effort on the part of the
researcher. In both cases, subsequent patents may be allowed
over such prior art if the applicant can demonstrate sufficiently
differentiating improvements or differences over the previously
disclosed technology.484 Nevertheless, we recommend that both
of these approaches continue to be used by SCE researchers.
480. See discussion supra Part I.
481. See supra notes 435–41 and accompanying text.
482. See supra notes 435–41 and accompanying text.
483. For example, David Keith published an article for an alternate
material for stratospheric aerosol injection with the intention that this would
establish prior art. See David W. Keith, Photophoretic Levitation of Engineered
Aerosols for Geoengineering, 107 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 16428 (2010);
Interview with David Keith, Gordon McKay Professor of Applied Physics and
Professor of Pub. Policy, Harvard Univ. (Feb. 26, 2016).
484. 35 U.S.C. § 102 (2012).
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B. TOWARD A RESEARCHCOMMONS FOR SOLAR CLIMATE
ENGINEERING
Rather than focus on limiting patent rights, compelling
third-party access through compulsory licensing, developing
patent pools, or defensive publication; we propose the formation
of an SCE research commons. This would have four principal
elements: (1) a framework for sharing research data; (2) a
series of commitments or pledges by public and private
research institutions to make patent licenses available on
specific, favorable terms; (3) an internationally coordinated
effort to monitor and assess emerging patents, patent
applications, and trade secrets; and (4) clarification of
government policies regarding the exercise of retained or
march-in rights.
We believe that the early establishment of an SCE
research commons is particularly important. SCE research
today is dominated by researchers at public and traditional
institutions who are, for the large part, not filing and enforcing
patent claims and are willing to share data.485 Yet as the field
matures, some research activity will likely migrate from
publicly funded academic institutions and other traditional
research institutions to the private sector. At such time, it
would be easier to persuade corporate actors to participate in
an existing research commons that is already viewed as the
norm in the field, rather than to urge them to form one
notwithstanding their existing R&D.
1. Research Data Sharing
Current academic SCE researchers presently appear to be
willing to share research data and information arising from
their research. This prevailing attitude bodes well for future
collaboration. However, several measures can be taken at an
early stage in order to preserve this open research environment
as SCE research area increases in prominence and scope.
One such measure would be the establishment of an open
technical framework for SCE data sharing. As discussed above,
commons such as these can yield benefits beyond the
immediate sharing and dissemination of research data.486 In
particular, these mechanisms can serve to make otherwise
obscure prior art available to examining patent offices around
485. See supra notes 115–20 and accompanying text.
486. See generally supra note 119 and accompanying text.
102 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. [Vol. 18:1
the world, thereby limiting patenting activity by external
actors (e.g. PAEs) seeking to obtain and maximize monetization
of patents in potentially lucrative fields.487 Such a framework
would both offer researchers a convenient and uniform resource
for sharing their data with the broader research community,
and provide users (including researchers, policy makers, and
members of the public) an accessible and open means for
accessing SCE research data. As discussed in Subsection V.B.3
above, data sharing infrastructures have advanced research
and facilitated collaboration in fields ranging from genetics and
genomics to astronomy, earth science, and climatology.488 Such
data sharing frameworks can take many forms, and the
ultimate structure of such a framework, whether it is centrally
managed and curated or distributed, and how its various
components will interoperate, will depend on factors including
availability of funding, the degree of international regulation
on resulting data and the internal policies and practices of
participating institutions.489 However, even with limited
budgets and resources, early planning and collaboration in the
area of data sharing by the relevant research community can
achieve significant gains.490
While some research communities have developed highly
successful data sharing frameworks independently (e.g., the
BioBricks Foundation), many of the more ambitious projects in
this area have been encouraged or mandated by
government/charitable funding agencies (e.g., the public
genomics databases established during the HGP).491 Given the
inherently public and international nature of SCE research,
development, and possible implementation, we recommend that
relevant public and private funding agencies cooperate to
develop uniform data requirements for creating, maintaining,
curating, indexing, annotating, and archiving SCE research.
They should also establish minimal conditions for the sharing
of SCE research data. At this stage, it is premature to insist on
a centralized data repository for SCE research, though such
centralized structures can offer significant benefits, albeit at a
cost.
487. See supra notes 435–38 and accompanying text.
488. See supra Subsection V.B.3.
489. See Contreras & Reichman, supra note 304, at 1313.
490. Id.
491. See supra note 427.
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A logical site for the development of these standards and
policies could be the Working Group on Coupled Modeling of
the World Climate Research Programme, a UN-affiliated body
whose mission is “to foster the development and review of
coupled climate models . . . includ[ing] the organisation of
model intercomparisons projects aiming at understanding
natural climate variability on decadal to centennial time scales
and its predictability, and at predicting the response of the
climate system to changes in natural and anthropogenic
forcing.”492 We also recommend that other relevant
stakeholders, such as governments, scientific societies, private
industry, and environmentally oriented nongovernmental
organizations, be engaged in the oversight and governance of
such an SCE research data sharing regime.
2. A Solar Climate Engineering Intellectual Property Pledge
Community
The second element of our proposed SCE research
commons is an IP pledge community. In this, SCE researchers
and their institutions would commit either not to assert their
SCE patents against certain implementations, or to grant
licenses under favorable terms. They would also make other
commitments to further open and responsible SCE research.
As discussed in Subsection V.B.2 above, such commitments
or “patent pledges” have been adopted in a variety of settings
from wireless telecommunications standards bodies to open
source software communities to environmentally friendly
technologies.493 Although patent pledges are forms of private
action, they can be enforced under a variety of legal
mechanisms, such as contract law, estoppel, and
antitrust/competition law.494 They also have the benefit of
global applicability, eliminating the need for each relevant
jurisdiction to enact its own legislative or administrative
solutions. That is, a pledge can operate on the entire global
patent portfolio of the pledgor, making it inherently
international.
We propose the development of a uniform IP pledge that
possess the following minimum terms:
492. World Climate Research Programme, The Working Group on Coupled
Modeling (WCGSM): Overview, https://www.wcrp-climate.org/wgcm-overview
(last visited Feb. 22, 2016).
493. See supra Subsection V.B.2.
494. See Contreras,Market Reliance, supra note 408, at 482–84.
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1. The pledge applies to all patents held by the pledgor
that cover technologies necessary to research, develop, or
implement SCE, as well as any other patents resulting
from the pledgor’s SCE research.
2. The pledgor commits not to assert covered patents
against other pledgors in the latter’s legitimate SCE R&D
activities.
3. As an alternative to the above, pledgors may license
their patents nonexclusively to other pledgors at
reasonable royalty rates for the latter’s legitimate SCE
R&D activities.
4. The pledgor makes any future sales or transfers of the
patent conditional upon acceptance of the pledge by the
recipient.
5. The pledgor produces and makes available SCE
research data in a manner consistent with international
standards, such as those describe in Subsection VI.B.1,
above.
6. The pledgor commits to share SCE-related data with
other legitimate SCE researchers.
7. The pledgor cooperates with international efforts to
monitor and assess patents related to SCE, such as those
described in Subsection VI.B.3, below.
8. The pledgor submits results of SCE research to peer
reviewed scientific journals, preferably with open access.
9. The pledgor commits to not retain valuable technical
information regarding SCE as a trade secret.
We envision that both SCE researchers and research
institutions could adopt the pledge. The former group may do
so more quickly, given their apparent desire that IP not
interfere with SCE R&D495 and the difficulty of institutional
decision-making processes. In the longer run, a community of
research institutions that have pledged would be easier to
coordinate. The institutions should require that their SCE
495. See, e.g., supra Section III.B.
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researchers abide by the IP pledge, which would more
effectively bring junior and temporary researchers into the
pledge’s fold. Furthermore, funders and scientific publishers
could also commit to support and publish only SCE research
conducted by pledgors.
Significant institutional support will be necessary for
launching the pledge, as well as for subsequent administration.
However, public decision makers presently appear to be
reluctant to engage with SCE.496 Given the present
circumstances, non- and quasi-governmental scientific bodies
such as the Royal Society of London, the American and
European Geophysical Unions, the American Association for
the Advancement of Science, and the International Council for
Science, as well as private research funders, may be well
positioned to develop and support an IP pledge community. The
Solar Radiation Management Governance Initiative, a project
of the Royal Society, Environmental Defense Fund, and The
World Academy of Sciences, could also play a facilitative role.
There should be mechanisms to incorporate other partners,
such as public funders, other public agencies, research
institutions, scientific publishers, intergovernmental
organizations, nongovernmental organizations, and for-profit
private actors into the administrative structure. There should
also be a path toward greater legalization of an administrative
body and the pledge community, such as through the gradually
increasing involvement of national governments and
intergovernmental organizations.
The second-best option of royalties for the licensing of SCE
patents under the pledge (item 3 above) warrants elaboration.
On one hand, we are concerned about the growth of SCE
patents, particularly at the early stages of research, for a
variety of reasons discussed above in Part IV. At the same
time, a total prohibition on patent royalties might make the
pledge unattractive and reduce incentives for innovation. This
is more likely to be a concern at later developmental stages,
such as potential SCE implementation by governmental actors
that procure services in the private sector. Our
recommendation of reasonable royalties could be a first step
toward balancing these competing concerns. However, a precise
determination of reasonableness may require costly litigation.
Another possibility would be to subject the SCE patents held by
496. See discussion in supra Section V.A.
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members of the pledge community to an aggregate rate cap.497
Of course, some institution, with theinput of multiple
stakeholders, would need to determine the cap and allocate it
across the multiple patents to which it would apply. That body
could be the one described in the Subsection that immediately
follows.
3. International Patent Monitoring and Assessment
We have concerns regarding the potential accumulation
and enforcement of patents related to SCE, given the need for
widespread, expeditious research and the potential benefits of
its development and possible implementation. Our concerns are
especially acute with respect to the development of early, broad
SCE-related patent claims, or patent claims on uncreative
applications of SCE-related scientific discoveries or trivially
modified natural materials (to whatever extent they are
currently eligible under national patent laws). In order to
address potential issues that would arise from such broad or
basic patents covering key SCE technologies, methods, or
products, we urge national patent offices to be vigilant in
examining patent applications relating to SCE, particularly
given the early stage of the field and the potential scarcity of
prior art.
One important step toward this goal could be the
establishment of an international SCE patent monitoring panel
comprising members of relevant national and regional patent
offices, supplemented by academic and industry experts drawn
from both within and beyond the SCE research community.
Such a panel could monitor patent filing and assertion trends
in the area of SCE, and could make recommendations to
governmental agencies and legislatures if patenting activity
appeared to pose a threat to the responsible R&D of SCE
technologies.498
This panel could also coordinate efforts to collect and make
available relevant SCE prior art in order to aid national patent
497. This structure would resemble a patent pool, though it would avoid
some of the restrictions imposed on pools as antitrust compliance measures.
See Contreras, Fixing FRAND, supra note 477, at 75–81 (proposing “pseudo-
pool” approach to fix maximum aggregate royalty caps on patents essential to
certain technical standards).
498. Of course, membership on this panel should not be used by academic
or industrial SCE researchers to gain confidential early knowledge of their
competitors’ patent applications. Thus, care would be needed to address
potential conflict of interest issues for the members of such a panel.
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offices in examining SCE patent applications, so as to restrict
granted claims to truly novel and non-obvious inventions.
Engaging the broader SCE research community in
documenting their tacit and codified knowledge for ready use
by patent offices could also be useful.499 As a counterpart, the
panel could request the input of SCE researchers to help review
published patent applications in the SCE field, much as the
software community was invited to inspect and offer relevant
prior art in response to software-based inventions in the U.S.
“peer to patent” pilot program.500
Finally, to the extent that data sharing is required as part
of the SCE research commons, the proposed panel could also
serve to monitor data sharing and use compliance and to
adjudicate disputes regarding data sharing violations.501
4. Clarifying the Government Role in Using and Assuring
Access to Patented Technologies
If, notwithstanding the implementation of proposals such
as those described above, problems develop with regard to SCE
data sharing or access to patent rights, government efforts to
exercise powers to compel greater sharing or access may come
into play. This is also important to assure the public that no
private actor will retain exclusive rights to reduce climate
change and its risks through SCE. Accordingly, the final
element of our proposal is for interested governments to
convene multi-stakeholder meetings to begin to detail and
publish the criteria under which they would exercise such
governmental use, march-in, compulsory licensing, and other
powers. A particular possibility is a set of “best practices” for
when and how governments might exercise (1) their funding
powers to compel greater sharing of data; (2) their existing
rights or powers to use government-funded or privately funded
patented technologies themselves (or through contractors) with
or without compensation to rights holders; and (3) their
authority to impose additional restrictions on government-
499. Such approaches have been used with varying degrees in, for example,
the area of computer software.
500. Peer to Patent, N.Y. L. SCH., http://www.peertopatent.org (last visited
Nov. 10, 2016).
501. NIH has adopted a similar policing and enforcement role with respect
to genomic data that is required to be shared by researchers, though critics
have questioned the effectiveness of the agency’s efforts in this respect. See
Contreras, Leviathan in the Commons, supra note 310, at 17.
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funded patent rights or to march in to correct problems with
access to or costs of using the patented technologies for
research, development, or implementation.502 Because patent
holders will likely seek rights in multiple jurisdictions, and
because SCE technologies may have only limited private uses,
such coordination of government approaches will be critical.
Further, specifying in advance the criteria for the exercise of
such powers may reduce uncertainties for private researchers
and investors and actually expand efforts and funding directed
towards this important technological field. As one of the
authors has previously noted, funding recipients then should
understand the conditions on which clarified march-in rights
would be exercised
and thus should (or could) either have avoided accepting the terms of
the deal or have avoided creating the triggering conditions. For this
reason, the exercise of march-in rights should not generate concerns
similar to regulatory takings of constitutionally protected property,
as there would be no ‘reasonable, investment-backed expectation’
that the government would not engage in such action.503
C. ADDITIONAL POLICY PROPOSALS
This article’s proposal focused on a research commons for
SCE consisting of data sharing, patent pledging, patent
monitoring, and governmental coordination. These proposals
could likely occur without the need for national legislation.504
Below, we also recommend that scholars and policy makers
consider two other potential courses of action related to IP
policy. Because these would likely require some changes to
national legislation (or at least significant changes to current
judicial and administrative approaches), and given potential
political obstacles to achieving them, we offer these proposals
separately from the research commons identified above.
First, although we do not advocate the wholesale exclusion
of SCE technologies from patent eligibility, we support the
strengthening and broadening of exemptions from patent
infringement for scientific research, technical interoperability,
and reverse-engineering.505 Though some countries such as
502. See, e.g., Sarnoff, supra note 342, at 349–56 (recommending creation
of retained rights to assure research and humanitarian uses, presumptions of
non-exclusive licensing, and clarification of march-in criteria).
503. Id. at 356.
504. See supra Subsection VI.A.1.
505. See Sarnoff, The Patent System and Climate Change, supra note 342,
at 344–48.
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Belgium and the United Kingdom recognize a broad exemption
from patent infringement for scientific research using patented
inventions, even when commercially motivated,506 the 2002
appellate court decision in Madey v. Duke University severely
eroded this doctrine in the United States.507 Accordingly, except
for a small number of exceptions,508 basic scientific research
carried out at academic laboratories in the United States can
infringe patents. Given the pressing need for global research
and coordination in the field of SCE, we recommend that a
more robust research exemption be recognized either judicially
or legislatively in the United States and other countries that do
not currently recognize such an exemption.
Second, although patents are used as a means to
incentivize investment in research and technological
development, the public good nature of SCE technologies
suggests that the financial incentives for private action are
likely to be significantly lower than social returns to public
welfare from SCE inventions.509 This would especially be the
506. See, e.g., Belgian Patent Act, art. 28, § 1(b) (enacted Apr. 25, 2005),
http://www.ejustice.just.fgov.be/cgi/summary.pl; Geertrui Van Overwalle, The
Implementation of the Biotechnology Directive in Belgium and its After-Effects.
The Introduction of a New Research Exemption and a Compulsory Licence for
Public Health, 37 INT’L REV. INTELL. PROP. & COMPETITION L. 889, 906–08
(2006); see generally Judith L. Curry & Bruce E. O’Connor, University
Research: A New Defense Under the Patent Law, 12 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 29
(2004) (stating that broad patent law exceptions for academic institutions,
such as the experimental use exception and the research exemption, regarding
innovative developments are starting to be called into question by courts).
507. See Madey v. Duke Univ., 307 F.3d 1351, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2002)
(holding that research activities at Duke University could infringe a former
researcher’s patent given the potentially commercial nature of Duke’s
research enterprise, its need to raise funds through tuition and government
grants, and the like); see also Amy Yancey & C. Neal Stewart, Jr., Are
University Researchers at Risk for Patent Infringement? 25 NATURE
BIOTECHNOLOGY 1225 (2007).
508. Two types of research are generally exempt from patent infringement
in the United States. First, experimentation conducted in furtherance of
regulatory submissions for drugs and veterinary products is exempt from
patent infringement. 35 U.S.C. § 271(e) (2012). Second, because state
governments may not be sued in U.S. federal courts, research activities
conducted by state universities are generally believed to be immune from
claims for patent infringement damages (which are purely federal claims),
although injunctive relief may potentially be obtained. See Fla. Prepaid
Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627 (1999).
509. See generally Mark A. Lemley & Brett Frischmann, Spillovers, 107
COLUM. L. REV. 257 (2006) (arguing that patented technology can provide
more social welfare for the public, by a significant factor, than is gained in the
private sphere by protecting patents).
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case with the widespread adoption of an IP pledge that limits
royalties. It is consequently possible that alternative
mechanisms such as prizes and tax incentives could also be
leveraged to help achieve such competition and technological
advancement in this area.510 We therefore urge policymakers to
explore such avenues of promoting SCE R&D. Further, if
governments make a clearer commitment to procuring such
technologies if they prove safe, effective, cost-effective, and
politically acceptable, that commitment will likely attract
substantially more private capital to this field much more
quickly. And for global climate change, time is of the essence.
VII. CONCLUSION
SCE appears to offer substantial potential for averting the
most dire consequences of global climate change. While the
emerging SCE research community has not yet experienced
significant disruption due to IP aggregation or litigation, the
potential for such effects exists,511 particularly if the actual use
of SCE technologies becomes more likely. The current, early
state of R&D of SCE as well as the present absence of IP claims
provide a unique opportunity to create norms and institutions
to help assure that the R&D of these important—but risky and
controversial—technologies proceed in a manner that supports
the common good. We therefore encourage other scholars and
policy makers to take up the call to consider, refine, and
generate a research commons in SCE at the earliest possible
opportunity, before substantial problems arise that could now
be avoided.
510. See supra notes 342–45 and accompanying text; see also Davies, supra
note 256.
511. See Schofield, supra note 294, at 592.
